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{\title What allows for the trade-offs necessary to constitutional values to operate is the long term perspective introduced by politi}{\author Miguel Poiares Maduro}{\operator IS Manager}{\creatim\yr2004\mo8\dy16\hr7\min31}
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\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid16482152  and the New Forms of Power
\par }{\fs32\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid16482152\charrsid16482152 Comparative Institutional Analysis as a Constitutional Theory of Power }{\fs32\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15741338\charrsid16482152 for Global Governance}{
\fs32\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid1708391\charrsid16482152 
\par }\pard\plain \qc \li0\ri0\sb60\sa60\sl360\slmult1\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid5833351 \fs24\lang2070\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp2070\langfenp1033 {\b\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid6908545\charrsid15741338 

\par }{\b\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid5833351\charrsid15741338 Miguel Poiares Maduro
\par }{\b\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid6908545\charrsid16482152 
\par }{\b\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid6908545\charrsid15741338 (Very rough draft, written as }{\b\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3567660\charrsid15741338 work in process}{
\b\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid6908545\charrsid15741338 ; most citations and footnotes omitted at this point)
\par }{\b\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid5833351\charrsid15741338 
\par }\pard \qj \li0\ri0\sb60\sa60\sl360\slmult1\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid3937939 {\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid13131359\charrsid15741338 
Processes of global governance, I will argue, change the forms and locus of power. }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid4209180\charrsid15741338 They }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid13131359\charrsid15741338 also }{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid4209180\charrsid15741338 challenge the conditions of national constitutionalism and with it they require a rethinking of constitutionalism itself. Such rethinking must depart from tw
o practical questions: what are the consequences of global governance for }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid13131359\charrsid15741338 national constitutionalism? c}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid4209180\charrsid15741338 
an global governance be moulded by a form of global constitutionalism? These two questions embody tremendous normative challenges, requiring us to revisi
t the basic ideals of constitutionalism and to discuss its different possible forms: what are the normative ideals of constitutionalism? Can they be pursued outside the conditions secured by national constitutionalism? If they can, what are the requiremen
ts to be secured by global constitutionalism? And what ought to regulate the relationship between such form of constitutionalism and national constitutionalism?}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid6908545\charrsid15741338 
\par }\pard \qj \li0\ri0\sb60\sa60\sl360\slmult1\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid2048226 {\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid16482152 
In this context, comparative institutional analysis is essential to understand and address the v
ariety of institutional forums involved on the debate on global governance.  Comparative institutional analysis is the inherent methodology of constitutionalism as the form of power. Constitutionalism is about controlling and allocating power among a vari
e
ty of institutional alternatives in the pursuit of the ideals of freedom and full participation and representation. As I will argue below, those institutional alternatives and the constant balances between them are a consequence of the paradoxical nature 
o
f constitutionalism which only a comparative institutional analysis can fully embrace.  At the same time, the challenges of global governance are also particularly useful for developing comparative institutional analysis. First, they require us to address
 
the relationship between institutional and jurisdictional choice (should comparative institutional analysis also include polity choice?). Second, they require us to have a deeper analysis of the normative content of comparative institutional analysis (do,
 for example, the ideals of participation and representation stop at national borders?)
\par }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid4522260\charrsid15741338 I}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15730521\charrsid15741338 n this paper I}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid4522260\charrsid15741338 
 will argue that constitutionalism is required as the form of power in global governance. But I will also recognise that national political communities still provide the best proxy for constitutionalism.  }{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15730521\charrsid15741338 
This apparent conundrum is solved by distinguishing constitutions (constitutionalism in the context of political communities) from constitutionalism (as a theory of power or social decision making). How su
ch constitutionalism can have a global form and how is it to be related to constitutions will be linked to a constitutional approach based on comparative institutional analysis and a vision of constitutionalism as a set of paradoxes involving two balances
:
 a procedural balance between inclusion and intensity of participation and a substantive balance between individual autonomy and civic solidarity. These balances are, in turn, instrumental to the constitutional ideals of freedom and full participation and
 representation. }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid9448170\charrsid15741338 The character of the constitutionalism argued for in here has, as a consequence, that }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid6908545\charrsid15741338 no }{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid9448170\charrsid15741338 single constitutional model}{\cs19\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\super\langnp2057\insrsid16482152 \chftn {\footnote \pard\plain \s18\qj \li0\ri0\sb60\sa60\sl360\slmult1
\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0 \fs20\lang2070\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp2070\langfenp1033 {\cs19\super\insrsid5123278 \chftn }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid5123278\charrsid16482152  }{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid5123278 Which is in reality a broader expression of the idea of single institutionalism coined by Neil Komesar to also embrace different forms of institutional malfunction within the same institution.}}}{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid9448170\charrsid15741338  }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid8350735\charrsid15741338 is}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid9448170\charrsid15741338 
 adopted and no across the board solution is put forward. Instead, this paper argues, what we can identify is a series of constitutional choices and what we can provide is a set of constitutional criteria. But even the latter, it is argued, do }{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid8350735\charrsid15741338 not provide us with undisputable or easy answers. That is so because the ideals of constitutionalism embody, in themselves, permanen
t paradoxes and tensions that never provide a final answer but simply a context for legitimating that answer. What we can try is to place global governance at the core of such paradoxes and tensions. It is in that way that we can transform it into a tool,
 and not an obstacle, of constitutionalism.}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15730521\charrsid15741338 
\par I start by reviewing the impact of global governance on the form and locus of power. }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid16482152 This will allow me to highlight the dissemination of power through a variety of institutional alternatives. }{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15730521\charrsid15741338 In section 2, I explain how such processes challenge national constitutionalism.}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid2048226\charrsid15741338  }{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15730521\charrsid15741338 I then discuss the relation between constitutionalism and national constitutionalism}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15741338\charrsid15741338 
: in section 3, I argue that national constitutionalism is simply a contextual representation of constitutionalism; in section 4, I argue that national constitutionalism is however the best proxy for constitutionalism we have so }{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid16482152 in the light of a particular long term institutional analysis}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15741338\charrsid15741338 
. Section 5 is devoted to an analysis of different current constitutional perspectives on global governance (pro and against global constitutionalism). I will point to the limits of these approaches by referring to their single }{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid16482152 institutional}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15741338\charrsid15741338  character}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid16482152 .}{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15741338\charrsid15741338  The final section discusses what an alternative approach may look like.}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid2048226\charrsid15741338 
\par }\pard\plain \s2\qj \li0\ri0\sb240\sa60\sl360\slmult1\keepn\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\outlinelevel1\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid8539488 \b\i\f1\fs28\lang2070\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp2070\langfenp1033 {
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid8539488\charrsid15741338 Global Governance and }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid14554544\charrsid15741338 the Form and Locus of }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid8539488\charrsid15741338 
Power
\par }\pard\plain \qj \li0\ri0\sb60\sa60\sl360\slmult1\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid3937939 \fs24\lang2070\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp2070\langfenp1033 {\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid8539488\charrsid15741338 
In 1993 the }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid9719082\charrsid15741338 Spanish constitutional scholar}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid8539488\charrsid15741338  }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid9719082\charrsid15741338 
Francisco }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid8539488\charrsid15741338 Rubio Llorente published a remarkable book called }{\i\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid8539488\charrsid15741338 La Form}{
\i\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid9719082\charrsid15741338 a}{\i\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid8539488\charrsid15741338  del Poder}{\cs19\i\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\super\langnp2057\insrsid9719082\charrsid15741338 \chftn {\footnote 
\pard\plain \s18\qj \li0\ri0\sb60\sa60\sl360\slmult1\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0 \fs20\lang2070\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp2070\langfenp1033 {\cs19\super\insrsid5123278 \chftn }{
\lang3082\langfe1033\langnp3082\insrsid5123278\charrsid9719082  }{\lang3082\langfe1033\langnp3082\insrsid5123278\charrsid9719082 Rubio Llorente, Francisco, La Forma del Poder, Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, Madrid, 1993}{
\lang3082\langfe1033\langnp3082\insrsid5123278 .}}}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid8539488\charrsid15741338  (The Form of Power). }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid9719082\charrsid15741338 
For Rubio Llorente, the Constitution is the form of power. In here, I will depart from a similar perception of constitutionalism as a set of }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid14620321\charrsid15741338 processes}{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid9719082\charrsid15741338  and rules that allocate, discipline and govern power in such a way as to maximise the constitutional ideals of }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid14761451\charrsid15741338 
freedom and }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid9719082\charrsid15741338 full participation and representation.}{\cs19\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\super\langnp2057\insrsid9719082\charrsid15741338 \chftn {\footnote \pard\plain 
\s18\qj \li0\ri0\sb60\sa60\sl360\slmult1\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0 \fs20\lang2070\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp2070\langfenp1033 {\cs19\super\insrsid5123278 \chftn }{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid5123278\charrsid9719082  }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid5123278 I explain in more detail somewhere else this point of departure and its underlying assumptions. See mine \'85 cite As Good As It Gets\'85 }}}{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid16482152  These ideals underlie my approach to comparative institutional analysis.}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid9719082\charrsid15741338 
 It does not follow from this perspective that wherever there is power there must be a Constitution. It does however require any exercise of power to be traced back and ultimately legitimised by r
eference to some constitutional authority. Moreover, this entails that any independent power must be the subject of constitutionalism. It further requires that any }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid14620321\charrsid15741338 conflict}{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid9719082\charrsid15741338  between different constitutional authorities must itself }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid14620321\charrsid15741338 be regulated by constitutionalism. 
\par Traditionally, the form of power has been }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid14554544\charrsid15741338 the Constitution of the Nation State}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid14620321\charrsid15741338 . }{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid14554544\charrsid15741338 The States}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid14620321\charrsid15741338 
 were the holders of the ultimate authority and of a monopoly over power (encapsulated in the traditional conception of sovereignty); others could exercise such power but either in the form of a delegation or authorisation from the State }{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11809694 (}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid14620321\charrsid15741338 regulated}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11809694 , in turn,}{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid14620321\charrsid15741338  by its Constitution}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11809694 )}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid14620321\charrsid15741338 
. Constitution and power coincided in the same }{\i\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid14620321\charrsid15741338 locus}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid14620321\charrsid15741338 : the State. }{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid1528525\charrsid15741338 The idea of global governance reflects a perception of change in the locus and form of power. There is a transfer of power to global sites of varying degree}{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid8539488\charrsid15741338 s}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid1528525\charrsid15741338  of institutionalisation. And there is a}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid8539488\charrsid15741338 lso a}
{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid1528525\charrsid15741338  substantial change in the mechanisms that determine the exercise of such power. Both the allocation of authority and }{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3224344\charrsid15741338 the }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid8539488\charrsid15741338 forms}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3224344\charrsid15741338  of }{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid1528525\charrsid15741338 participation and representation }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3224344\charrsid15741338 are impacted by those changes. }{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15074696\charrsid15741338 In some instances such power can no longer be traced back and legitimated through the State}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11809694  Constitution}{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15074696\charrsid15741338 , in other instances such power alters the national constitutional form of power.}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid1528525\charrsid15741338 
\par }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15074696\charrsid15741338 In this way, t}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15079220\charrsid15741338 he idea of global governance can be seen as including a variety of different phenomen}{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15074696\charrsid15741338 a that have, as their}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15079220\charrsid15741338  common element,}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15074696\charrsid15741338 
 a change in the locus and form}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15079220\charrsid15741338  of power. We }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15074696\charrsid15741338 can }{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15079220\charrsid15741338 easily identify some of these phenomena in various current international trends}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid12662293\charrsid15741338  of which one can }{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15074696\charrsid15741338 give some example}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid12662293\charrsid15741338 s}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15079220\charrsid15741338 : }{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid12662293\charrsid15741338 J}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15079220\charrsid15741338 udicialisation}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11809694  refering }{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid12662293\charrsid15741338 to }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15079220\charrsid15741338 the growth }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid12662293\charrsid15741338 in}{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15079220\charrsid15741338  third party dispute resolution in international law }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid12662293\charrsid15741338 (}{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15079220\charrsid15741338 of which the WTO is the strongest example}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid12662293\charrsid15741338 ), }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15079220\charrsid15741338 
the international courts of }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid12662293\charrsid15741338 humanitarian law,}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15079220\charrsid15741338  and the role of courts in regional }{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid12662293\charrsid15741338 integration regimes; }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11809694 The}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15079220\charrsid15741338  }{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11809694 s}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15079220\charrsid15741338 upra-nationalisation of policy-making}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11809694  that}{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid12662293\charrsid15741338  takes place, in various degrees,}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15079220\charrsid15741338  }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11809694 mainly }{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15079220\charrsid15741338 in the context of regional regimes of integration (such }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid12662293\charrsid15741338 as the EU, NAFTA, MERCOSUL etc.}{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15079220\charrsid15741338 ); }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid12662293\charrsid15741338 S}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15079220\charrsid15741338 
tandardisation and its associated technocratic international bodies }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid12662293\charrsid15741338 and agencies;}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid7220748\charrsid15741338  }{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid12662293\charrsid15741338 T}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid7220748\charrsid15741338 ransnational political action}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11809694 ,}{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid7220748\charrsid15741338  expressed in the increased networks that cut across national States and create political and power links between both private actors (with increased transnational coalitions promoted, i
n a more or less institutionalised form, by such things as the internet or ONGs forums) and public actors (such as is the case with networks of  members of the national administrations or judges)}{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15079220\charrsid15741338 ;}{\cs19\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\super\langnp2057\insrsid11809694 \chftn {\footnote \pard\plain \s18\qj \li0\ri0\sb60\sa60\sl360\slmult1
\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0 \fs20\lang2070\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp2070\langfenp1033 {\cs19\super\insrsid5123278 \chftn }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid5123278\charrsid11809694  }{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid5123278 cite Slaughter}}}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15079220\charrsid15741338  }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11809694 \'93}{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid12662293\charrsid15741338 P}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid7220748\charrsid15741338 rivatisation}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11809694 \'94}{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid7220748\charrsid15741338  of international law through the increased
 role of private actors both on its litigation (either directly, by being given a right of access to international courts, or indirectly, by influencing the judicial actions brought by States) and its law-making activities; }{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid12662293\charrsid15741338 E}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid7220748\charrsid15741338 conomic liberalisation and the 
increased role it allocates to the global market in shaping the regulation of economic activity.}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15160889\charrsid15741338 
\par }\pard \qj \li0\ri0\sb60\sa60\sl360\slmult1\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid15150109 {\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid12662293\charrsid15741338 As it may already have become clear, g}{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15150109\charrsid15741338 lobal governance will not be taken to }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid12662293\charrsid15741338 include}{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15150109\charrsid15741338 , in here, only centralised forms of decision making but, instead, any form of social decision making that takes place at the transnational level}{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid6095354\charrsid15741338  expressing a use of power that can no longer be legitimised by reference to the Constitutions of the States}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15150109\charrsid15741338 . }{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15153488\charrsid15741338 Rules, dispute resolution and political deliberation may be the \'93stars\'94 of global governance but the processes of power transfer are broader. }{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15150109\charrsid15741338 There are}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15153488\charrsid15741338  less formalised and even}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15150109\charrsid15741338 
 atomistic forms of decision making at the global level that have, in effect, taken over some of State\rquote s governmental functions. These processes (such as the market) }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15153488\charrsid15741338 
have embedded certain mechanisms of repr}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid6095354\charrsid15741338 esentation and participation that}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15153488\charrsid15741338  produce social decisions}{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid6095354\charrsid15741338 , requiring them to be}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15150109\charrsid15741338  subject to constitutional analysis.}{
\cs19\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\super\langnp2057\insrsid15150109\charrsid15741338 \chftn {\footnote \pard\plain \s18\qj \li0\ri0\sb60\sa60\sl360\slmult1\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0 
\fs20\lang2070\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp2070\langfenp1033 {\cs19\super\insrsid5123278 \chftn }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid5123278\charrsid15150109 
 In reality, much of the economic analysis of the market is, effect, constitutional analysis: issues }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid5123278 such }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid5123278\charrsid15150109 as externalities}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid5123278 
 or information and transaction costs are simply economic jargon for problems of participation in the market and, as I will discuss below, this is both the core of constitutionalism and the currency for the transdisciplinary discours
e that is required by the current global processes.}}}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15150109\charrsid15741338  }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid16482152 
In other words, these processes embody different institutional alternatives to address the growing problems which have extra-territorial effects and escape the control of the States or their regulatory competence and legitimacy.
\par  }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid6095354\charrsid15741338 In the following examples I will highlight these changes in the }{\i\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid6095354\charrsid15741338 locus}{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid6095354\charrsid15741338  and form of power raised by the processes of global governance.}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid16482152 
 In the process, some of the emerging institutional alternatives and their constitutional consequences will be highlighted.}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15150109\charrsid15741338 
\par }\pard \qj \li540\ri0\sb60\sa60\sl360\slmult1\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin540\itap0\pararsid3567660 {\b\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid6298279\charrsid15741338 International Organisations and Power Changes}{
\b\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid1796728\charrsid15741338  
\par }{\f36\lang1033\langfe1033\langnp1033\insrsid1796728\charrsid15741338 Traditionally, international organizations }{\f36\lang1033\langfe1033\langnp1033\insrsid6095354\charrsid15741338 were not}{
\f36\lang1033\langfe1033\langnp1033\insrsid1796728\charrsid15741338  conceived as affecting the conditions for the domestic political definition of policy-making. }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid1796728\charrsid15741338 
International organizations were mainly set up to reduce information and transaction costs and to provide the necessary framework for viable cooperation among States since this 
would be difficult to achieve without the institutionalised processes provided for by those international organizations. The application of this classical conception of international organizations }{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid6095354\charrsid15741338 has, however, become increasingly}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid1796728\charrsid15741338  highly problematic}{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid6095354\charrsid15741338 . Regional integration systems }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid16482152 such as the European Union }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid6095354\charrsid15741338 
are the most obvious example. But that is also the case with international }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid1796728\charrsid15741338 organisations such as the WTO or}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid6095354\charrsid15741338  }{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid1796728\charrsid15741338 the ILO}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid6095354\charrsid15741338  for example.}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid1796728\charrsid15741338  }{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid6095354\charrsid15741338 In the case of the WTO, its}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid1796728\charrsid15741338  legal norms and }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid6095354\charrsid15741338 
judicial power}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid1796728\charrsid15741338  }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid6095354\charrsid15741338 end up attributing to it }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid1796728\charrsid15741338 
independent normative authority. }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid6298279\charrsid15741338 That is the case even at the political level. }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid1796728\charrsid15741338 
Once international organizations are perceived by the different social actors as emerging forms of independent power, they will attempt to profit from these organization
s to pursue their different agendas. As a result, international organizations will tend to develop political and social goals that may diverge from those of its initial masters (the States). There is a circular dynamic between the spill-over of the power 
initially attributed to the WTO, which raises the interest of social actors for political action in this institution, and the reinforcement of the institution\rquote 
s power precisely by virtue of the political dynamic promoted by the action of those social actors
. This cycling dynamic promotes the overall power of the WTO and its role as a global political arena. In the process, the control of social decision-making by traditional }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid6298279\charrsid15741338 national }{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid1796728\charrsid15741338 political processes decreases. }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid6298279\charrsid15741338 
\par }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid1796728\charrsid15741338 The WTO and the ILO are }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11809694 good}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid1796728\charrsid15741338  best examples 
of international institutions }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid6298279\charrsid15741338 that}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid1796728\charrsid15741338 , more than simply coordinating }{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid6298279\charrsid15741338 the policies of different }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid1796728\charrsid15741338 States}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid6298279\charrsid15741338 , }{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid1796728\charrsid15741338 promote independent political and social goals which are determined by a constituency of social actors which goes beyond the States and participates in mann
ers different from those occurring in domestic political processes. The consequence, of constitutional and social relevance is that the actors that }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid6298279\charrsid15741338 participate and dominate in these}{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid1796728\charrsid15741338  emerging political arena}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid6298279\charrsid15741338 s}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid1796728\charrsid15741338 
 are not necessarily the same that have participated in the drafting of public policies at the }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid6298279\charrsid15741338 national }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid1796728\charrsid15741338 
level. Some actors are disempowered }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid6298279\charrsid15741338 while others are empowered }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid1796728\charrsid15741338 
and it is this that explains the scepticism with which some social groups see international trade and globa}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid6298279\charrsid15741338 lization: the constitutional ba
lances of representation and participation established by national constitutions are altered.}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid1796728\charrsid15741338  At the same time, the}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid6298279\charrsid15741338 
se}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid1796728\charrsid15741338  new centres of decision-making }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid6298279\charrsid15741338 assume }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid1796728\charrsid15741338 
certain functions of governance that have traditionally been subject to the democrat}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11809694 ic standards of the State. This}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid1796728\charrsid15741338 
 raises claims of a democratic deficit.}{\cs19\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\super\langnp2057\insrsid6298279\charrsid15741338 \chftn {\footnote \pard\plain \s18\qj \li0\ri0\sb60\sa60\sl360\slmult1\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0 
\fs20\lang2070\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp2070\langfenp1033 {\cs19\super\insrsid5123278 \chftn }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid5123278\charrsid6298279  }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid5123278 Weiler?}}}{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid1796728\charrsid15741338   
\par }{\b\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid1796728\charrsid15741338 The Transfer of Power to the Market
\par }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid1796728\charrsid15741338 One of the consequences of the legal and economic processes of regulatory competition arising from international trade is a reduction in the political control ove
r the economic sphere. Liberalisation of trade generates competition among }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid6298279\charrsid15741338 the }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid1796728\charrsid15741338 
products and services of different polities which, in turns, leads to a competition between the different regulatory frameworks to which those products and services are subject}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid6298279\charrsid15741338  therein}
{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid1796728\charrsid15741338 
. Political communities have to determine their policies not only on the basis of their internal preferences but also taking into account the need for their products and services to be competitive in the global market.}{
\cs19\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\super\langnp2057\insrsid6298279\charrsid15741338 \chftn {\footnote \pard\plain \s18\qj \li0\ri0\sb60\sa60\sl360\slmult1\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0 
\fs20\lang2070\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp2070\langfenp1033 {\cs19\super\insrsid5123278 \chftn }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid5123278\charrsid6298279  }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid5123278 
That is so even if the degree of such economic global competition is exaggerated. Introduce Krugman and discuss}}}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid1796728\charrsid15741338  The consequence is a transfer
 of power from political processes to the global market. It is the \'93market\'94}{\cs19\f36\super\insrsid1796728\charrsid15741338 \chftn {\footnote \pard\plain \s18\qj \li0\ri0\sb60\sa60\sl360\slmult1
\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid1796728 \fs20\lang2070\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp2070\langfenp1033 {\cs19\super\insrsid5123278 \chftn }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid5123278\charrsid1796728 
 This is a broader market than the simple market of business transactions: it includes, for example, the mobility of market participants (companies, consumers, workers) as a form of influencing decisions.}}}{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid1796728\charrsid15741338  that will choose between competing regulatory policies. Again, it becomes crucial to assess the \'93constitutional quality\'94 of representation and participation in }{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid6298279\charrsid15741338 such a}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid1796728\charrsid15741338  market and to assess the consequences of such changes.}{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15153488\charrsid15741338 
\par }{\b\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid1796728\charrsid15741338 Technocratic Forms of Global Regulation
\par }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid1796728\charrsid15741338 A similar }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid5863824\charrsid15741338 change in power occurs when}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid1796728\charrsid15741338 
, instead of trusting the regulation of international trade to the market, we decide to subject it to international standards set by internationa}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid5863824\charrsid15741338 l technocratic bodies. Both }{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid1796728\charrsid15741338 markets and these technocratic bodies have an inherent rationality and a set of normative values which is not subject to a traditional form of political discourse}{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid5863824\charrsid15741338  and its patterns of participation and representation.}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid1796728\charrsid15741338  }{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid5863824\charrsid15741338 T}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid1796728\charrsid15741338 o p}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid5863824\charrsid15741338 
ut it differently, these institutions decide}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid1796728\charrsid15741338 
 on the basis of a community of participation and representation that is different from that of political processes. Once again, the democratic }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid5863824\charrsid15741338 and constitutional }{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid1796728\charrsid15741338 question arises.}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11089961\charrsid15741338 
\par }{\b\f36\lang1033\langfe1033\langnp1033\insrsid5863824\charrsid15741338 Changing the Domestic Patterns of Representation and Participation in Public Policies
\par }{\f36\lang1033\langfe1033\langnp1033\insrsid5863824\charrsid15741338 There are many instances}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid5863824\charrsid15741338  where we can continue to link the determination of }{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11809694 specific}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid5863824\charrsid15741338  policies at the global level to an agreement among the more traditional participants in the international community
 (States). However, the simple fact that the State\rquote s decisions will be decided in the framework of a different State policy sphere means that representation and participation in the drafting of those policies will change. }{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid16482152 As a consequence, the domestic institutional framework changes. }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid5863824\charrsid15741338 
The coordination of domestic policies at the international level means that many of the State determinations of those policies are, at least in part, brought into the realm of foreign or commercial policy. Once we accept that 
States do not have an homogeneous national interest and that there are different mechanisms and forms of participation involved in different areas of domestic policy-making, one of the consequences of the increased number of policies that are }{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid1456153\charrsid15741338 \'93appropriated\'94 by}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid5863824\charrsid15741338 
 foreign and commercial policies is that the relevant participants in the framing of those policies change. }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid1456153\charrsid15741338 
The most obvious example of this is the empowerment of executives at the expense of parliaments}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid13830955\charrsid15741338  that occurs as a consequence of these processes}{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid1456153\charrsid15741338 .  
\par In addition}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid5863824\charrsid15741338 , }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid1456153\charrsid15741338 the international and regional arenas have increasingly become an instrument }{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11809694 for certain domestic actors }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid1456153\charrsid15741338 to challeng}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11809694 e}{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid1456153\charrsid15741338  the }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11809694 deliberations }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid1456153\charrsid15741338 of national political processes in}{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid5863824\charrsid15741338  the definition of the social good. }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11809694 T}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid5863824\charrsid15741338 he emerging }{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid1456153\charrsid15741338 global }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid5863824\charrsid15741338 decision-making processes can be used by }{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid1456153\charrsid15741338 different social actors to}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid5863824\charrsid15741338  }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid1456153\charrsid15741338 
challenge a particular domestic political outcome that they did not favour. In some cases, this promotes the re-deliberation of democratically agreed national policies. In other cases, it may even }{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid5863824\charrsid15741338 be said to offer to some citizens the option of exit with regard to the decisions of their political community}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid1456153\charrsid15741338 . That}
{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid5863824\charrsid15741338  challenges tha}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid1456153\charrsid15741338 t political community balance}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid5863824\charrsid15741338 
 of representation and participation.}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15160889\charrsid15741338 
\par }\pard \qj \li0\ri0\sb60\sa60\sl360\slmult1\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid8539488 {\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid1456153\charrsid15741338 All these changes, allocate the exercise of power to different 
institutional alternatives from those that are traditionally entrusted with such power by national constitutionalism. With it, they change the patterns of representation and participation defined by national constitutionalism and it is this that explains 
the tremendous suspicion with which such processes are seen by some social groups (particularly, those that see themselves disempowered by such processes). }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid6298279\charrsid15741338 
The question that arises, therefore, is whether demands for constitutional legitimacy should only follow institutionalised political arrangements }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid1456153\charrsid15741338 that coincide with the States }{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid6298279\charrsid15741338 or if they should follow power in general.}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11809694  When States cannot constitutionally control global governance what ought to?}{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid6298279\charrsid15741338 
\par }\pard\plain \s2\qj \li0\ri0\sb240\sa60\sl360\slmult1\keepn\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\outlinelevel1\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid2690260 \b\i\f1\fs28\lang2070\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp2070\langfenp1033 {
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid1708391\charrsid15741338 The Challenge to National Constitutionalism}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid2690260\charrsid15741338 
\par }\pard\plain \qj \li0\ri0\sb60\sa60\sl360\slmult1\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid6298279 \fs24\lang2070\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp2070\langfenp1033 {\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid13830955\charrsid15741338 
From what has been said so far, it has already become clear that the constitutional claim over global governance arises from two sources: first, there is an increased number of global \'93sites\'94
 of independent power that require a form of constitutional governance; second, there is a challenge to national constitutionalism that, itself, requires constitutional analysis. National constitutions as the form of power guaranteed the constitutional }{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15930160\charrsid15741338 self-determination of their respective political communities. That was grounded in th
ree pillars: the definition of the ultimate authority; self-government; and democratic autonomy. All these pillars are affected by the processes of global governance. }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid6298279\charrsid15741338 
\par }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid2102926\charrsid15741338 The }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11809694 first pillar is that of the }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid2102926\charrsid15741338 
Constitution as the ultimate criteria o validity of a legal system and, therefore, as the }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11809694 criterion}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid2102926\charrsid15741338 
 of ultimate authority. The Constitution was the utmost expression of sovereignty as the ultimate source of power in the political and legal organisation of society. Even the claim of authority that has always bee
n made by international rules under international monist theories of international law supremacy was not conceived as challenging the fundamentals of national constitutional sovereignty since that supremacy was traditionally legitimised through reference 
to a previous self-binding commitment of the States supported by }{\i\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid2102926\charrsid15741338 pacta sunt servanda}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid2102926\charrsid15741338 .}{
\cs19\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\super\langnp2057\insrsid2102926\charrsid15741338 \chftn {\footnote \pard\plain \s18\qj \li0\ri0\sb60\sa60\sl360\slmult1\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0 
\fs20\lang2070\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp2070\langfenp1033 {\cs19\super\insrsid5123278 \chftn }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid5123278\charrsid2102926  }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid5123278 
It can be said that such principle even if creating an higher norm than national constitutional norms was mainly an operative pr
inciple that safeguarded in all other respects the notion of national constitutional sovereignty. Moreover, such conception, itself, reflected the same idea of sovereignty as definition of an ultimate authority. }}}{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid2102926\charrsid15741338  In this case, international instances of shared, pooled or even limited State sovereignty do not really challenged State sovereignty since those exercises of internationa
l sovereignty are delegated from the States and limited by the strict mandates of that delegation.}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid12222303\charrsid15741338  However }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid2102926\charrsid15741338 
it has increasingly become the case that the new forms of regional and global governance claim normative authority independent }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11809694 from }{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid2102926\charrsid15741338 the}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid12222303\charrsid15741338  States. In some cases, the extent of }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid16205799\charrsid15741338 this
}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid12222303\charrsid15741338  claim is such that the supranational power is, in effect, backed up by a claim of constitutional supremacy.}{
\cs19\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\super\langnp2057\insrsid12222303\charrsid15741338 \chftn {\footnote \pard\plain \s18\qj \li0\ri0\sb60\sa60\sl360\slmult1\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0 
\fs20\lang2070\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp2070\langfenp1033 {\cs19\super\insrsid5123278 \chftn }{\insrsid5123278  Reference to EU literature}}}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid12222303\charrsid15741338  }{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid16205799\charrsid15741338 This }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid12222303\charrsid15741338 
challenges the traditional conception of sovereignty and requires us to embrace a notion of competing sovereignties.}{\cs19\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\super\langnp2057\insrsid12222303\charrsid15741338 \chftn {\footnote \pard\plain 
\s18\qj \li0\ri0\sb60\sa60\sl360\slmult1\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0 \fs20\lang2070\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp2070\langfenp1033 {\cs19\super\insrsid5123278 \chftn }{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid5123278\charrsid12222303  }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid5123278 Ref to article Neil\rquote s book}}}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid12222303\charrsid15741338  Whatever the different }{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid16205799\charrsid15741338 degrees of challenge}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid12222303\charrsid15741338 , what is clear is that the role of }{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid16205799\charrsid15741338 National }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid12222303\charrsid15741338 
Constitutions as the determinants of an ultimate authority is under challenge. The trend towards a framework of constitutional pluralism is an answer to that challenge.}{\cs19\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\super\langnp2057\insrsid12222303\charrsid15741338 
\chftn {\footnote \pard\plain \s18\qj \li0\ri0\sb60\sa60\sl360\slmult1\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0 \fs20\lang2070\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp2070\langfenp1033 {\cs19\super\insrsid5123278 \chftn }{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid5123278\charrsid12222303  }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid5123278 cite Neil Walker, MacCormick, Mattias Kumm etc.}}}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15930160\charrsid15741338 
\par }\pard \qj \li0\ri0\sb60\sa60\sl360\slmult1\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid1060444 {\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid16205799\charrsid15741338 
The second affected pillar of national constitutional self-determination is embodied by the idea of self-government. The narrative of this challenge is well known: States are increasingly affected in their capacity to autonomous determine their dome
stic policies due to external constraints derived from both international organisations, competition with other States, and the extra-territorial effects of other State\rquote s policies.}{
\cs19\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\super\langnp2057\insrsid16205799\charrsid15741338 \chftn {\footnote \pard\plain \s18\qj \li0\ri0\sb60\sa60\sl360\slmult1\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0 
\fs20\lang2070\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp2070\langfenp1033 {\cs19\super\insrsid5123278 \chftn }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid5123278\charrsid16205799  }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid5123278 cite literature\'85 Held etc.}}}{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid6779011\charrsid15741338  }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid229160\charrsid15741338 The }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11809694 question of policy autonomy is }{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid229160\charrsid15741338 a}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid6779011\charrsid15741338 lso a}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid229160\charrsid15741338  question of participation. }{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid6779011\charrsid15741338 This is so for two reasons: first, national political communities }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11809694 perceive an \'93intrusion\'94 (or inclusion\'85}{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid6779011\charrsid15741338 ) of \'93outsiders\'94 in what they have decided; second, }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid229160\charrsid15741338 
less policy autonomy entails a reduction in the relative power of the voice of each citizen of that polity. Their relative power in participation decreases as the scope of the participants is increased}{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3029278\charrsid15741338  by }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid6779011\charrsid15741338 the participation of others.}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3950396\charrsid15741338 
\par }\pard \qj \li0\ri0\sb60\sa60\sl360\slmult1\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid6779011 {\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid6779011\charrsid15741338 
The third pillar is also linked to participation but in a different manner. When I refer to the democratic autonomy of national
 political communities protected by national constitutions I am thinking, in this case, of the autonomy of the members of such political communities to define the balances of participation and representation in those political communities. In other words,
 their power to structure the mechanisms of representation and participation of different members of the political community in different institutions and their policies. As already mentioned, global governance changes such domestic p}{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid1796728\charrsid15741338 atterns of }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid6779011\charrsid15741338 representation and participation in public p}{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid1796728\charrsid15741338 olicies}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid6779011\charrsid15741338 .}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid1796728\charrsid15741338 
\par }\pard \qj \li0\ri0\sb60\sa60\sl360\slmult1\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid2048226 {\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid2048226\charrsid15741338 
The challenge brought by global governance to these three pillars of national constitutions can however become a broader challenge to national constitutionalism. In this case, national constitutionalism is not simpl
y a national expression of constitutionalism but embodies a certain dominant conception of constitutionalism. It identifies constitutionalism with the borders and conditions offered by national political communities. }{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid14251412 By challenging the symmetry between pow
er and national polities and their constitutions, global governance requires constitutionalism to develop a new framework of analysis capable of addressing the news forms of power and their institutional forums. }{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid2048226\charrsid15741338 Such challenge is evident when we confront the foundations of national constitutionalism with the ideals of constitutionalism. }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11809694 Can}{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15090317\charrsid15741338  such challenge have any normative foundation? In other words, how can such challenge not be seen simply as an erosion of constitutionalism? That is what I discussed }{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid2048226\charrsid15741338 somewhere else}{\cs19\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\super\langnp2057\insrsid15090317\charrsid15741338 \chftn {\footnote \pard\plain \s18\qj \li0\ri0\sb60\sa60\sl360\slmult1
\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0 \fs20\lang2070\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp2070\langfenp1033 {\cs19\super\insrsid5123278 \chftn }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid5123278\charrsid12341392  Cite}}}{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid2048226\charrsid15741338  and summarise in the next section.}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid1796728\charrsid15741338 
\par }\pard\plain \s2\qj \li0\ri0\sb240\sa60\sl360\slmult1\keepn\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\outlinelevel1\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid13322690 \b\i\f1\fs28\lang2070\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp2070\langfenp1033 {
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid13322690\charrsid15741338 National Constitutionalism as }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid12341392\charrsid15741338 a }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid13322690\charrsid15741338 
Contextual Representation of Constitutionalism}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid2690260\charrsid15741338 
\par }\pard\plain \qj \li0\ri0\sb60\sa60\sl360\slmult1\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid13322690 \fs24\lang2070\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp2070\langfenp1033 {\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid12341392\charrsid15741338 
In }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid8940816\charrsid15741338 a }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid12341392\charrsid15741338 previous work I have argued that constitutionalism is }{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid5126536\charrsid15741338 related to}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid12341392\charrsid15741338  three paradoxes: the paradox of the polity; the fear of the few and the fear of the many}{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid4996023\charrsid15741338 ;}{\cs19\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\super\langnp2057\insrsid12341392\charrsid15741338 \chftn {\footnote \pard\plain \s18\qj \li0\ri0\sb60\sa60\sl360\slmult1
\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0 \fs20\lang2070\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp2070\langfenp1033 {\cs19\super\insrsid5123278 \chftn }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid5123278\charrsid12341392 
 An expression originally crafted by Neil Komesar...cite}}}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid4996023\charrsid15741338  and the question of who decides who decides. They are paradoxical because they }{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid5126536\charrsid15741338 simultaneously }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid4996023\charrsid15741338 embrace conflicting values in }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11809694 an }{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid4996023\charrsid15741338 attempt to reconcile them that is at the core of constitutionalism. With respect to all of them, n
ational constitutionalism can be seen as both a promoter of and a limit to constitutionalism. }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11809694 
\par }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid4996023\charrsid15741338 The polity is the basic assumption of a Constitution. }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11227499\charrsid15741338 
Constitutional questions have always been addressed within a pre-existing polity (normally the Nation State
). It is that polity that has served as the yardstick of constitutionalism. Relations within the polity are regulated by constitutional law. Relations among polities, instead, have been dominated by a different set of actors (the States) and a different s
et of rules (international law). }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid4996023\charrsid15741338 
The Constitution both defines and presupposes a polity or political community whose members are bound by such constitution. It is from this political community and its people that the democratic process draws its legitimacy 
and that of the majority decisions reached in the democratic representative process. The basis of the polity is normally referred to as \'93the people\'94. Constitutional and democratic theory scholars normally presuppose that \'93a people\'94
 already exists.}{\cs19\f36\super\insrsid4996023\charrsid15741338 \chftn {\footnote \pard\plain \s18\qj \li0\ri0\sb60\sa60\sl360\slmult1\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4996023 
\fs20\lang2070\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp2070\langfenp1033 {\cs19\super\insrsid5123278 \chftn }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid5123278\charrsid4996023  Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics, n\'85, at 3.}}}{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid4996023\charrsid15741338  But wha
t makes a people? And who has the right to be considered as part of the people? And why should participation and representation be limited by the requirement of belongingness to such a polity? It is the paradox of the concept of polity in its relation wit
h constitutionalism and democracy. Isn\rquote 
t a national demos a limit to democracy and constitutionalism? In fact, participation in national democracies is not granted to all those affected by the decisions of the national political process but only to those af
fected which are considered as citizens of the national polity. It is not the existence of democracy at national level that is contested but the extent of that democracy.}{\cs19\f36\super\insrsid4996023\charrsid15741338 \chftn {\footnote \pard\plain 
\s18\qj \li0\ri0\sb60\sa60\sl360\slmult1\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4996023 \fs20\lang2070\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp2070\langfenp1033 {\cs19\super\insrsid5123278 \chftn }{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid5123278\charrsid4996023  The different between the existence of democracy and the extent of democracy is highlighted by Jon Elster, Deliberation and Constitution Making, n\'85, at 99.}}}{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid4996023\charrsid15741338  There is problem of inclusion faced by national polities.}{\cs19\f36\super\insrsid4996023\charrsid15741338 \chftn {\footnote \pard\plain \s18\qj \li0\ri0\sb60\sa60\sl360\slmult1
\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4996023 \fs20\lang2070\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp2070\langfenp1033 {\cs19\super\insrsid5123278 \chftn }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid5123278\charrsid4996023 
 Dahl points out that polities have a twofold problem: \lquote 1 - The problem of inclusion: What persons have a rightful claim to be included in the demos; 2 - The scope of its authority: What rightful limits are there on the control of a demos\rquote 
, n\'85, at 119. See also David Held, Democracy and the Global Order, Cambridge and Oxford: Polity Press, 1995, mainly chapters 1 and 10.}}}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid4996023\charrsid15741338  Such problem of inclusion
 does not exist simply by not taking the others into account in decisions that affect them. }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid7757694\charrsid15741338 N}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid4996023\charrsid15741338 ational polities are }
{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid7757694\charrsid15741338 also }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid4996023\charrsid15741338 not open to all those which would accept their political }{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11809694\charrsid15741338 contract}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid4996023\charrsid15741338 . National polities tend to exclude many which would accept their}{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11809694  political contract}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid4996023\charrsid15741338  and are affected by their policies simply because they are not part of the }{
\i\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid4996023\charrsid15741338 demos}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid4996023\charrsid15741338  as understood in }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid7757694\charrsid15741338 a certain ethno, }{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid4996023\charrsid15741338 cultural }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid7757694\charrsid15741338 or historical }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid4996023\charrsid15741338 sense. }{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid7757694\charrsid15741338 In this way, if national polities can be seen as an instrument of constitutionalism, they also limit its ambitions of}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid4996023\charrsid15741338 
 full representation and participation.}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid14251412 
 This is a particularly interesting problem for comparative institutional analysis as such jurisdictional choice puts forward the question of how far comparative institutional analysis should go in 
the search for the best institutional alternative in light, for example, of a participation centred approach.  In other words, what justifies, in light of the normative ideals of comparative institutional analysis, excluding foreign interests from the fra
mework of analysis?}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid2048226\charrsid15741338 
\par }\pard \qj \li0\ri0\sb60\sa60\sl360\slmult1\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid7757694 {\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid14251412 Another}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid7757694\charrsid15741338 
 paradox of }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid14251412 constitutionalism is embodied in what Neil Komesar described as }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid7757694\charrsid15741338 
the fear of the few and the fear of the many. All major constitutional arguments and doctrines gravitate around a complex system of countervailing forces 
set up by constitutional law to promote the democratic exercise of power (assure that the few do not rule over the many) but, at the same time, to limit that power (assuring that the many will not abuse of their power over the few). There are two basic fe
ars underlying constitutional discourse and organisation:  the fear of the many and fear of the few. }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11809694 Such fears translate}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid5126536\charrsid15741338 
 into two biases in decision-making: majoritarian and minoritarian biases. }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid7757694\charrsid15741338 The core of constitutional law is the balance between the fea
r of the many and the fear of the few. Constitutional law sets up the mechanisms through which the many can rule but, at the same time, creates rights and processes to the protection of the few. Separation of powers, fundamental rights, parliamentary repr
esentation are all expressions of these fears.}{\cs19\f36\super\insrsid7757694\charrsid15741338 \chftn {\footnote \pard\plain \s18\qj \li0\ri0\sb60\sa60\sl360\slmult1\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid7757694 
\fs20\lang2070\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp2070\langfenp1033 {\cs19\super\insrsid5123278 \chftn }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid5123278\charrsid7757694  Bellamy (The Political Form o
f the Constitution: the Separation of Powers, Rights and Representative Democracy, in Bellamy and Castiglione (Eds.) Constitutionalism in Transformation: European and Theoretical Perespectives, Oxford, Blackwell Publishers, 1996, 24) highlights three prin
ciples who have defined constitutionalism: rights, separation of powers and representative government. However, in his view, the first has come to predominate in recent years: \lquote 
Rights, upheld by judicial review, are said to comprise the prime component of constitutionalism, providing a normative legal framework within which politics operate\rquote , at 24.}}}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid7757694\charrsid15741338 
 Traditionally, the many have been associated with the decisions taken by the majority through the political process while the protection of the few is associated with individual rights. The function of judicia
l review of legislation has frequently been argued on substantive or procedural conceptions of minority protection.}{\cs19\f36\super\insrsid7757694\charrsid15741338 \chftn {\footnote \pard\plain \s18\qj \li0\ri0\sb60\sa60\sl360\slmult1
\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid7757694 \fs20\lang2070\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp2070\langfenp1033 {\cs19\super\insrsid5123278 \chftn }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid5123278\charrsid7757694 
 For the first see Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977. For second see John Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980.}}}{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid7757694\charrsid15741338  This classical picture of constitutional law has been challenged by the multiplication of social decision-making forums and the insights br
ought by new institutional analyses. Interest group theories of the political process have demonstrated, for example, how democratic decision-making may, in effect, be controlled by a few against the interests of the many.}{
\cs19\f36\super\insrsid7757694\charrsid15741338 \chftn {\footnote \pard\plain \s18\qj \li0\ri0\sb60\sa60\sl360\slmult1\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid7757694 \fs20\lang2070\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp2070\langfenp1033 {
\cs19\super\insrsid5123278 \chftn }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid5123278\charrsid7757694  Other theories have contributed in same sense. Ackerman\rquote s \'93dualist democracy\'94
, for example, equates both the political process and the courts with the promotion and/or protection of democratic decisions. }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid5123278\charrsid12260154 See, We The People, n\'85}}}{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid7757694\charrsid15741338  }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid5126536\charrsid15741338 This has helped }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid7998420 to }{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid5126536\charrsid15741338 challenge idealised visions of the workings of national democratic institutions. In this light, and as I have tried to demonstrate in detail somewhere else and will }{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid7998420 also address}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid5126536\charrsid15741338  below, there is no reason why instances of supra-national and global governance cannot be s
een as correcting instances of majoritarian or minoritarian biases in national institutions that national constitutionalism has not adequately addressed.}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid7757694\charrsid15741338 
\par }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid5126536\charrsid15741338 The final paradox is that of who decides who decides}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid8940816\charrsid15741338 ? National constitutions have always been conceive
d has holding the answer to that question. In its relationship with the notion of State sovereignty highlighted above, national constitutions have usually been considered as the higher degree and ultimate source of legitimacy of the legal system and its r
ules. Independently of one\rquote 
s conception of constitutional law as a "grundnorm", a set of rules of recognition, positivized natural law, an higher command of a sovereign supported by an habit of obedience, or other, constitutional law has always been conceiv
ed as the higher law of the legal system, criterion of legitimacy and validity of other sources of the law. The new sites of power of global governance challenge that authority of national constitutions}{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid6362923\charrsid15741338  and require a pluralist conception of power that is in contradiction with proving the question of who decides who decides with a single answer}{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid8940816\charrsid15741338 . }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid6362923\charrsid15741338 
This may appear to challenge national constitutions but it does not challenge constitutionalism. In reality, the question of \'93who decides who decides\'94 has long been 
around in constitutionalism. It is a normal consequence of the divided powers system inherent in constitutionalism. In fact, it can be considered as an expected result of the Madisonian view of separation of powers as creating a mechanism of checks and ba
l
ances. Though national constitutions may have developed historical answers to that question they are a contextual product of certain constitutional regimes and not a systemic feature of constitutionalism. On the contrary, the nature of the organisation of
 
power inherent in constitutionalism requires the question to be permanently open and frequently reassessed. In this way, the pluralist relations of power brought forward by global governance may challenge national constitutions but may also serve to promo
te the ideals of constitutionalism.}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid5126536\charrsid15741338 
\par }\pard \qj \li0\ri0\sb60\sa60\sl360\slmult1\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid13322690 {\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid13322690\charrsid15741338 
Once we understand the paradoxical character of constitutionalism we can free ourselves from the boundaries of national constitutionalism. }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid6362923\charrsid15741338 
There is nothing in constitutionalism that makes of national polities the natural jurisdiction for full representation and participation. There is nothing that imposes that the fear of the few and the fear of the many must be addressed within a }{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11227499\charrsid15741338 national}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid6362923\charrsid15741338  polity and}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11227499\charrsid15741338 , in fact,}{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid6362923\charrsid15741338  }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11227499\charrsid15741338 the control of such fears may require us to move beyond national jurisdictions. }{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid6362923\charrsid15741338 Finally, it is artificial to think that }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11227499\charrsid15741338 national }{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid6362923\charrsid15741338 constitutionalism can allocate a final authority on who decides who decides when constitutionalism is precisely about dividing (and, in this way, limiting) authority.}{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11227499\charrsid15741338  Seen in this light, national constitutions become}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid13322690\charrsid15741338  a simple contextual expression of constitutionalism. }{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11227499\charrsid15741338 
\par Constitutionalism }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid10304337\charrsid15741338 is therefore both possible and necessary outside the State. But what does this mean for national constitutionalism}{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid14251412  and comparative institutional analysis}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid10304337\charrsid15741338 ? }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid14251412 C}{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid10304337\charrsid15741338 an global constitutionalism simply overcome national constitutionalism by either assuming or rising above the characteristics of national constitutionalism? }{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid14251412 And does this mean that comparative institutional analysis should ignore the borders of national pol
itical communities when assessing institutional alternatives in  light of the impacted interests? Or is there an institutional justification for the usual correspondence between constitutionalism and the national polities? }{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid10304337\charrsid15741338 The fact that national constituti
onalism is simply a contextual representation of constitutionalism does not mean that it is no longer the best representation of constitutionalism. National political communities may still provide the best context on which constitutional ideals can be pro
moted. If that is the case, }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid13322690\charrsid15741338 nati}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid14251412 onal constitutionalism should}{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid13322690\charrsid15741338  still be considered as the pref}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid10304337\charrsid15741338 
erred form of constitutionalism and this would impact on the way we can currently constitutionalise global governance.}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid13322690\charrsid15741338   
\par }\pard\plain \s2\qj \li0\ri0\sb240\sa60\sl360\slmult1\keepn\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\outlinelevel1\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid1708391 \b\i\f1\fs28\lang2070\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp2070\langfenp1033 {
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid1708391\charrsid15741338 National }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11028131\charrsid15741338 Constitutions}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid1708391\charrsid15741338  as a Proxy for Const
itutionalism
\par }\pard\plain \qj \li0\ri0\sb60\sa60\sl360\slmult1\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid10304337 \fs24\lang2070\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp2070\langfenp1033 {\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid10304337\charrsid15741338 
As we have see}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3951143 n}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid10304337\charrsid15741338 
 constitutionalism is all about establishing difficult balances between values or institutions that it, simultaneously, advances and fears: the balance between the common values of the polity and the individual preferences of it
s members; the balance between the democratic will of the majority and the rights of the minority; the balance between the intensity and the scope of participation. These balances and the inherent paradoxes in which they are reflected are aimed at }{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid14761451\charrsid15741338 promoting the ideals of freedom and full participation and representation that dominate constitutionalism}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid14251412 
 and, in my view, also form the normative core of comparative institutional analysis}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid14761451\charrsid15741338 . At the same}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3951143  time}{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid14761451\charrsid15741338 , national constitutionalism has developed a series of in
struments to promote such balances, in the form of the doctrines of fundamental rights, separation of powers, democratic decision making through representation etc. The political contracts of national constitutionalism are composed as a set of inter-depen
dent doctrines and institutional frameworks that aim at preserving the tensions of constitutionalism without letting the balance tilt to either side. May be we can talk in this respect about a procedural and a substantive balance in constitutionalism. }{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid10304337\charrsid15741338 
\par }\pard \qj \li0\ri0\sb60\sa60\sl360\slmult1\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4801185 {\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid14761451\charrsid15741338 The 
procedural balance of constitutionalism regards the balance between intensity and inclusion in promoting participation in the deliberative process. }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid4801185\charrsid15741338 
This has a two-fold dimension: in the first place, deliberative processes should not only promote equal part
icipation but ought also to reflect the intensity of the impacts in the different affected interests; in the second place, deliberative processes are faced with the dilemma arising from the fact that the relative participation and representation of each i
ndividual decreases the higher the scope of the participants included in deliberation.}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid6825551\charrsid15741338 
\par }\pard \qj \li0\ri0\sb60\sa60\sl360\slmult1\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid1517708 {\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid4801185\charrsid15741338 
The substantive balance of constitutionalism regards the balance between individual autonomy and civic solidarity. Constitutionalism is about safeguarding a society of equal and free individuals. But it has also become clearer that }{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid12725897\charrsid15741338 
such a society requires both mechanisms to manage the conflicts of interests between those individuals and the provision to all members of that society of equal instruments to pursue happiness i
n the exercise of their freedom. Needless to say how contested are some of the underlying assumptions or even the way to achieve these goals. But it is true that in all modern societies it is generally recognised that constitutionalism must also embrace a
 principle of distributive justice in the pursuit of its ideals. The commitment towards both the common resolution of societal disputes and a principle of distributive justice is what composes the idea of civic solidarity. }{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid10755155\charrsid15741338 This tension between individual autonomy and civic solidarity also underlies much of constitutionalism.}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid1517708\charrsid15741338 
\par }\pard \qj \li0\ri0\sb60\sa60\sl360\slmult1\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid2690260 {\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid10755155\charrsid15741338 
National constitutions, with national political communities and their artificial borders, offer a particularly favourable framework to manage such tensions and implement those two balances of constitutionalism. They are, in this sense, a good proxy }{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid6512976\charrsid15741338 for}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid10755155\charrsid15741338 
 constitutionalism. This is so because of the conditions provided for by the existence of a political community and its underlying long-term political contract. What allows for the trade-off
s necessary to such constitutional balances to operate is the long term perspective introduced by }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid6512976\charrsid15741338 the political contracts underlying}{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid10755155\charrsid15741338  national political communities. }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid12260154\charrsid15741338 
Majoritarian democracy, for example, is necessary in the context of massive and complex societies both to make deliberation possible and, in some cases, to promote redistributive policies.}{
\cs19\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\super\langnp2057\insrsid16075457\charrsid15741338 \chftn {\footnote \pard\plain \s18\qj \li0\ri0\sb60\sa60\sl360\slmult1\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0 
\fs20\lang2070\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp2070\langfenp1033 {\cs19\super\insrsid5123278 \chftn }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid5123278\charrsid16075457  }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid5123278 
Whether or not majoritarian democracy is the natural form of democracy is more debatable (cite Buchanan and Trullock). The same on whether majoritarian democracies provide more efficient decisions. It depends on the c
oncept of efficiency and on the measurement of impacts.}}}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid12260154\charrsid15741338 
 But such majoritarian democracy means that some will loose in certain circumstances and others will not even see the intensity of their interests really taken into account. }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid13453588\charrsid15741338 
In this respect, a}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid12260154\charrsid15741338  political community }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid13453588\charrsid15741338 
brings back the balances between the scope and intensity of participation and individual autonomy and civic solidarity. F}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid12260154\charrsid15741338 
irst, it assures the loosing side that their loss in one instance can become a victory in another (there are no absolute looser and winners)}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid13453588\charrsid15741338 .}{
\cs19\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\super\langnp2057\insrsid12260154\charrsid15741338 \chftn {\footnote \pard\plain \s18\qj \li0\ri0\sb60\sa60\sl360\slmult1\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0 
\fs20\lang2070\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp2070\langfenp1033 {\cs19\super\insrsid5123278 \chftn }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid5123278\charrsid12260154  }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid5123278 
There can be risks of more insulated groups being subject to majoritarian bias and that is why national constitutionalism provides for other protecting mechanisms. }}}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid13453588\charrsid15741338  S}{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid12260154\charrsid15741338 econd, it avoids zero-sum decisions}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid13453588\charrsid15741338 
: those winning, knowing they may loose in the future, have an interest in taking all interests into account in all decisions and in trading-off participatio
n for intensity of impacts. Third, it authorises for other long-term agreements to derogate from democratic decisions in order to safeguard values such as individual autonomy or distributive justice (this is the role of fundamental rights). }{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid12260154\charrsid15741338  }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid13453588\charrsid15741338 The full devel
opment of constitutional ideals and their trade-offs require a context of application that is not dominate}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3951143 d}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid13453588\charrsid15741338 
 by one-shot decisions but is, instead, grounded on the stable framework provided by a political community. }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid16075457\charrsid15741338 Communities are not, in this sense, contr
ary to a liberal perspective. In many respect, an appropriate theory of liberalism must make room for communities in the pursuit of individual autonomy. This is so for three sets of reasons: first, communities provide the deliberative space and institutio
ns necessary for the pursuit of individual autonomy (without participation in deliberative processes there is not true individual autonomy and without the democratically organised institutions of political communities there is no form of expressing one
\rquote s individual autonomy in deliberative processes);}{\cs19\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\super\langnp2057\insrsid16075457\charrsid15741338 \chftn {\footnote \pard\plain \s18\qj \li0\ri0\sb60\sa60\sl360\slmult1
\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid16075457 \fs20\lang2070\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp2070\langfenp1033 {\cs19\super\insrsid5123278 \chftn }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid5123278\charrsid16388697  }{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid5123278 Kant and Habermas}}}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid16075457\charrsid15741338 
 second, communities promote the civic dynamics necessary to the effective individual participation in those common deliberative processes and public spaces;}{\cs19\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\super\langnp2057\insrsid16075457\charrsid15741338 \chftn 
{\footnote \pard\plain \s18\qj \li0\ri0\sb60\sa60\sl360\slmult1\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid16075457 \fs20\lang2070\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp2070\langfenp1033 {\cs19\super\insrsid5123278 \chftn }{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid5123278\charrsid15951086  }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid5123278 Something that was highlighted by the Republican tradition.}}}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid16075457\charrsid15741338 
 third, communities enhance individual autonomy in t
hat they constitute joint spaces of differentiation; in other words, the existence of different communities promotes a higher possible realm of individual choices even in contexts where collective action is necessary. National political communities provid
e therefore a framework to reconcile liberal and communitarian ideals (perhaps not}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid6581377\charrsid15741338 , with regard to the latter,}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid16075457\charrsid15741338 
 in a thick sense but in the republican sense of a community that promotes civic virtues). }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid14427657\charrsid15741338 
\par }\pard \qj \li0\ri0\sb60\sa60\sl360\slmult1\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0 {\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid14427657\charrsid15741338 Those ideals }{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid6581377\charrsid15741338 are}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid14427657\charrsid15741338  themselves reflected in the tensions o
f constitutionalism to which national political communities provide a commonly agreed resolution. The political contract underlying national political communities }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid6581377\charrsid15741338 
guarantees, in this way,}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid14427657\charrsid15741338  both the political and social viability of the normative project of constitutionalism.}{
\cs19\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\super\langnp2057\insrsid6581377\charrsid15741338 \chftn {\footnote \pard\plain \s18\qj \li0\ri0\sb60\sa60\sl360\slmult1\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0 
\fs20\lang2070\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp2070\langfenp1033 {\cs19\super\insrsid5123278 \chftn }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid5123278\charrsid6581377  }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid5123278 
Refer and discuss difference with Habermas in Towards\'85}}}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid14427657\charrsid15741338  }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid14697527\charrsid15741338 
Constitutionalism in this form requires loyalty and the latter requires some form of identity and long term commitment. The most benign form of providing such identity }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3350670\charrsid15741338 
has been the political contract of the Constitutional }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid14427657\charrsid15741338 Nation }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3350670\charrsid15741338 State.}{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid14427657\charrsid15741338  }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid14697527 
\par }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid14251412 
This can be reconstructed as a form of long term institutional choice regarding the ideal polity for constitutionalism.  Comparative institutional analysis allow us to represent the preference for national polities not like an arbitrary or historically co
ntextual choice, in light of the normative constitutional ideals of freedom and full representation and participation, but as a choice founded in a long term institutional analysis linked to the necessary requirements to the pursuit of those constitutiona
l ideals. }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid14251412\charrsid15741338 
\par }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid14697527\charrsid15741338 The question now becomes whether such project }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid14427657\charrsid15741338 can currently be transposed to}{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid14697527\charrsid15741338  the global level}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid14427657\charrsid15741338 ? If it is not, does that mean the end of any claim for constitutionalising global governance? }{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid6054605\charrsid15741338 And if such}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid14427657\charrsid15741338  claim can survive }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid6054605\charrsid15741338 in }{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid14427657\charrsid15741338 the absence of }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid6054605\charrsid15741338 a political community}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3951143  a second question arises: 
}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid14427657\charrsid15741338 how to relate this new form of global constitutionalism}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid14697527\charrsid15741338  with the claims of national constitutionalism}{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3951143 ?}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3350670\charrsid15741338  In this sense to move constitutionalism to the arena of global governance is to move }{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid6054605\charrsid15741338 it beyond a normative theory of}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3350670\charrsid15741338  political communities to a normative theory of social decision-making.}{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid14251412  This can only be done through comparative institutional analysis as it allow us to integrated in a single framework the choices between polities with the choices between institutions 
within those polities. }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3350670\charrsid15741338  }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid14427657\charrsid15741338 It is to have constitutionalism without a constitution. }{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3350670\charrsid15741338 Even if such move is necessary (as argued before) and possible (as will be argued below) it does not mean that such form of constitutionalism can and ought to overcome the form
 of constitutionalism linked to }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11227499\charrsid15741338 national }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid14427657\charrsid15741338 political communities, particularly absent a global political community.
}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3350670\charrsid15741338   }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid14697527\charrsid15741338 
\par }\pard\plain \s2\qj \li0\ri0\sb240\sa60\sl360\slmult1\keepn\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\outlinelevel1\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid72965 \b\i\f1\fs28\lang2070\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp2070\langfenp1033 {
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid72965\charrsid15741338 Constitutionalism at the Global Level
\par }\pard\plain \qj \li0\ri0\sb60\sa60\sl360\slmult1\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid3029278 \fs24\lang2070\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp2070\langfenp1033 {\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3951143 H}{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid6054605\charrsid15741338 ow should the }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid10304337\charrsid15741338 challenge to constitutionalism }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid6054605\charrsid15741338 
brought by global governance be addr}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3951143 essed?}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid6054605\charrsid15741338  S}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid10304337\charrsid15741338 hould such c
hallenge be opposed or accepted}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid6054605\charrsid15741338  in normative terms}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid10304337\charrsid15741338 ? And if can be legitimated}{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid6054605\charrsid15741338  in normative terms}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid10304337\charrsid15741338 , }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid6054605\charrsid15741338 when and }{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid10304337\charrsid15741338 how should t}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid6054605\charrsid15741338 hat be the case}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid10304337\charrsid15741338 ?}{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid6054605\charrsid15741338  Normative conceptions of global governance}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3029278\charrsid15741338  tend to reflect }{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid6054605\charrsid15741338 a myriad of philosophical perspectives}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid9859430\charrsid15741338 .}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3029278\charrsid15741338 
 There are many theories and in the opposing extremes one can find either nationalist theories supported by communitarian ideals or cosmopolitan proposals supported by liberal idea}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid9859430\charrsid15741338 l}{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3029278\charrsid15741338 s. }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid9859430\charrsid15741338 The perspectives on global governance tend therefore to intersect with general philosophical p
erspectives regarding individual autonomy and communities or with institutional perspectives and assumptions on political process versus the market for example. Constitutionalism is not absent from these discussions but is more frequently assumed than exp
o
sed. Constitutionalism appears in the context of global governance in two opposing senses: on the one hand, there are those that use it to legitimise the process of global governance; on the other hand, there are those that use it precisely to oppose the 
same process. Within each of these sides there are different versions of constitutionalism and its relation with global governance that I will briefly review next.}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid14251412 
 In the process, the institutional character of these different visions will become clearer.}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3029278\charrsid15741338 
\par }\pard\plain \s4\qj \li0\ri0\sb240\sa60\sl360\slmult1\keepn\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\outlinelevel3\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid11089961 \b\fs28\lang2070\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp2070\langfenp1033 {
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid14100672\charrsid15741338 The Alternative Programmes of G}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11089961\charrsid15741338 lobal Constitutionalism: 
\par }\pard\plain \s5\qj \li0\ri0\sb240\sa60\sl360\slmult1\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\outlinelevel4\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid11089961 \b\i\fs26\lang2070\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp2070\langfenp1033 {
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid9051137\charrsid15741338 Rights Constitutionalism}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11089961\charrsid15741338 
\par }\pard\plain \qj \li0\ri0\sb60\sa60\sl360\slmult1\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid15098279 \fs24\lang2070\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp2070\langfenp1033 {\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid7018397\charrsid15741338 
Petersmann speaks of a developing international constitutionalism the contours of which are still unclear.}{\cs19\f36\super\insrsid7018397\charrsid15741338 \chftn {\footnote \pard\plain \s18\qj \li0\ri0\sb60\sa60\sl360\slmult1
\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid7018397 \fs20\lang2070\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp2070\langfenp1033 {\cs19\super\insrsid5123278 \chftn }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid5123278\charrsid7018397  E.U. Petersmann, 
\lquote How to Reform the UN System? Constitutionalism, International Law and International Organizations\rquote , 10 LJIL (1997) 421, at 463}}}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid7018397\charrsid15741338 
 As in regional forms of integration, trade law is conceived as the engine of global integration and its emerging constitutionalism.}{\cs19\f36\super\insrsid7018397\charrsid15741338 \chftn {\footnote \pard\plain \s18\qj \li0\ri0\sb60\sa60\sl360\slmult1
\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid7018397 \fs20\lang2070\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp2070\langfenp1033 {\cs19\super\insrsid5123278 \chftn }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid5123278\charrsid9051137  Ibidem at 445.}}}{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid7018397\charrsid15741338  The World Trade Organization and the agreements derived from the Uruguay Round are }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid9051137\charrsid15741338 conceived as }{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid7018397\charrsid15741338 the primary tool }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid9051137\charrsid15741338 for such}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid7018397\charrsid15741338 
 global constitutionalism. }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid14251412 To these he has further added the other international human rights documents.}{\cs19\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\super\langnp2057\insrsid14251412 \chftn {\footnote \pard\plain 
\s18\qj \li0\ri0\sb60\sa60\sl360\slmult1\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0 \fs20\lang2070\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp2070\langfenp1033 {\cs19\super\insrsid5123278 \chftn }{\insrsid5123278  CITE EJIL}}}{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid14251412  }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid9051137\charrsid15741338 He argues for a \'93rights-based\'94
 constitutional development from the ground up, through individual litigants and courts (such as happen in the European Union).}{\cs19\f36\super\insrsid9051137\charrsid15741338 \chftn {\footnote \pard\plain \s18\qj \li0\ri0\sb60\sa60\sl360\slmult1
\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid9051137 \fs20\lang2070\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp2070\langfenp1033 {\cs19\super\insrsid5123278 \chftn }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid5123278\charrsid15098279  Op. cit., at 423.}}
}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid9051137\charrsid15741338  Petersmann establishes a direct legitimating link between individuals and }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid10235845\charrsid15741338 the new forms of global g}{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid14251412 overnance, mainly those based on}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid10235845\charrsid15741338  human rights and international trade}{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid9051137\charrsid15741338 . The role of international trade law is that of guaranteeing the freedom of individuals in the international arena so that they can fully enjoy their personal autonomy. }{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid10235845\charrsid15741338 The way to promote global constitutionalism is by extending the scope and application of international trade law, human rights documents and dispute-settlement mechanisms. }{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid9051137\charrsid15741338 For Petersman there is an emerging process of global constitutionalism where democracies will operate \'93
in a constitutional framework of national and international guarantees of freedom, non-discrimination, rule of law and institutional \'abchecks and balances\'bb\'94.}{\cs19\f36\super\insrsid9051137\charrsid15741338 \chftn {\footnote \pard\plain 
\s18\qj \li0\ri0\sb60\sa60\sl360\slmult1\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid9051137 \fs20\lang2070\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp2070\langfenp1033 {\cs19\super\insrsid5123278 \chftn }{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid5123278\charrsid15098279  Op. cit., at 447 and 448.}}}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid9051137\charrsid15741338 .
\par This vision of }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15098279\charrsid15741338 Petersmann}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid10235845\charrsid15741338 , shared by others,}{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15098279\charrsid15741338  }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid9051137\charrsid15741338 transfers to the global arena }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid10235845\charrsid15741338 Hayek\rquote s
}{\cs19\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\super\langnp2057\insrsid10235845\charrsid15741338 \chftn {\footnote \pard\plain \s18\qj \li0\ri0\sb60\sa60\sl360\slmult1\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0 
\fs20\lang2070\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp2070\langfenp1033 {\cs19\super\insrsid5123278 \chftn }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid5123278\charrsid10235845  cite}}}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid10235845\charrsid15741338  and }{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid9051137\charrsid15741338 the ordo-liberal}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid10235845\charrsid15741338 s}{\cs19\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\super\langnp2057\insrsid10235845\charrsid15741338 \chftn 
{\footnote \pard\plain \s18\qj \li0\ri0\sb60\sa60\sl360\slmult1\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0 \fs20\lang2070\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp2070\langfenp1033 {\cs19\super\insrsid5123278 \chftn }{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid5123278\charrsid10235845  }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid5123278 Insert references}}}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid10235845\charrsid15741338  }{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid9051137\charrsid15741338 conception of constitutionalism as a constrain}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid10235845\charrsid15741338 t}{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid9051137\charrsid15741338  on public power}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid10235845\charrsid15741338 . A conception}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid9051137\charrsid15741338 
 that has also influenced the discourse of European constitutionalism.}{\cs19\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\super\langnp2057\insrsid10235845\charrsid15741338 \chftn {\footnote \pard\plain \s18\qj \li0\ri0\sb60\sa60\sl360\slmult1
\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0 \fs20\lang2070\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp2070\langfenp1033 {\cs19\super\insrsid5123278 \chftn }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid5123278\charrsid10235845  }{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid5123278 We The Court\'85}}}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid9051137\charrsid15741338  }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid10235845\charrsid15741338 
Under this view, international human rights and international trade law are not in opposition but, on the contrary, in the words of another author \lquote 
they are topologically similar: (b)oth international trade law and international human rights are largely deregulatory \endash  they declare what the State should not do. 
In each regime, the problem to be solved is the overbearing State which wants to control voluntary activity.\rquote }{\cs19\f36\super\insrsid10235845\charrsid15741338 \chftn {\footnote \pard\plain \s18\qj \li0\ri0\sb60\sa60\sl360\slmult1
\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid10235845 \fs20\lang2070\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp2070\langfenp1033 {\cs19\super\insrsid5123278 \chftn }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid5123278\charrsid15098279  Steve Charnovitz, 
\lquote The Globalization of Economic Human Rights\rquote , 25 Brooklyn Journal of International Law 1999, 113, at}}}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15098279\charrsid15741338 
 But, of course, this entails a particular notion of both human rights and international trade law}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid10235845\charrsid15741338  which is not consensual}{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15098279\charrsid15741338 .}{\cs19\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\super\langnp2057\insrsid14251412 \chftn {\footnote \pard\plain \s18\qj \li0\ri0\sb60\sa60\sl360\slmult1
\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0 \fs20\lang2070\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp2070\langfenp1033 {\cs19\super\insrsid5123278 \chftn }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid5123278\charrsid14251412  }{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid5123278 cite debate with Alston}}}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15098279\charrsid15741338  }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid10235845\charrsid15741338 The content of h}{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15098279\charrsid15741338 uman rights }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid10235845\charrsid15741338 is not undisputed and they }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15098279\charrsid15741338 
may also require strong government intervention. In the same way, international trade law may be developed my enacting international regulatory standards to which all economic operators would have to conform instead of foc
using on the liberalisation of trade through the elimination of the different regulatory standards to which economic operators have to comply with.}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid10235845\charrsid15741338 
 As a consequence, the relevant question becomes whether the current processes of global governance hold the necessary legitimacy to enforce a particular}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid1783499\charrsid15741338 
 conception of human rights or international trade.}{\cs19\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\super\langnp2057\insrsid14251412 \chftn {\footnote \pard\plain \s18\qj \li0\ri0\sb60\sa60\sl360\slmult1\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0 
\fs20\lang2070\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp2070\langfenp1033 {\cs19\super\insrsid5123278 \chftn }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid5123278\charrsid14251412  }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid5123278 
Pettersman has argued that his vision includes the protection of social and other human rights but this is contested. Cite debate\'85}}}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15098279\charrsid15741338 
\par The focus }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid1783499\charrsid15741338 of such form of global constitutionalism is }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid14251412 on a notion of constitutionalism based}{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15098279\charrsid15741338  non-discrimination, individual rights (mainly economic rights) and
 dispute-settlement mechanisms. The expectation is that these instances will develop into a set of individual constitutional rights protected }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid1783499\charrsid15741338 at the global level }{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15098279\charrsid15741338 from any form of power. The dynamics of international trade will fuel the development of an in
ternational  rule of law through these economic rights and dispute-settlement mechanisms. Such dynamics will result however in a }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid1783499\charrsid15741338 limited}{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15098279\charrsid15741338  }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid1783499\charrsid15741338 conception of the ideals}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15098279\charrsid15741338 
 of constitutionalism. The fundamental idea is that of constitutionalism as limited government.
 The fundamental fear is that of the many. The fundamental suspicion lies over the political process. In reality, behind such conception lies a deep distrust over the political process and the way it organises and exercises power. However, the alternative
 institutions}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid1783499\charrsid15741338  to which power is transferred }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15098279\charrsid15741338 through gener}{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid1783499\charrsid15741338 al rules of a higher legal rank, embodied in such a particular set of human rights,}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15098279\charrsid15741338 
 are generally assumed in a an idealised form. Those institutions tend to be either the courts or the market}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid1783499\charrsid15741338 . But, as
 the analysis of the paradoxes and tensions of constitutionalism has hopefully highlighted, such institutions are }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15098279\charrsid15741338 themselves }{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid1783499\charrsid15741338 subject to other forms of constitutional}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15098279\charrsid15741338  suspicion and potential malfunctions.
\par }\pard\plain \s5\qj \li0\ri0\sb240\sa60\sl360\slmult1\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\outlinelevel4\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid11089961 \b\i\fs26\lang2070\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp2070\langfenp1033 {
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid14100672\charrsid15741338 Political}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11089961\charrsid15741338  Constitutionalism: The Cosmopolitan View
\par }\pard\plain \qj \li0\ri0\sb60\sa60\sl360\slmult1\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid9859430 \fs24\lang2070\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp2070\langfenp1033 {\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid1783499\charrsid15741338 T
he other Kantian and liberal trend is that which focus on the }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid6512976\charrsid15741338 ideal of a cosmopolis.}{\cs19\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\super\langnp2057\insrsid6512976\charrsid15741338 \chftn {\footnote 
\pard\plain \s18\qj \li0\ri0\sb60\sa60\sl360\slmult1\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0 \fs20\lang2070\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp2070\langfenp1033 {\cs19\super\insrsid5123278 \chftn }{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid5123278\charrsid6512976  see the different variants in Zolo}}}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid6512976\charrsid15741338 
 Here the ambition is greater than in the previous case. The ambition is that of creating a global civil society that can reconstitute at that global level the political c
ontract of the States (and not between the States). The existence of a global political community would make it possible to have democracy at that level. Such an ambition is supported on a liberal normative claim to higher inclusion and to bring down the 
national borders that}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid6581377\charrsid15741338 
 restrict a full expression of the ideal of a society of free and equal individuals. In this light, the processes of global governance become a welcome scenario from which to build this global democracy. The proposals on how to do it vary}{
\cs19\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\super\langnp2057\insrsid6581377\charrsid15741338 \chftn {\footnote \pard\plain \s18\qj \li0\ri0\sb60\sa60\sl360\slmult1\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0 
\fs20\lang2070\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp2070\langfenp1033 {\cs19\super\insrsid5123278 \chftn }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid5123278\charrsid6581377  Refer and discuss both David Held and Richard Falk}}}{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid6581377\charrsid15741338 
 but they have both bottom-up elements (for example, promoting the creation of transnational political action) and top-down elements (promoting the democratic reform of international organization}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3951143 s}{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid6581377\charrsid15741338  such as the UN). 
\par The }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid4016617\charrsid15741338 first problem with}{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid6581377\charrsid15741338  such vision }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid4016617\charrsid15741338 is}{
\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid6581377\charrsid15741338  how difficult it is to transform it into a viable programme for }{\f36\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid4016617\ch