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{\field{\*\fldinst {\lang4105  SEQ CHAPTER \\h \\r 1}}{\fldrslt }}\pard \fs24\qc\sl360\slmult1 
What A Comparative Institutional Analysis of Online Surveillance Reveals\par
\ftnrstcont\ftnrstcont\ftnrstcont\pard \fs24\qc\sl360\slmult1 
Susan Freiwald{\*\bkmkstart _Ref75857037}{}{\plain \fs24 \*\cs32\super 0{\footnote \pard \fs24\s31\sa120 
{\plain \fs24 \*\cs32\super 0}{}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \*\cs32\super\fs20 *}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \f1\fs20 {\u32\'e3}}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  2004, Susan Freiwald.  Professor, University of San Francisco School of Law.  My work on this \softline
symposium essay has benefited immeasurably from the comments of  Stuart Benjamin, Jennifer Lynch and \softline
Arti Rai.  Erin Dolly provided excellent research assistance, for which I am grateful.{\field{\*\fldinst ADVANCE \\d 6}{\fldrslt }}}}}
{\plain \fs24 \pard \fs20\qc\sl360\slmult1 
{\*\bkmkend _Ref75857037}{\*\bkmkstart _Ref75857037}{\*\bkmkend _Ref75857037}}{\plain \fs24  }{\plain \fs20 \*\cs32\super\fs20 \par
}\pard \fs24\sl360\slmult1 
{\plain \fs24 \par
}\pard \fs24\s29\sl480\slmult1\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640 
{\plain \fs24 Introduction\par
}\pard \fs24\sl480\slmult1 
{\plain \fs24 I. Online Surveillance of Non-Contents Information\par
}\pard \fs24\s29\sl360\slmult1\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640 
{\plain \fs24 \tab A. Historical Background\par
}\pard \fs24\fi720\sl360\slmult1 
{\plain \fs24 B. Current Law and Current Practices\par
}\pard \fs24\fi720\sl360\slmult1 
{\plain \fs24 C. The Question of Institutional Choice\par
}\pard \fs24
{\plain \fs24 \par
}{\plain \fs24 \par
}\pard \fs24\sl360\slmult1 
{\plain \fs24 II.  Comparative Institutional Analysis of Online Surveillance\par
}\pard \fs24\s29\fi720\sl360\slmult1\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640 
{\plain \fs24 A. Social Policy Goal\par
}\pard \fs24\sl360\slmult1 
{\plain \fs24 \tab B. Interested Parties and Participation Benefits\par
}\pard \fs24\fi720\sl360\slmult1 
{\plain \fs24 C. Comparative Institutional Analysis and its Implications\par
}\pard \fs24\sl360\slmult1 
{\plain \fs24 \tab \tab 1.  The Market\par
}\pard \fs24\s29\sl360\slmult1\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640 
{\plain \fs24 \tab \tab 2.  The Congress\par
}\pard \fs24\s29\sl360\slmult1\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640 
{\plain \fs24 \tab \tab 3.  The Courts\par
}\pard \fs24\s29\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640 
{\plain \fs24 \tab \tab 4.  The Executive Branch\par
}\pard \fs24\s29\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640 
{\plain \fs24 \par
}\pard \fs24
{\plain \fs24 III.  Challenges to the Model \par
}\pard \fs24\s29\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640 
{\plain \fs24 \tab A.  The Primacy of Social Policy Goals\par
}\pard \fs24
{\plain \fs24 \tab B.  Choosing Institutions\par
}\pard \fs24\sl480\slmult1 
{\plain \fs24 \tab C.  Legitimacy\par
}{\plain \fs24 Conclusion\par
}\page 
\pard \fs24\sl360\slmult1 
{\plain \fs24 Introduction\par
}{\plain \fs24 \par
}\ftnrstcont\ftnrstcont\pard \fs24\sl360\slmult1 
{\plain \fs24 \tab Rapid technological change has defined the Internet revolution.  Just a decade \softline
ago, cell phones and e-mail were beginning to take hold, and the World Wide Web was \softline
in its infancy.{}{\plain \fs24 \*\cs32\super 1{\footnote \pard \fs24\s31\sa120 
{1}{}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \*\cs32\super\fs20 }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 See}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \scaps\fs20 Tim Berners-Lee, Weaving the Web}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  (2000) (describing the development of the World Wide Web \softline
from the perspective of its inventor). {\field{\*\fldinst ADVANCE \\d 6}{\fldrslt }}}}}
}{\plain \fs24 }{\plain \fs24   As cutting-edge modes of communication have become commonplace, \softline
they have outgrown laws designed for more traditional methods.  In this context, the \softline
comparative institutional inquiry naturally arises: which institution is best suited, or least \softline
poorly suited, to change the legal rules to fit the new communications technologies?   \par
}{\plain \fs24 \tab \par
}\pard \fs24\fi720\sl360\slmult1 
{\plain \fs24 The rules regulating government surveillance of the Internet particularly warrant \softline
revision.  The applicable statute, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act ({\u8220\'93}ECPA{\u8221\'94}) \softline
,though designed to be comprehensive, predated the World Wide Web and relies on \softline
terms that do not comfortably expand to cover it.  Though it has been revised a few times \softline
since its passage in 1986, the ECPA leaves many crucial questions unanswered.  \softline
Meanwhile, the Supreme Court has not specified how the Fourth Amendment{\u8217\'92}s \softline
prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures translates into the online realm, and \softline
lower courts have stretched precedents developed for traditional media beyond \softline
recognition.\par
}\pard \fs24\fi720\sl360\slmult1 
{\plain \fs24 \par
}\ftnrstcont\pard \fs24\fi720\sl360\slmult1 
{\plain \fs24 It is of pressing importance that we update the surveillance laws to account for \softline
new communications technologies.  Among other things, the limits we place on \softline
government surveillance in general are intended to uphold the constitutional separation of \softline
powers.  Properly formulated, they retain sufficient judicial intervention and \softline
congressional oversight to permit executive branch agents to pursue their law \softline
enforcement duties zealously but not oppressively.  Unfortunately, the current legal \softline
scheme has fallen so far behind emerging technologies that it facilitates a surveillance 
society in which the rights of speech, association, and even self-fulfillment are subject to \softline
the whims of an unchecked executive.{}{\plain \fs24 \*\cs32\super 2{\footnote \pard \fs24\s31\sa120 
{2}{}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \*\cs32\super\fs20 }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 See, e.g.,}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  W}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \scaps\fs20 estin, Privacy and Freedom}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  (1967); }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 see}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 also}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  Paul M. Schwartz, }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 Privacy and Democracy in \softline
Cyberspace}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20 , 52 }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \scaps\fs20 Vand. L. Rev}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20 . 1610, 1647-59 (1999) (arguing that information privacy on the Internet is \softline
critical to citizens{\u8217\'92} ability to define themselves and engage in democratic deliberation).{\field{\*\fldinst ADVANCE \\d 6}{\fldrslt }}}}}
}{\plain \fs24 }{\plain \fs24     \par
}\pard \fs24\fi720\sl360\slmult1 
{\plain \fs24 \par
}\pard \fs24\fi720\sl360\slmult1 
{\plain \fs24 In this essay, I focus on the provisions that regulate the interception by law \softline
enforcement agents of online information that is not the contents of electronic \softline
communications.  These rules are the weakest and the most vague of the current \softline
framework.  In Part I, I summarize the legal question.  Part II conducts a comparative \softline
institutional analysis, drawing upon the participation-centered model championed by \softline
Professor Neil Komesar.  It highlights what that analysis adds to the current thinking.  \softline
Part III considers the challenges and limits of the comparative institutional method that \softline
the case study reveals.   \par
}\pard \fs24\sl360\slmult1 
{\plain \fs24 \par
}{\plain \fs24 I. Online Surveillance of Non-Contents Information\tab \par
}\pard \fs24\fi720\sl360\slmult1 
{\plain \fs24 \par
}\pard \fs24\fi720\sl360\slmult1 
{\plain \fs24 A. Historical Background \par
}\pard \fs24\sl360\slmult1 
{\plain \fs24 \tab \par
}\ftnrstcont\pard \fs24\sl360\slmult1 
{\plain \fs24 \tab Rules that apply to government surveillance of the Internet are particularly \softline
problematic.  The constitutional doctrine that underlies the relevant statute fails to \softline
account for new practices.  Those practices, in turn, are constantly evolving and difficult \softline
to pin down, because the government endeavors to keep them secret.  The statutory rules \softline
are complex, if not chaotic; few cases interpret them, and those that do tend to conflict, \softline
strain logic, or both.{\*\bkmkstart _Ref77823905}{}{\plain \fs24 \*\cs32\super 3{\footnote \pard \fs24\s31\sa120 
{3}{}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \*\cs32\super\fs20 }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 See}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 generally}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20 , Susan Freiwald, }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 Online Surveillance, Remembering the Lessons of the Wiretap Act,}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  \softline
forthcoming }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \scaps\fs20 Alab. L. Rev}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20 . (2004).{\field{\*\fldinst ADVANCE \\d 6}{\fldrslt }}}}}
}{\plain \fs24 {\*\bkmkend _Ref77823905}{\*\bkmkstart _Ref77823905}{\*\bkmkend _Ref77823905}}{\plain \fs24  \par
}{\plain \fs24 \tab \par
}\ftnrstcont\pard \fs24\sl360\slmult1 
{\plain \fs24 \tab Constitutional doctrine shapes the legal landscape of surveillance law.  In 1967, \softline
the Supreme Court brought wiretapping under Fourth Amendment regulation in }{\plain \fs24 \i Katz v.}{\plain \fs24  \softline
}{\plain \fs24 \i United}{\plain \fs24  }{\plain \fs24 \i States}{\plain \fs24 , when it announced that the {\u8220\'93}Fourth Amendment protects people, not 
places.{\u8221\'94}{}{\plain \fs24 \*\cs32\super 4{\footnote \pard \fs24\s31\sa120 
{4}{}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \*\cs32\super\fs20 }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). {\field{\*\fldinst ADVANCE \\d 6}{\fldrslt }}}}}
}{\plain \fs24 \ftnrstcont\pard \fs24\sl360\slmult1 
}{\plain \fs24   In }{\plain \fs24 \i Katz}{\plain \fs24 , the Court found telephone conversations to be protected from \softline
unreasonable search and seizure, even though the government could listen to them \softline
without committing a physical trespass.{}{\plain \fs24 \*\cs32\super 5{\footnote \pard \fs24\s31\sa120 
{5}{}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \*\cs32\super\fs20 }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 See}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 id}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20 . {\field{\*\fldinst ADVANCE \\d 6}{\fldrslt }}}}}
}{\plain \fs24 }{\plain \fs24   \par
}{\plain \fs24 \tab \par
}\ftnrstcont\pard \fs24\sl360\slmult1 
{\plain \fs24 \tab Congress responded to }{\plain \fs24 \i Katz}{\plain \fs24  by passing the Wiretap Act of 1968.{}{\plain \fs24 \*\cs32\super 6{\footnote \pard \fs24\s31\sa120 
{6}{}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \*\cs32\super\fs20 }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, Title III, 82 Stat. 212 (1968) \softline
(}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 codified}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 as}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 amended}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  at 18 U.S.C. {\u167\'a7}{\u167\'a7} 2510-2522 (2002)).  Commentators use either {\u8220\'93}Title III{\u8221\'94} or the more \softline
intuitive {\u8220\'93}Wiretap Act{\u8221\'94} to refer to the law.{\field{\*\fldinst ADVANCE \\d 6}{\fldrslt }}}}}
}{\plain \fs24 \ftnrstcont\pard \fs24\sl360\slmult1 
}{\plain \fs24   The federal \softline
law that had previously prohibited wiretapping had been incomplete and under enforced.{\*\bkmkstart _Ref77570071}{}{\plain \fs24 \*\cs32\super 7{\footnote \pard \fs24\s31\sa120 
{7}{}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \*\cs32\super\fs20 }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 See}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  The Communications Act of 1934, Chapter 652, 48 Stat. 1064, 1100, }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 codified at}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  47 U.S.C. {\u167\'a7} 605 \softline
(1958) (amended in 1968); Freiwald, }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 supra}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  note 3 (reviewing the history of the law).{\field{\*\fldinst ADVANCE \\d 6}{\fldrslt }}}}}
}{\plain \fs24 \ftnrstcont\pard \fs24\sl360\slmult1 
{\*\bkmkend _Ref77570071}{\*\bkmkstart _Ref77570071}{\*\bkmkend _Ref77570071}}{\plain \fs24   \softline
The Wiretap Act brought uniformity to the law and significant protection to the \softline
{\u8220\'93}contents{\u8221\'94} of communications, which it defined broadly.{}{\plain \fs24 \*\cs32\super 8{\footnote \pard \fs24\s31\sa120 
{8}{}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \*\cs32\super\fs20 }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 See}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  18 U.S.C. {\u167\'a7} 2510(8) (1968).  The definition of {\u8220\'93}contents{\u8221\'94} was designed to be comprehensive.  }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 See}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  S. \softline
Rep. No. 90-1097, at 105 (1968), }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 reprinted}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 in}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  U.S.C.C.A.N 2112, 2179 (defining {\u8220\'93}contents{\u8221\'94} to include {\u8220\'93}all \softline
aspects of the communication{\u8221\'94}).{\field{\*\fldinst ADVANCE \\d 6}{\fldrslt }}}}}
}{\plain \fs24 \ftnrstcont\pard \fs24\sl360\slmult1 
}{\plain \fs24   Both Congress and the Court \softline
viewed electronic surveillance as particularly intrusive and powerful.  As a result, they \softline
made it much harder for government investigators to get wiretaps approved as compared \softline
to physical searches.  For example, government investigators must demonstrate that \softline
traditional investigative methods are insufficient and that a wiretap is highly likely to \softline
disclose criminal conduct.{}{\plain \fs24 \*\cs32\super 9{\footnote \pard \fs24\s31\sa120 
{9}{}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \*\cs32\super\fs20 }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 See}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  18 U.S.C. {\u167\'a7} 2518(3).  This is known as the {\u8220\'93}necessity{\u8221\'94} requirement.  }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 See}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20 , }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 e.g}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20 ., United States v. Lynch, \softline
367 F.3d 1148, 1158 (9}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \super\fs20 th}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  Cir. 2004).{\field{\*\fldinst ADVANCE \\d 6}{\fldrslt }}}}}
}{\plain \fs24 \ftnrstcont\pard \fs24\sl360\slmult1 
}{\plain \fs24   They also have to minimize the interception of non-incriminating conversations.{}{\plain \fs24 \*\cs32\super 10{\footnote \pard \fs24\s31\sa120 
{10}{}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \*\cs32\super\fs20 }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 See}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  18 U.S.C. {\u167\'a7} 2518(5).{\field{\*\fldinst ADVANCE \\d 6}{\fldrslt }}}}}
}{\plain \fs24 \ftnrstcont\pard \fs24\sl360\slmult1 
}{\plain \fs24   Under the Wiretap Act, courts maintain a significant \softline
oversight role before, during and after investigations.{}{\plain \fs24 \*\cs32\super 11{\footnote \pard \fs24\s31\sa120 
{11}{}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \*\cs32\super\fs20 }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 See}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 id}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  {\u167\'a7} 2518(3).{\field{\*\fldinst ADVANCE \\d 6}{\fldrslt }}}}}
}{\plain \fs24 \ftnrstcont\pard \fs24\sl360\slmult1 
}{\plain \fs24   Further, those using or approving \softline
wiretaps have to provide detailed annual reports to Congress to insure the efficacy of \softline
investigations.{}{\plain \fs24 \*\cs32\super 12{\footnote \pard \fs24\s31\sa120 
{12}{}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \*\cs32\super\fs20 }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 See}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 id}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20 . {\u167\'a7} 2518 (procedures for granting wiretap orders, extending orders, requiring progress reports, \softline
keeping copies or evidence, and giving notice of wiretapping).  {\field{\*\fldinst ADVANCE \\d 6}{\fldrslt }}}}}
}{\plain \fs24 \ftnrstcont\pard \fs24\sl360\slmult1 
}{\plain \fs24   Finally, targets of surveillance are given after-the-fact notice, and 
significant recourse for improper investigations, including civil damages and a statutory \softline
suppression remedy.{}{\plain \fs24 \*\cs32\super 13{\footnote \pard \fs24\s31\sa120 
{13}{}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \*\cs32\super\fs20 }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 See}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  18 U.S.C. {\u167\'a7} 2518(8) (notice to targets); }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 id}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20 .{\u167\'a7} 2518(10) (civil damages and suppression remedy).  {\field{\*\fldinst ADVANCE \\d 6}{\fldrslt }}}}}
}{\plain \fs24 }{\plain \fs24 \par
}{\plain \fs24 \tab \par
}\ftnrstcont\pard \fs24\sl360\slmult1 
{\plain \fs24 \tab In }{\plain \fs24 \i Smith}{\plain \fs24  v. }{\plain \fs24 \i Maryland}{\plain \fs24 , the Supreme Court considered whether the constitutional \softline
protection accorded to telephone conversations twelve years earlier extended to the \softline
numbers dialed on a telephone and obtained by an investigative device known as a {\u8220\'93}pen \softline
register.{\u8221\'94}{}{\plain \fs24 \*\cs32\super 14{\footnote \pard \fs24\s31\sa120 
{14}{}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \*\cs32\super\fs20 }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 See}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).{\field{\*\fldinst ADVANCE \\d 6}{\fldrslt }}}}}
}{\plain \fs24 \ftnrstcont\pard \fs24\sl360\slmult1 
}{\plain \fs24   The mechanical pen register at issue had limited functions.  It used a pen to \softline
record on a paper tape the numbers dialed by the target{\u8217\'92}s phone.  It did not indicate \softline
whether the caller succeeded in having a telephone conversation, or if so, how long that \softline
conversation lasted.  Notwithstanding the limited information disclosed by a pen register, \softline
a strong dissent in }{\plain \fs24 \i Smith}{\plain \fs24  argued that the device revealed the target{\u8217\'92}s associations and \softline
activities and that such information should be constitutionally protected.  A majority of \softline
the Supreme Court disagreed and found that the pen register investigation did not \softline
constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment.{}{\plain \fs24 \*\cs32\super 15{\footnote \pard \fs24\s31\sa120 
{15}{}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \*\cs32\super\fs20 }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 See}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 id}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20 .{\field{\*\fldinst ADVANCE \\d 6}{\fldrslt }}}}}
}{\plain \fs24 }{\plain \fs24   \par
}\pard \fs24\fi720\sl360\slmult1 
{\plain \fs24 \par
}\ftnrstcont\pard \fs24\fi720\sl360\slmult1 
{\plain \fs24 The }{\plain \fs24 \i Smith}{\plain \fs24  majority applied the reasonable expectation of privacy test from Justice \softline
Harlan{\u8217\'92}s concurrence in }{\plain \fs24 \i Katz}{\plain \fs24 .  That test finds a constitutional search only when the target \softline
subjectively expected that the information disclosed was private, and only when society \softline
recognizes that expectation as reasonable.  The Court in }{\plain \fs24 \i Smith}{\plain \fs24  found no reasonable \softline
expectation of privacy in telephone numbers, because the caller disclosed them to the \softline
telephone company, which could record them.  The Court reasoned that one who \softline
knowingly discloses his telephone numbers to the telephone company cannot complain \softline
when the government learns of those numbers as well.{}{\plain \fs24 \*\cs32\super 16{\footnote \pard \fs24\s31\sa120 
{16}{}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \*\cs32\super\fs20 }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 See}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 Smith}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20 , 442 U.S. at 742-43 ({\u8220\'93}[I]t is too much to believe that telephone subscribers, under these \softline
circumstances, harbor any general expectation that the numbers they dial will remain secret.{\u8221\'94}).{\field{\*\fldinst ADVANCE \\d 6}{\fldrslt }}}}}
}{\plain \fs24 }{\plain \fs24  \par
}\pard \fs24\sl360\slmult1 
{\plain \fs24 \par
}\pard \fs24\fi720\sl360\slmult1 
{\plain \fs24 There is no question that the }{\plain \fs24 \i Smith}{\plain \fs24  decision limited communications privacy.  \softline
Besides that outcome, there is much to criticize about the Court{\u8217\'92}s reasoning in }{\plain \fs24 \i Smith}{\plain \fs24 .  \softline
First, the Court viewed callers as assuming the risk that a government agent will intercept 
the numbers they dial.  But callers should not be held to assume risks they had no choice  \softline
but to accept.  Because one cannot avoid disclosing telephone numbers to the telephone \softline
company, the element of voluntariness seems lacking.  Secondly, if the Supreme Court in \softline
}{\plain \fs24 \i Katz}{\plain \fs24  had used the }{\plain \fs24 \i Smith}{\plain \fs24  approach}{\plain \fs24 \i , }{\plain \fs24 it would have found no constitutional protection for \softline
telephone conversations, because those were just as capable of interception by the \softline
telephone company.  Finally, by focusing on the fact of interceptibility, the }{\plain \fs24 \i Smith}{\plain \fs24  court \softline
avoided the central normative question inherent in the reasonable expectation of privacy \softline
test: what should be private in our society?  By deriving privacy rights from \softline
technological possibilities rather than limiting technology to protect privacy, the }{\plain \fs24 \i Smith}{\plain \fs24  \softline
Court got it precisely backwards.  Moreover, the Court opened the door to further \softline
technological erosions of privacy.\par
}\pard \fs24\fi720\sl360\slmult1 
{\plain \fs24 \par
}\ftnrstcont\pard \fs24\fi720\sl360\slmult1 
{\plain \fs24 Not surprisingly, government investigators walked right through the door }{\plain \fs24 \i Smith}{\plain \fs24  \softline
opened.  The lack of constitutional protection for pen register targets contrasted sharply \softline
with the expansive rights granted to wiretapping targets.  As a result, government \softline
litigators argued that they were free from either constitutional or Wiretap Act restrictions \softline
when they used increasingly sophisticated {\u8220\'93}pen registers{\u8221\'94} to reveal much more than mere \softline
telephone numbers.{\*\bkmkstart _Ref77572136}{}{\plain \fs24 \*\cs32\super 17{\footnote \pard \fs24\s31\sa120 
{17}{}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \*\cs32\super\fs20 }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 See }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20 Susan Freiwald, }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 Uncertain Privacy: Communications Attributes After the Digital Telephony Act}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20 , 69 \softline
}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \scaps\fs20 S. Cal. L. Rev}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20 . 949, 982-89 (1996) (reviewing the evolution of the pen register). {\field{\*\fldinst ADVANCE \\d 6}{\fldrslt }}}}}
}{\plain \fs24 \ftnrstcont\pard \fs24\fi720\sl360\slmult1 
{\*\bkmkend _Ref77572136}{\*\bkmkstart _Ref77572136}{\*\bkmkend _Ref77572136}}{\plain \fs20 \super\fs20  }{\plain \fs24  Courts have accepted as {\u8220\'93}pen registers{\u8221\'94} devices that recorded, not \softline
only the telephone numbers dialed, but whether the call went through, when it happened, \softline
how long it lasted, and who the parties to it were.  These new {\u8220\'93}pen registers{\u8221\'94} could \softline
record electronically and transmit remotely, and they could be embodied in computer \softline
hardware and software.{}{\plain \fs24 \*\cs32\super 18{\footnote \pard \fs24\s31\sa120 
{18}{}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \*\cs32\super\fs20 }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 See}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 id}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20 . at 986-87.{\field{\*\fldinst ADVANCE \\d 6}{\fldrslt }}}}}
}{\plain \fs24 }{\plain \fs24   In short, courts have been expansive in their view of what \softline
counts as a pen register. \par
}\pard \fs24\fi720\sl360\slmult1 
{\plain \fs24 \par
}\ftnrstcont\pard \fs24\fi720\sl360\slmult1 
{\plain \fs24 The stakes were raised high in this game when Congress passed the ECPA in \softline
1986 and addressed {\u8220\'93}pen registers{\u8221\'94} by statute for the first time.  The ECPA provided \softline
none of the protections in the Wiretap Act to targets of pen register investigations.{}{\plain \fs24 \*\cs32\super 19{\footnote \pard \fs24\s31\sa120 
{19}{}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \*\cs32\super\fs20 }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 See}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  Pub. L. No. 99-508, {\u167\'a7} 301, 100 Stat. 1848, 1848-73 (1986) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. {\u167\'a7}{\u167\'a7} \softline
3121-27 (2000 & Supp. I 2001)).{\field{\*\fldinst ADVANCE \\d 6}{\fldrslt }}}}}
}{\plain \fs24 \ftnrstcont\pard \fs24\fi720\sl360\slmult1 
}{\plain \fs24   
There was no meaningful limit on investigations and accordingly no real judicial review.  \softline
Agents seeking a pen register merely had to assert that the device would disclose \softline
information relevant to an investigation; judges were instructed to grant any application \softline
containing such an assertion.  Targets were never notified, and if they somehow found \softline
out they had been investigated improperly, they were provided no remedy.  Neither civil \softline
damages nor a suppression remedy were available.{\*\bkmkstart _Ref77824460}{}{\plain \fs24 \*\cs32\super 20{\footnote \pard \fs20\s31 
{20}{}{\plain \fs20 \*\cs32\super\fs20 }{\plain \fs20 \fs20  Law enforcement agents who engage in unlawful pen register investigations may be subject to a fine or \softline
up to one year in jail.  }{\plain \fs20 \i\fs20 See}{\plain \fs20 \fs20  18 U.S.C. {\u167\'a7} 3121(d). There are no reported prosecutions under this provision.\par
}\pard \fs24\s31 
}}}
{\plain \fs24 \ftnrstcont\pard \fs24\fi720\sl360\slmult1 
{\*\bkmkend _Ref77824460}{\*\bkmkstart _Ref77824460}{\*\bkmkend _Ref77824460}}{\plain \fs24   Reports to Congress provided little \softline
detail.  In sum, courts interpreting the ECPA have viewed the pen register provisions as \softline
setting up an administrative scheme rather than ensuring any privacy rights to those \softline
subject to investigation.{}{\plain \fs24 \*\cs32\super 21{\footnote \pard \fs24\s31\sa120 
{21}{}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \*\cs32\super\fs20 }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 See, e.g}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20 ., United States v. Hallmark, 911 F.2d 399, 402 (10}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \super\fs20 th}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  Cir. 1990) (describing provisions {\u8220\'93}as \softline
intended merely to safeguard against purely random use{\u8221\'94} of pen registers); }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 In re}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  Order Authorizing \softline
Installation of a Pen Register, 846 F. Supp. 1555, 1559 (M.D. Fla 1994) (seeing minimal pen register \softline
provisions as designed to {\u8220\'93}accumulate reliable statistics{\u8221\'94} for Congressional oversight).  {\field{\*\fldinst ADVANCE \\d 6}{\fldrslt }}}}}
}{\plain \fs24 }{\plain \fs24      \par
}\pard \fs24\fi720\sl360\slmult1 
{\plain \fs24 \par
}\ftnrstcont\pard \fs24\fi720\sl360\slmult1 
{\plain \fs24 Language in the 1986 statute that tied pen registers to traditional telephones did \softline
not stop investigators from using {\u8220\'93}pen registers{\u8221\'94} on the Internet.{}{\plain \fs24 \*\cs32\super 22{\footnote \pard \fs24\s31\sa120 
{22}{}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \*\cs32\super\fs20 }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  For example, the statute defined a pen register as {\u8220\'93}a device which records or decodes electronic or other \softline
impulses which identify the }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 numbers}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 dialed}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  or otherwise transmitted on the }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 telephone}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 line}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  to which such \softline
device is attached.{\u8221\'94} 18 U.S.C. {\u167\'a7} 3127(3) (2000) (}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 amended}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  2001) (emphasis added).{\field{\*\fldinst ADVANCE \\d 6}{\fldrslt }}}}}
}{\plain \fs24 \ftnrstcont\pard \fs24\fi720\sl360\slmult1 
}{\plain \fs24    But the concern arose \softline
that such practices could create liability and the suppression of evidence.  Although some \softline
have argued that the absence of language referring to online pen register investigations \softline
means that such practices were entirely free from regulation,{}{\plain \fs24 \*\cs32\super 23{\footnote \pard \fs24\s31\sa120 
{23}{}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \*\cs32\super\fs20 }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 See}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20 , }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 e.g.,}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  Orin Kerr,,}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20  Internet Surveillance Law After the USA Patriot Act: The Big Brother That Isn{\u8217\'92}t}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20 , \softline
2003 }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \scaps\fs20 N.W. Law Rev.}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  607, 645-47.{\field{\*\fldinst ADVANCE \\d 6}{\fldrslt }}}}}
}{\plain \fs24 \ftnrstcont\pard \fs24\fi720\sl360\slmult1 
}{\plain \fs24  courts could instead have \softline
found them entirely prohibited.{}{\plain \fs24 \*\cs32\super 24{\footnote \pard \fs24\s31\sa120 
{24}{}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \*\cs32\super\fs20 }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  For example, historically, some Justices had argued that {\u8220\'93}pen registers{\u8221\'94} falling outside the statutory \softline
definition should be entirely prohibited.  }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 See}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  United States v. New York Telephone, 434 U.S. 159, 178-87 \softline
(1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (opinion joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall).  Also, the Court of \softline
Appeals of New York held that a pen register-type device with the ability to reveal contents was prohibited \softline
under New York Law.  }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 See}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  People v. Bialostock, 610 N.E.2d 374 (N.Y. 1993).{\field{\*\fldinst ADVANCE \\d 6}{\fldrslt }}}}}
}{\plain \fs24 \ftnrstcont\pard \fs24\fi720\sl360\slmult1 
}{\plain \fs24    Or, courts might have treated online pen registers the \softline
same way that they had handled secret government monitoring by videotaping in the \softline
mid-eighties.  Despite the Wiretap Act{\u8217\'92}s omission of any reference to video surveillance, \softline
seven circuit courts subjected the practice to four of the {\u8220\'93}core constitutional{\u8221\'94} protections \softline
of the Wiretap Act.  The courts reasoned that such videotaping is as intrusive, powerful, 
indiscriminate, and hidden as wiretapping, and therefore it warrants the same strict \softline
limits.{}{\plain \fs24 \*\cs32\super 25{\footnote \pard \fs24\s31\sa120 
{25}{}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \*\cs32\super\fs20 }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 See}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  Freiwald, }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 supra}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  note 3, at notes 388-92, 432-46 and accompanying text.  {\field{\*\fldinst ADVANCE \\d 6}{\fldrslt }}}}}
}{\plain \fs24 }{\plain \fs24   \par
}\pard \fs24\fi720\sl360\slmult1 
{\plain \fs24 \par
}\ftnrstcont\pard \fs24\fi720\sl360\slmult1 
{\plain \fs24 Congress gave a partial answer to the question of what limits applied to \softline
government use of pen registers on the Internet when it passed the USA Patriot Act \softline
({\u8220\'93}Patriot Act{\u8221\'94}) in October 2001.  Congress updated the pen register definition to make it \softline
applicable to electronic mail.  Instead of referring to the numbers dialed, the amended \softline
statute permits pen registers to obtain {\u8220\'93}dialing, routing, addressing, and signaling{\u8221\'94} \softline
information.{\*\bkmkstart _Ref77824393}{}{\plain \fs24 \*\cs32\super 26{\footnote \pard \fs24\s31\sa120 
{26}{}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \*\cs32\super\fs20 }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 See}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  18 U.S.C. {\u167\'a7} 3127(3) (Supp. I. 2001).{\field{\*\fldinst ADVANCE \\d 6}{\fldrslt }}}}}
}{\plain \fs24 \ftnrstcont\pard \fs24\fi720\sl360\slmult1 
{\*\bkmkend _Ref77824393}{\*\bkmkstart _Ref77824393}{\*\bkmkend _Ref77824393}}{\plain \fs24   The new law also provides for additional reporting on the use of a filtering \softline
device known as {\u8220\'93}Carnivore,{\u8221\'94} which purports to be a computerized pen register placed \softline
by government agents on a service provider{\u8217\'92}s computer server.{}{\plain \fs24 \*\cs32\super 27{\footnote \pard \fs24\s31\sa120 
{27}{}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \*\cs32\super\fs20 }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 See}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 id}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20 . {\u167\'a7} 3123(a) (3).{\field{\*\fldinst ADVANCE \\d 6}{\fldrslt }}}}}
}{\plain \fs24 }{\plain \fs24   The new law thus \softline
brings those devices that gather dialing, routing, addressing, and signaling information \softline
under the minimal protections of the pen register provisions.\par
}\pard \fs24\fi720\sl360\slmult1 
{\plain \fs24 \par
}\ftnrstcont\pard \fs24\fi720\sl360\slmult1 
{\plain \fs24 There is much that Congress did not do in the Patriot Act amendments.  \softline
Importantly, it rejected an outrageous request by the Justice Department that pen registers \softline
be permitted to obtain contents.{\*\bkmkstart _Ref77824987}{}{\plain \fs24 \*\cs32\super 28{\footnote \pard \fs24\s31\sa120 
{28}{}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \*\cs32\super\fs20 }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 See}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  Beryl A. Howell, }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 Symposium Article}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20 , 72 }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \scaps\fs20 Geo. Wash. Law Rev.}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  (forthcoming summer 2004).{\field{\*\fldinst ADVANCE \\d 6}{\fldrslt }}}}}
}{\plain \fs24 \ftnrstcont\pard \fs24\fi720\sl360\slmult1 
{\*\bkmkend _Ref77824987}{\*\bkmkstart _Ref77824987}{\*\bkmkend _Ref77824987}}{\plain \fs24   If granted, that request would have entirely eviscerated \softline
the Wiretap Act protections for electronic communications.  That rejection, however, is \softline
one of the few privacy-protecting features of the Patriot Act.  Though disappointing, that \softline
should not be surprising.  Congress passed the law six weeks after the September 11 \softline
tragedy, under tremendous pressure from the executive branch, and in the midst of a \softline
terrifying anthrax attack that kept members of Congress out of their offices.  Few in \softline
Congress had time to read the statute before adopting it, let alone the will to resist \softline
measures that promised to give law enforcement new tools, whether those tools were \softline
actually needed or sufficiently restricted.  Congress failed to enact proposals to increase \softline
the limits on pen registers, such as by imposing a real probable cause requirement, \softline
ensuring meaningful judicial review, or providing notice and remedies to targets of 
unlawful investigations.  Those proposals had made it into a bill approved by the House \softline
in 2000, and had even appeared in earlier versions of the Patriot Act.{}{\plain \fs24 \*\cs32\super 29{\footnote \pard \fs24\s31\sa120 
{29}{}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \*\cs32\super\fs20 }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 See}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  H.R. Rep. No. 106-932 (2000) (describing the proposed Electronic Communications Privacy Act of \softline
2000);  H.R. Rep. No. 107-236 (I) (2001) (describing unenacted version of the Patriot Act).{\field{\*\fldinst ADVANCE \\d 6}{\fldrslt }}}}}
}{\plain \fs24 }{\plain \fs24   The final version, \softline
supported by the Justice Department, increased the scope of pen register investigations \softline
but not their regulation.\par
}\pard \fs24\fi720\sl360\slmult1 
{\plain \fs24 \par
}\pard \fs24\fi720\sl360\slmult1 
{\plain \fs24 The pen register provisions, even as amended, leave much unclear.  In the online \softline
context, the extent of both {\u8220\'93}contents{\u8221\'94} and {\u8220\'93}dialing, routing, addressing, and signaling{\u8221\'94} \softline
remain opaque, as does the crucial question of whether there is any information that those \softline
two categories exclude.  I turn to those questions next. \par
}\pard \fs24\fi720\sl360\slmult1 
{\plain \fs24 \par
}\pard \fs24\sl360\slmult1 
{\plain \fs24 \tab B. The Regulation of Current Practices\par
}{\plain \fs24 \par
}{\plain \fs24 \tab The ECPA, as amended, permits law enforcement investigators to benefit from \softline
the extremely weak protections accorded in the pen register provisions when they acquire \softline
{\u8220\'93}dialing, routing, addressing, and signaling{\u8221\'94} ({\u8220\'93}dras{\u8221\'94}) information online, but not \softline
{\u8220\'93}contents.{\u8221\'94}  To acquire the {\u8220\'93}contents{\u8221\'94} of an electronic communication, government \softline
investigators must satisfy the substantially more demanding requirements of the Wiretap \softline
Act.  That is what we do know.\par
}{\plain \fs24 \par
}{\plain \fs24 \tab What we don{\u8217\'92}t know is what counts as dras, what counts as contents, and whether \softline
there is anything besides those two categories.  Some hypotheticals may elaborate.  Alice \softline
sends an e-mail to Bob.  The e-mail looks something like this:\par
}{\plain \fs24 \par
}\pard \fs24
{\plain \fs24 To: Bob\par
}{\plain \fs24 From: Alice\line Subject: Our Date\par
}{\plain \fs24 When: Feb. 15, 2005\par
}{\plain \fs24 Attachment: Cute picture of us at dinner.\par
}{\plain \fs24 \par
}{\plain \fs24 Body Text: I had a great time last night. You are my valentine.\par
}{\plain \fs24 \par
}\ftnrstcont\pard \fs24\sl360\slmult1 
{\plain \fs24 \tab In the above email: {\u8220\'93}I had a great time last night.  You are my valentine{\u8221\'94} clearly \softline
constitutes the contents of the e-mail and should be unavailable to government \softline
investigators who acquire authorization only for a pen register.  The To and From \softline
information is clearly dras.  Information identifying the computer that sent the email and \softline
the computer that received it would also seem to be dras information.   The government \softline
has specified in its manuals that the subject line: {\u8220\'93}Our Date{\u8221\'94} and the attached picture \softline
count as contents.{\*\bkmkstart _Ref77656878}{}{\plain \fs24 \*\cs32\super 30{\footnote \pard \fs24\s31\sa120 
{30}{}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \*\cs32\super\fs20 }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 See}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \scaps\fs20  Computer Crime and Intell. Prop. Sec., Crim. Division, U.S. Dep{\u8217\'92}t of Just., Searching and \softline
Seizing Computers and Obtaining Electronic Evidence in Crim. Investigations}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  59 (2002) \softline
[hereinafter }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \scaps\fs20 DOJ Search Manual}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20 ].{\field{\*\fldinst ADVANCE \\d 6}{\fldrslt }}}}}
}{\plain \fs24 \ftnrstcont\pard \fs24\sl360\slmult1 
{\*\bkmkend _Ref77656878}{\*\bkmkstart _Ref77656878}{\*\bkmkend _Ref77656878}}{\plain \fs24   However, the statute does not say that and no court has yet \softline
confirmed it. There are other facts or attributes about this email, such as how big it is, \softline
when it was sent, when it arrived, and whether it has attachments.  The government \softline
contends that  any non-contents information may be obtained as pen register data.{\*\bkmkstart _Ref77656152}{}{\plain \fs24 \*\cs32\super 31{\footnote \pard \fs24\s31\sa120 
{31}{}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \*\cs32\super\fs20 }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 See, e.g., }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20 Mark Eckenwiler, U.S. Dep{\u8217\'92}t of Justice, }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 Field Guidance on New Authorities that Relate to \softline
Computer Crime and Electronic Evidence Enacted in the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \scaps\fs20 , 701 pli/pat}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  1227, \softline
1234 (2002) ({\u8220\'93}[P]en register and trap and trace devices may obtain any non-content information.{\u8221\'94}) \softline
[hereinafter }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 DOJ}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 Field}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 Guidance}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20 ]. {\field{\*\fldinst ADVANCE \\d 6}{\fldrslt }}}}}
}{\plain \fs24 {\*\bkmkend _Ref77656152}{\*\bkmkstart _Ref77656152}{\*\bkmkend _Ref77656152}}{\plain \fs24   \softline
However, neither the Wiretap Act nor the ECPA mentions these attributes explicitly.\par
}{\plain \fs24 \par
}\ftnrstcont\pard \fs24\sl360\slmult1 
{\plain \fs24 \tab According to the government, the law divides contents protected under the \softline
Wiretap Act from non-contents covered by the pen register provisions, and everything \softline
fits into one of those two categories.{\*\bkmkstart _Ref77824900}{}{\plain \fs24 \*\cs32\super 32{\footnote \pard \fs24\s31\sa120 
{32}{}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \*\cs32\super\fs20 }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 See, e.g}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20 , }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 Antiterrorism Investigations and the Fourth Amendment After September 11, 2001: Hearing \softline
Before the Subcomm. On the Constitution of the House Judiciary Committee}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20 , 108}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \super\fs20 th}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  Cong., 1}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \super\fs20 st}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  Sess. 63-64 \softline
(2003) (printing Department of Justice{\u8217\'92}s claim that all online information is either {\u8220\'93}contents{\u8221\'94} or may be \softline
obtained by a pen register) [hereinafter }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 Antiterrorism}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 Hearings]{\field{\*\fldinst ADVANCE \\d 6}{\fldrslt }}}}}
}{\plain \fs24 \ftnrstcont\pard \fs24\sl360\slmult1 
{\*\bkmkend _Ref77824900}{\*\bkmkstart _Ref77824900}{\*\bkmkend _Ref77824900}}{\plain \fs24   But much information seem to fit neither.  In the \softline
above example, neither dras nor contents captures the information about size, duration, \softline
and attachments.  In addition, detailed information about an online user{\u8217\'92}s travels through \softline
the Internet seems to fall somewhere in between contents and dras.  The same applies to \softline
the URL{\u8217\'92}s of the web sites one visits, the search terms that one enters on web sites, and \softline
the URL{\u8217\'92}s that contain those revealing search terms.  Log files retain just this sort of \softline
information and also indicate how long one spends at each site.{\*\bkmkstart _Ref77572036}{}{\plain \fs24 \*\cs32\super 33{\footnote \pard \fs24\s31\sa120 
{33}{}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \*\cs32\super\fs20 }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  In fact, an important question is what process regulates government access to stored records.  The law \softline
differentiates between real-time access by pen registers and access to information in electronic storage.  \softline
While the issue is crucial, it is beyond the scope of this essay.  For more on the different categories of the \softline
current law, }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 see}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  Patricia L. Bellia, }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 Surveillance Law Through Cyberlaw{\u8217\'92}s Lens,}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  72 }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \scaps\fs20 Geo. Wash. Law Rev.}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20   \softline
(forthcoming 2004); Freiwald, }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 supra}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  note 3.{\field{\*\fldinst ADVANCE \\d 6}{\fldrslt }}}}}
}{\plain \fs24 {\*\bkmkend _Ref77572036}{\*\bkmkstart _Ref77572036}{\*\bkmkend _Ref77572036}}{\plain \fs24   Such web-traffic data 
seems well beyond dras information, but not quite the contents of a communication \softline
either.\par
}{\plain \fs24 \par
}\ftnrstcont\pard \fs24\sl360\slmult1 
{\plain \fs24 \tab Courts have not provided clear answers.  One of the few cases that has addressed \softline
the issue demonstrates that secrecy will further impede clarity.  In the }{\plain \fs24 \i Scarfo}{\plain \fs24  case, the \softline
government convinced the court that it could not release information about a key-stroke \softline
logger program it had used to obtain the defendant{\u8217\'92}s encryption password without unduly \softline
compromising national security.  The defendant himself was provided only a brief \softline
summary of the technology.  The court accepted the government{\u8217\'92}s claim that the device \softline
did not intercept communications, contents or otherwise, because it was turned off when \softline
the defendant{\u8217\'92}s modem was engaged.  Without full disclosure of the mechanisms by \softline
which the government conducts its online monitoring, it is difficult to evaluate its \softline
claims.{}{\plain \fs24 \*\cs32\super 34{\footnote \pard \fs24\s31\sa120 
{34}{}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \*\cs32\super\fs20 }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 See}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  United States v. Scarfo, 180 F. Supp. 2d 572 (D.N.J. 2001); }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 see}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 also}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 id}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  (affidavit of Randall S. \softline
Murch) (Oct. 4}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \super\fs20 th}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20 , 2001) (describing the functionality of key-stroke loggers in general terms).{\field{\*\fldinst ADVANCE \\d 6}{\fldrslt }}}}}
}{\plain \fs24 }{\plain \fs24  \par
}{\plain \fs24 \par
}\ftnrstcont\pard \fs24\fi720\sl360\slmult1 
{\plain \fs24 The Justice Department has maintained a shroud of secrecy around its practices.  \softline
Among other issues, its resists disclosing the mechanisms behind Carnivore, the filtering \softline
software it considers to be a pen register.{}{\plain \fs24 \*\cs32\super 35{\footnote \pard \fs24\s31\sa120 
{35}{}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \*\cs32\super\fs20 }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 See The {\u8220\'93}Carnivore{\u8221\'94} Controversy: Electronic Surveillance and Privacy in a Digital Age: Hearing before \softline
the Senate Comm. On the Judiciary, }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20 106}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \super\fs20 th}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  Cong., 1}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \super\fs20 st}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  Sess. (2000) (statement of Donald M. Kerr, Assistant \softline
Director, Laboratory Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation); }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 The Fourth Amendment and Carnivore: \softline
Hearing before the Subcomm. On the Constitution of the House Judiciary Comm}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20 ., 106}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \super\fs20 th}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  Cong., 1}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \super\fs20 st}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  Sess. \softline
(2000) (statement of Barry Steinhardt, Associate Director of the ACLU) (describing Carnivore as {\u8220\'93}a black \softline
box into which flows all of a service providers communications traffic.  The service provider knows what \softline
goes in, but it has no way of knowing what the FBI takes out.{\u8221\'94}); E. Judson Jennings, }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 Carnivore: U.S. \softline
Government Surveillance of Internet Transmissions, }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20 6 }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \scaps\fs20 Va. J. L. & Tech.}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  10 (2001). {\field{\*\fldinst ADVANCE \\d 6}{\fldrslt }}}}}
}{\plain \fs24 \ftnrstcont\pard \fs24\fi720\sl360\slmult1 
}{\plain \fs24   The Department has gone so far as to resist \softline
disclosing its current legal interpretations.  Those prosecutors interested in learning more \softline
about the line between contents and non-contents information are instructed to call a 1-800 number.{}{\plain \fs24 \*\cs32\super 36{\footnote \pard \fs24\s31\sa120 
{36}{}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \*\cs32\super\fs20 }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 See}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 DOJ Field Guidance}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20 , }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 supra}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  note {\*\bkmkstart _Hlt67283065}31, at 1234.  Curiously, the article directs the inquiring prosecutor \softline
to contact the DOJ Section which purports to be the author of publication.  }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 See}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 id{\field{\*\fldinst ADVANCE \\d 6}{\fldrslt }}}}}
}{\plain \fs24 \ftnrstcont\pard \fs24\fi720\sl360\slmult1 
}{\plain \fs24   During consideration of the Patriot Act, Justice Department negotiators \softline
refused to clarify what {\u8220\'93}contents{\u8221\'94} meant in the online context, despite repeated requests \softline
from congressional staffers.{}{\plain \fs24 \*\cs32\super 37{\footnote \pard \fs24\s31\sa120 
{37}{}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \*\cs32\super\fs20 }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 See}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20 , }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 e.g}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20 ., Howell , }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 supra}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  note 28; 147 }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \scaps\fs20 Cong. Rec}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20 . S10372 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 2001) (statement of Sen. \softline
Leahy) ({\u8220\'93}[T]he FBI and Justice Department are short-sighted in their refusal to define{\u8221\'94} the terms {\u8220\'93}content{\u8221\'94}, 
{\u8220\'93}routing{\u8221\'94}, and {\u8220\'93}addressing{\u8221\'94} in the Patriot Act.).{\field{\*\fldinst ADVANCE \\d 6}{\fldrslt }}}}}
}{\plain \fs24 }{\plain \fs24   \par
}\pard \fs24\sl360\slmult1 
{\plain \fs24 \par
}{\plain \fs24 \tab \par
}{\plain \fs24 C. The Question of Institutional Choice\par
}{\plain \fs24 \par
}\ftnrstcont\pard \fs24\sl360\slmult1 
{\plain \fs24 \tab It is hard to deny that the law regulating online surveillance bears amending.  \softline
Even those who interpret the ECPA to give broad powers to the executive branch \softline
recognize that it must be updated.{\*\bkmkstart _Ref77654265}{}{\plain \fs24 \*\cs32\super 38{\footnote \pard \fs24\s31\sa120 
{38}{}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \*\cs32\super\fs20 }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 See, e.g. }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20 Orin Kerr, }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 Lifting the {\u8220\'93}Fog{\u8221\'94} of Internet Surveillance: How a Suppression Remedy Would \softline
Change Computer Law}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20 , 54}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \scaps\fs20  Hastings L. J. 805 (2003).}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  {\field{\*\fldinst ADVANCE \\d 6}{\fldrslt }}}}}
}{\plain \fs24 {\*\bkmkend _Ref77654265}{\*\bkmkstart _Ref77654265}{\*\bkmkend _Ref77654265}}{\plain \fs24   But who should update the law?  Courts could fill in \softline
gaps in the law through statutory interpretation.  They could clarify what counts as \softline
{\u8220\'93}dialing, routing, addressing, and signaling{\u8221\'94} and specify how to treat information \softline
excluded from both that category and {\u8220\'93}contents.{\u8221\'94}  Alternatively, Congress could devise \softline
new rules to regulate current practices and even future ones.  Other institutions bear \softline
consideration, including the market and the executive branch.  These are the comparative \softline
institutional considerations that I turn to next.\par
}{\plain \fs24 \par
}{\plain \fs24 II.  Comparative Institutional Analysis of Online Surveillance\par
}{\plain \fs24 \par
}{\plain \fs24 \tab At a descriptive level, comparative institutional analysis separates questions of \softline
institutional choice from those pertaining to goals and other values.  Particularly when \softline
proposing reforms, advocates often confuse arguments about what the goal should be \softline
with arguments about the appropriate way to achieve that goal.  Careful distillation of the \softline
institutional part of the debate promotes more refined thinking.\par
}{\plain \fs24 \par
}\ftnrstcont\pard \fs24\sl360\slmult1 
{\plain \fs24 \tab But how well does comparative institutional analysis prescribe?  It promises to \softline
yield insights into which institution, among all those available, is best situated to effect a \softline
particular legal change.  In the seminal book, }{\plain \fs24 \i Imperfect}{\plain \fs24  }{\plain \fs24 \i Alternatives}{\plain \fs24 , Professor Komesar \softline
used comparative institutional analysis to select courts as the institution best situated to \softline
handle questions of tort reform.{\*\bkmkstart _Ref77566666}{}{\plain \fs24 \*\cs32\super 39{\footnote \pard \fs24\s31\sa120 
{39}{}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \*\cs32\super\fs20 }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 See}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \scaps\fs20 Neil K. Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives: Choosing Institutions in Law, Economics, and \softline
Public Policy 1}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20 53-195 (1994) [hereinafter }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \scaps\fs20 {\u8220\'93}Imperfect Alternatives}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20 {\u8221\'94}].{\field{\*\fldinst ADVANCE \\d 6}{\fldrslt }}}}}
}{\plain \fs24 \ftnrstcont\pard \fs24\sl360\slmult1 
{\*\bkmkend _Ref77566666}{\*\bkmkstart _Ref77566666}{\*\bkmkend _Ref77566666}}{\plain \fs24   In a case study evaluating the liability of online \softline
intermediaries for third-party defamation, I used the method to choose courts as the 
preferred institution to set the legal standard.{\*\bkmkstart _Ref77737198}{}{\plain \fs24 \*\cs32\super 40{\footnote \pard \fs24\s31\sa120 
{40}{}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \*\cs32\super\fs20 }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 See}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  Susan Freiwald, }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 Comparative Institutional Analysis in Cyberspace: The Case of Intermediary \softline
Liability for Defamation}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20 , 14 HARV. J. L. TECH. 569 (2001). {\field{\*\fldinst ADVANCE \\d 6}{\fldrslt }}}}}
}{\plain \fs24 {\*\bkmkend _Ref77737198}{\*\bkmkstart _Ref77737198}{\*\bkmkend _Ref77737198}}{\plain \fs24   Comparative institutional analysis should \softline
be able to recommend an institution to update the internet surveillance laws.\par
}{\plain \fs24 \par
}\ftnrstcont\pard \fs24\sl360\slmult1 
{\plain \fs24 \tab The comparative institutional analyst identifies the relevant legal question, the \softline
social policy goal to be promoted by the answer, and the parties interested in both.  Then \softline
the analyst assesses the participation of each interested party in the available institutions.  \softline
Participation costs derive from the complexity of the question, the difficulty of achieving \softline
information about it, and the costs of organizing the members of each interested party.  \softline
Those must be weighed against participation benefits, which comprise the stakes in the \softline
outcome.{\*\bkmkstart _Ref77763341}{}{\plain \fs24 \*\cs32\super 41{\footnote \pard \fs24\s31\sa120 
{41}{}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \*\cs32\super\fs20 }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  Professor Komesar discusses {\u8220\'93}numbers{\u8221\'94} extensively in his most recent book.  }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \scaps\fs20 Neil K. Komesar, Law{\u8217\'92}s \softline
Limits: The Rule of Law and The Supply and Demand of Rights (2001) [}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20 hereinafter}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \scaps\fs20  Law{\u8217\'92}s Limits].}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20   \softline
{\u8220\'93}Numbers{\u8221\'94} elucidate participation costs and benefits.  The higher the numbers in a group, }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 ceterus}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 paribus}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20 , \softline
the higher the costs of organization and the lower the participation benefits.  I view the discussion in the \softline
text as adequately accounting for the impact of numbers.{\field{\*\fldinst ADVANCE \\d 6}{\fldrslt }}}}}
}{\plain \fs24 \ftnrstcont\pard \fs24\sl360\slmult1 
{\*\bkmkend _Ref77763341}{\*\bkmkstart _Ref77763341}{\*\bkmkend _Ref77763341}}{\plain \fs24    For example, if a particular legal change will dramatically reduce a party{\u8217\'92}s \softline
liability, then that party experiences large participation benefits from achieving such a \softline
change.  Smaller reductions in liability mean smaller participation benefits.  When \softline
participation benefits exceed participation costs for a particular group, that group can be \softline
expected to participate.  Once participation forecasts are made for each party, the last \softline
step is to assess institutional participation in light of the social policy goal -- which \softline
participation patterns in which institution will best achieve the social policy goal?{}{\plain \fs24 \*\cs32\super 42{\footnote \pard \fs24\s31\sa120 
{42}{}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \*\cs32\super\fs20 }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  I derive this approach from Professor Komesar{\u8217\'92}s book.  }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 See}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \scaps\fs20 Imperfect Alternatives}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20 , }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 supra}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  note 39.{\field{\*\fldinst ADVANCE \\d 6}{\fldrslt }}}}}
}{\plain \fs24 }{\plain \fs24    \par
}{\plain \fs24 \par
}{\plain \fs24 \tab A. Social Policy Goal\par
}{\plain \fs24 \par
}\ftnrstcont\pard \fs24\sl360\slmult1\tx0\tx2520\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640 
{\plain \fs24             Recall from Part I that the legal question is: what rules should govern government \softline
interception of non-contents information on the Internet?   When Congress has \softline
considered similar questions in the past, it has purported to balance the government{\u8217\'92}s \softline
interest in law enforcement against the individual{\u8217\'92}s civil liberties in general, and right to \softline
privacy in particular.  Courts have affirmed the need to balance these interests.  Both \softline
institutions recognize a fundamental conflict between government agents{\u8217\'92} desire to 
acquire the most information possible through surveillance and citizens{\u8217\'92} desire to avoid \softline
surveillance so as to maintain privacy.{}{\plain \fs24 \*\cs32\super 43{\footnote \pard \fs24\s31\sa120\tx0\tx2520\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640 
{43}{}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \*\cs32\super\fs20 }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  This simplifies a bit.  Many citizens feel ambivalent about surveillance, to the extent that they consider it \softline
at all.  Also, law enforcement enforces restrictions on private surveillance to protect privacy.  }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 See}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  Freiwald, \softline
}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 supra}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  note 3.  {\field{\*\fldinst ADVANCE \\d 6}{\fldrslt }}}}}
}{\plain \fs24 }{\plain \fs24 \par
}\pard \fs24\sl360\slmult1\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640 
{\plain \fs24 \par
}\ftnrstcont\pard \fs24\sl360\slmult1\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640 
{\plain \fs24 \tab The balancing metaphor, though pervasive, is problematic.  It assumes that the \softline
more information government has, the better it will do its job and thereby sacrifices \softline
privacy to achieve law enforcement efficiency.  Security experts question whether \softline
privacy deprivations necessarily increase security.  In fact, many {\u8220\'93}safety{\u8221\'94} measures are \softline
pure {\u8220\'93}security theater{\u8221\'94}; they may make us feel better, but they do nothing to help law \softline
enforcement.{\*\bkmkstart _Ref77585330}{}{\plain \fs24 \*\cs32\super 44{\footnote \pard \fs24\s31\sa120\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640 
{44}{}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \*\cs32\super\fs20 }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 See}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \scaps\fs20 Bruce Schneier}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20 , }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \scaps\fs20 Beyond Fear: Thinking Sensibly About Security in an Uncertain World \softline
38, 248}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  (2003) (calling such actions as placing national guardsmen in airports in the wake of 9/11 {\u8220\'93}security \softline
theater{\u8221\'94} rather than security enhancing); }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \scaps\fs20 Jeffrey Rosen, The Naked Crowd: Reclaiming Security and \softline
Freedom in an Anxious Age}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  8, 34 (2004) (describing the public{\u8217\'92}s interest in {\u8220\'93}feel-good{\u8221\'94} measures that \softline
bring no {\u8220\'93}demonstrable security benefits{\u8221\'94}).{\field{\*\fldinst ADVANCE \\d 6}{\fldrslt }}}}}
}{\plain \fs24 \ftnrstcont\pard \fs24\sl360\slmult1\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640 
{\*\bkmkend _Ref77585330}{\*\bkmkstart _Ref77585330}{\*\bkmkend _Ref77585330}}{\plain \fs24   Moreover, law enforcement does not need more information so much as \softline
it needs the time and intelligence to interpret what it already has.{}{\plain \fs24 \*\cs32\super 45{\footnote \pard \fs24\s31\sa120\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640 
{45}{}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \*\cs32\super\fs20 }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  A common view emerging from analysis of the run-up to September 11 is that government investigators \softline
had too much data and too little {\u8220\'93}human intelligence,{\u8221\'94} which refers to agents on the ground and translators.  \softline
{\field{\*\fldinst ADVANCE \\d 6}{\fldrslt }}}}}
}{\plain \fs24 \ftnrstcont\pard \fs24\sl360\slmult1\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640 
}{\plain \fs24   Having more non-incriminating information may make analysis more difficult.  As the haystack of \softline
information grows, it gets harder to find the needle of useful data.{}{\plain \fs24 \*\cs32\super 46{\footnote \pard \fs24\s31\sa120\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640 
{46}{}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \*\cs32\super\fs20 }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 See, e.g., }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \scaps\fs20 Schneier}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20 , }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 supra}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  note 44, at 162-63, 243-51 (describing massive data mining schemes as vastly \softline
wasteful, unproductive, and threatening to privacy and safety).{\field{\*\fldinst ADVANCE \\d 6}{\fldrslt }}}}}
}{\plain \fs24 }{\plain \fs24   \par
}{\plain \fs24 \par
}\ftnrstcont\pard \fs24\sl360\slmult1\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640 
{\plain \fs24 \tab At a deeper level, the balancing metaphor may not adequately invoke the good \softline
reasons to limit government surveillance.  Perhaps when the Wiretap Act was passed, \softline
when many citizens strongly opposed government wiretapping, the balancing short-hand \softline
reminded them of the need to limit law enforcement{\u8217\'92}s access to communications.  But \softline
modern citizens, fearful of another terrorist attack, may well view those who want \softline
protection from surveillance as either paranoid or having something to hide.  The historic \softline
abuses by government, including the misuse of surveillance to silence criticism and 
harass opponents, may seem far removed.{\*\bkmkstart _Ref77568429}{}{\plain \fs24 \*\cs32\super 47{\footnote \pard \fs24\s31\sa120\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640 
{47}{}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \*\cs32\super\fs20 }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  Many books review this history.  }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 See}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20 , }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 e.g}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20 ., }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \scaps\fs20 James X. Dempsey and David Cole}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20 , }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \scaps\fs20 Terrorism and the \softline
Constitution: Sacrificing Civil Liberties in the Name of National Security}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  (2d. ed. 2002); \softline
}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \scaps\fs20 Anthony Summers, Official and Confidential: The Secret Life of J. Edgar Hoover}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  (1993); \softline
}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \scaps\fs20 Samuel Dash, Richard F. Schwartz & Robert E. Knowlton, The Eavesdroppers (}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20 photo. reprint \softline
1979) }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \scaps\fs20 (1959)}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20 .{\field{\*\fldinst ADVANCE \\d 6}{\fldrslt }}}}}
}{\plain \fs24 {\*\bkmkend _Ref77568429}{\*\bkmkstart _Ref77568429}{\*\bkmkend _Ref77568429}}{\plain \fs24   The traditional balance may thus invite an \softline
inappropriate privacy trade-off.\par
}{\plain \fs24 \par
}{\plain \fs24 \tab With that in mind, I view the social policy goal to be protecting the privacy of \softline
communications from unnecessary government monitoring.  This formulation recognizes \softline
that government monitoring should be limited to that which is {\u8220\'93}necessary{\u8221\'94} and highlights  \softline
the need to protect privacy.  Granted, this social policy goal assumes the primacy of \softline
privacy, independent of constitutional doctrine, and begs the question of what monitoring \softline
is necessary.  I will return to those issues shortly.\par
}{\plain \fs24 \par
}{\plain \fs24 \tab B. Interested Parties and Participation Benefits\par
}{\plain \fs24 \par
}{\plain \fs24 \tab The next question is: which parties are interested in updating the rules for \softline
government surveillance of non-contents information on the Internet, so as to protect \softline
privacy from unnecessary government monitoring?  What are their participation benefits, \softline
or their stake in the outcome?\par
}{\plain \fs24 \par
}\ftnrstcont\pard \fs24\sl360\slmult1\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640 
{\plain \fs24 \tab Would-be law enforcement monitors are highly interested in this question \softline
because the surveillance laws directly impact their work.{}{\plain \fs24 \*\cs32\super 48{\footnote \pard \fs24\s31\sa120\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640 
{48}{}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \*\cs32\super\fs20 }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20   Federal agents are directly affected by federal law and state agents are indirectly affected because federal \softline
law sets the floor under state surveillance laws.  }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 See}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 generally}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  Charles H. Kennedy and Peter P. Swire, \softline
}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 State Wiretaps and Electronic Surveillance After September 11}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20 , 54 }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \scaps\fs20 Hastings L.J.}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  971. 983-85 (2003).   {\field{\*\fldinst ADVANCE \\d 6}{\fldrslt }}}}}
}{\plain \fs24 }{\plain \fs24   Government investigators \softline
comprise a relatively small group, each with a strong interest in the applicable legal rules.  \softline
They each have high participation benefits, because the rules determine their surveillance \softline
practices.  \par
}{\plain \fs24 \par
}\ftnrstcont\pard \fs24\sl360\slmult1\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640 
{\plain \fs24 \tab Potential targets, which include citizens who face the possibility of being \softline
surveilled, also have a substantial interest.{}{\plain \fs24 \*\cs32\super 49{\footnote \pard \fs24\s31\sa120\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640 
{49}{}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \*\cs32\super\fs20 }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  I focus on citizens here because of the constitutional claims.  A significant issue for non-citizens and \softline
others targeted by foreign intelligence surveillance is the even  looser requirements of those laws.  }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 See}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  \softline
}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 generally}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20 , Peter P. Swire, }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 The System of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Law}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20 , 72 }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \scaps\fs20 Geo. Wash. Law Rev.}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  \softline
(forthcoming 2004).{\field{\*\fldinst ADVANCE \\d 6}{\fldrslt }}}}}
}{\plain \fs24 \ftnrstcont\pard \fs24\sl360\slmult1\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640 
}{\plain \fs24   Those with the most direct stake are Internet \softline
users, who may be targeted by online surveillance.  As Internet use increases, and as \softline
regular telephone calls increasingly traverse the Internet, most American citizens will \softline
soon be potentially subject to online surveillance.{}{\plain \fs24 \*\cs32\super 50{\footnote \pard \fs24\s31\sa120\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640 
{50}{}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \*\cs32\super\fs20 }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 See}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20 , }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 e.g.,}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  Daniel Roth, }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 Catch Us if You Can,}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \scaps\fs20 Fortune}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20 , Feb. 9, 2004, at 65, 65 (describing current plans \softline
to replace all telephone calls with Internet-technology calls).{\field{\*\fldinst ADVANCE \\d 6}{\fldrslt }}}}}
}{\plain \fs24 \ftnrstcont\pard \fs24\sl360\slmult1\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640 
}{\plain \fs24   Though citizens{\u8217\'92} overall interest in \softline
privacy may well exceed law enforcements{\u8217\'92} interest in reducing it, that interest is \softline
diffusely spread, with each individual sharing only a small part.{\*\bkmkstart _Ref77582696}{}{\plain \fs24 \*\cs32\super 51{\footnote \pard \fs24\s31\sa120\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640 
{51}{}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \*\cs32\super\fs20 }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  This situation resembles the skewed distribution that Professor Komesar discusses.  }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 See}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \scaps\fs20 Imperfect \softline
Alternatives}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20 , }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 supra}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  note 39, at 76-79, 130-34.   It also raises the difficulty of {\u8220\'93}balancing{\u8221\'94} different \softline
interests.  }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 See}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20 , }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 e.g.,}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \scaps\fs20 Edith J. Lapidus}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20 , }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \scaps\fs20 Eavesdropping on Trial 196-98 (}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20 1974) (discussing the difficulty \softline
of measuring competing interests to apply the balancing metaphor).{\field{\*\fldinst ADVANCE \\d 6}{\fldrslt }}}}}
}{\plain \fs24 {\*\bkmkend _Ref77582696}{\*\bkmkstart _Ref77582696}{\*\bkmkend _Ref77582696}}{\plain \fs24     \par
}{\plain \fs24 \par
}\ftnrstcont\pard \fs24\sl360\slmult1\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640 
{\plain \fs24 \tab The actual target group comprises two subgroups: those who know they have \softline
been targeted and those who do not.  The first subgroup is much smaller than the second \softline
because there is no notice requirement for online surveillance of non-contents \softline
information.  In fact, service providers and others who aid in the surveillance must not \softline
disclose it to the targets, and the surveillance records are kept under seal.{}{\plain \fs24 \*\cs32\super 52{\footnote \pard \fs24\s31\sa120\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640 
{52}{}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \*\cs32\super\fs20 }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20   }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 See }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20 18 U.S.C. {\u167\'a7} 3123(d).{\field{\*\fldinst ADVANCE \\d 6}{\fldrslt }}}}}
}{\plain \fs24 \ftnrstcont\pard \fs24\sl360\slmult1\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640 
}{\plain \fs24    Targets learn \softline
of non-contents surveillance either by accident or because law enforcement also conducts \softline
a contents interception, for which notice must be provided.  In addition to the legal online \softline
surveillance that goes unnoticed, one must assume some illegal online surveillance of \softline
non-contents information, given the history of illegal surveillance.{}{\plain \fs24 \*\cs32\super 53{\footnote \pard \fs24\s31\sa120\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640 
{53}{}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \*\cs32\super\fs20 }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 See}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 supra}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  note 47; }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 see}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 also}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 In}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 re}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  Order Authorizing Installation of a Pen Register, 846 F. Supp. 1555, \softline
1563-64 (M.D. Fla. 1994) (Exhibit A) (opinion of Magistrate Wilson) (expressing concern that the absence \softline
of judicial review in the pen register provisions will lead to government abuse and misuse of pen registers).{\field{\*\fldinst ADVANCE \\d 6}{\fldrslt }}}}}
}{\plain \fs24 }{\plain \fs24   Most of that \softline
surveillance would never come to the attention of the target.  At the end of the day, we \softline
have no idea how many people are targets of online non-contents surveillance, but we do \softline
know that the subgroup of targets who are aware of their surveillance is small indeed. \par
}{\plain \fs24 \par
}{\plain \fs24 \tab C. Comparative Institutional Analysis and its Implications\par
}{\plain \fs24 \par
}\ftnrstcont\pard \fs24\sl360\slmult1\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640 
{\plain \fs24 \tab The standard comparative institutional inquiry considers the following three \softline
major institutions:  the market, the congress and the courts.  So I will begin with the three \softline
traditional institutions, before considering the executive branch.{}{\plain \fs24 \*\cs32\super 54{\footnote \pard \fs24\s31\sa120\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640 
{54}{}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \*\cs32\super\fs20 }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  Although many have recommended that an expert agency get involved, as has the privacy commissioner \softline
in Canada, that seems unrealistic at this point.  For reasons I get into next, the relationship between would-be government surveillers and targets has to be regulated by statute and the Constitution.{\field{\*\fldinst ADVANCE \\d 6}{\fldrslt }}}}}
}{\plain \fs24 }{\plain \fs24 \par
}{\plain \fs24 \par
}\pard \fs24\fi720\li720\sl360\slmult1\tx720\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640 
{\plain \fs24 1.  The Market\par
}\pard \fs24\sl360\slmult1\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640 
{\plain \fs24 \par
}\ftnrstcont\pard \fs24\sl360\slmult1\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640 
{\plain \fs24 \tab It would be difficult for the market to clarify the rules for government \softline
surveillance of the Internet.  Government investigators do not conduct surveillance \softline
pursuant to contracts; citizens may not negotiate their way out of government monitoring.  \softline
Much debate has focused on the use of private contracting between Internet users and \softline
commercial marketers to resolve privacy conflicts,{}{\plain \fs24 \*\cs32\super 55{\footnote \pard \fs24\s31\sa120\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640 
{55}{}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \*\cs32\super\fs20 }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 See}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20 , }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 e.g., }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \scaps\fs20 Lawrence Lessig}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20 , }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \scaps\fs20 Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  (1999);}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20  }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20 Marc Rotenberg, }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 Fair \softline
Information Practices and the Architecture of Privacy (What Larry Doesn{\u8217\'92}t Get}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20 ), 2001 }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \scaps\fs20 Stan. Tech. L. \softline
Rev.}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  1 (2001). {\field{\*\fldinst ADVANCE \\d 6}{\fldrslt }}}}}
}{\plain \fs24 }{\plain \fs24  but I know of no proposals for \softline
market-based solutions to government surveillance.\par
}{\plain \fs24 \par
}\ftnrstcont\pard \fs24\sl360\slmult1\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640 
{\plain \fs24 \tab That is not to say that the market plays no role; it does in at least two ways.  First, \softline
technology developed for commercial purposes may dramatically affect Internet users{\u8217\'92} \softline
privacy, vis-{\f3 \'42}-vis both private and government monitors.  For example, government \softline
agents conduct surveillance using spying software designed for commercial uses.{}{\plain \fs24 \*\cs32\super 56{\footnote \pard \fs24\s31\sa120\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640 
{56}{}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \*\cs32\super\fs20 }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 See}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20 , }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 e.g. }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \scaps\fs20 Preston Gralla, How the Internet Works}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  (7}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \super\fs20 th}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  ed. 2004) 316-19 (describing use by \softline
government monitors of commercial monitoring tools).{\field{\*\fldinst ADVANCE \\d 6}{\fldrslt }}}}}
}{\plain \fs24 \ftnrstcont\pard \fs24\sl360\slmult1\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640 
}{\plain \fs24   \softline
Though law enforcement welcomes such innovations, it has not welcomed the \softline
development of commercial encryption products that make electronic information more \softline
difficult to decipher.{}{\plain \fs24 \*\cs32\super 57{\footnote \pard \fs24\s31\sa120\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640 
{57}{}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \*\cs32\super\fs20 }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 See generally}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \scaps\fs20  Whitfield Diffie and Susan Landau, Privacy on the Line: The Politics of \softline
Wiretapping and Encryption}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  (1999). {\field{\*\fldinst ADVANCE \\d 6}{\fldrslt }}}}}
}{\plain \fs24 \ftnrstcont\pard \fs24\sl360\slmult1\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640 
}{\plain \fs24   Second, private entities, such as Internet service providers, \softline
significantly influence the privacy of online communications.  In recent years, Congress \softline
has viewed third party intermediaries as important protectors of privacy, in part through 
their contracts with users.{}{\plain \fs24 \*\cs32\super 58{\footnote \pard \fs24\s31\sa120\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640 
{58}{}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \*\cs32\super\fs20 }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20   }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 See}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  Freiwald, }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 supra}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  note {\*\bkmkstart _Hlt77824001}17, at 1010-1013 (critiquing the government{\u8217\'92}s claim that intermediaries protect \softline
privacy); }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 But}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 cf}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20 . Recording Industry Association of America v. Verizon Internet Services, 351 F. 3d. 1239 \softline
(D.C. Cir. 2003) (granting online service provider{\u8217\'92}s motion to quash subpoenas requesting the identities of \softline
subscribers allegedly engaged in file sharing).   {\field{\*\fldinst ADVANCE \\d 6}{\fldrslt }}}}}
}{\plain \fs24 \ftnrstcont\pard \fs24\sl360\slmult1\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640 
}{\plain \fs24   Whether they actually protect privacy or instead offer an end \softline
run around privacy protections is an important public policy question.{}{\plain \fs24 \*\cs32\super 59{\footnote \pard \fs24\s31\sa120\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640 
{59}{}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \*\cs32\super\fs20 }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 See, e.g.,}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  Bellia, }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 supra}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  note 33, at 84-86.  {\field{\*\fldinst ADVANCE \\d 6}{\fldrslt }}}}}
}{\plain \fs24 }{\plain \fs24  \par
}\pard \fs24\fi720\li720\sl360\slmult1\tx720\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640 
{\plain \fs24 \par
}\pard \fs24\fi720\li720\sl360\slmult1\tx720\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640 
{\plain \fs24 2.  The Congress \par
}\pard \fs24\sl360\slmult1\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640 
{\plain \fs24 \par
}\ftnrstcont\pard \fs24\fi720\sl360\slmult1\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640 
{\plain \fs24 While market-based transactions may not identify the terms under which law \softline
enforcement investigators may obtain private online communications, legislation may.   \softline
In Congress, citizens face high participation costs.  As mentioned, it is challenging to get \softline
accurate information about current practices and current law, both of which are \softline
remarkably complex.  The descriptive question may be harder to grasp, however, than the \softline
normative one:  what restrictions should there be on the government{\u8217\'92}s ability to monitor \softline
online activities?   Further, citizens{\u8217\'92} information costs in Congress may be decreasing as \softline
information becomes more available.  Online activist groups and interested academics \softline
have recently published explanations of current law and practice.{}{\plain \fs24 \*\cs32\super 60{\footnote \pard \fs24\s31\sa120\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640 
{60}{}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \*\cs32\super\fs20 }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 See}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20 , }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 e.g.,}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  sources cited note 33; www.aclu.org/SafeandFree SafeandFree.cfm?ID=12719&c=207 \softline
(containing reports and other information about government surveillance); http://www.eff.org/Privacy/ \softline
(containing documents and links relating to online privacy); http://www.epic.org/privacy/internet/ (same).{\field{\*\fldinst ADVANCE \\d 6}{\fldrslt }}}}}
}{\plain \fs24 }{\plain \fs24   \par
}\pard \fs24\fi720\sl360\slmult1\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640 
{\plain \fs24 \par
}\ftnrstcont\pard \fs24\fi720\sl360\slmult1\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640 
{\plain \fs24 Government investigators should face lower information costs in Congress.  As \softline
those who enforce the laws, they ought either to understand them or have access to those \softline
who do.{}{\plain \fs24 \*\cs32\super 61{\footnote \pard \fs24\s31\sa120\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640 
{61}{}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \*\cs32\super\fs20 }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  The Department of Justice has published a report for those in the field that purports to explain the online \softline
surveillance laws.  S}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 e}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20 e }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 DOJ}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 Field Guidance, supra }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20 note 31, at 1234; }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \scaps\fs20 DOJ Search Manual , }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 supra}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  note \softline
30, at }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \scaps\fs20 5}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20 6-58.  {\field{\*\fldinst ADVANCE \\d 6}{\fldrslt }}}}}
}{\plain \fs24 \ftnrstcont\pard \fs24\fi720\sl360\slmult1\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640 
}{\plain \fs24   On the other hand the complexity of the current framework seems to vex even \softline
those conducting surveillance.  Justice Department representatives regularly disclaim \softline
awareness of the intricacies of the law and current practices.{}{\plain \fs24 \*\cs32\super 62{\footnote \pard \fs24\s31\sa120\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640 
{62}{}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \*\cs32\super\fs20 }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  For example, the Justice Department official in charge of those who conduct Internet Surveillance has \softline
repeatedly failed to clarify what the government collects with online {\u8220\'93}pen registers.{\u8221\'94}  }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 See, e.g.,}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  \softline
http://cfp2004.org/program/#keynote2  (containing transcripts of speech by Rachel Brand, Principal Deputy \softline
Assistant General, U.S. Dep{\u8217\'92}t of Justice, Office of Legal Policy).{\field{\*\fldinst ADVANCE \\d 6}{\fldrslt }}}}}
}{\plain \fs24 \ftnrstcont\pard \fs24\fi720\sl360\slmult1\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640 
}{\plain \fs24   Four years after passage \softline
of the ECPA, Secret Service agents did not realize that it applied to the seizure of e-mail 
records.{}{\plain \fs24 \*\cs32\super 63{\footnote \pard \fs24\s31\sa120\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640 
{63}{}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \*\cs32\super\fs20 }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. United States Secret Service, 816 F. Supp. 432, 442-44 (W.D. Tex. 1993), \softline
}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 aff{\u8217\'92}d}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  36 F.3d 457 (5th Cir. 1994) (finding that government agents never contemplated the applicable statute, \softline
and recommending more education of such agents). {\field{\*\fldinst ADVANCE \\d 6}{\fldrslt }}}}}
}{\plain \fs24 \ftnrstcont\pard \fs24\fi720\sl360\slmult1\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640 
}{\plain \fs24   Finally, as mentioned, recently published interpretations claim an aggressive \softline
power to conduct surveillance that is not justified by precedents or common sense.{}{\plain \fs24 \*\cs32\super 64{\footnote \pard \fs24\s31\sa120\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640 
{64}{}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \*\cs32\super\fs20 }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 See}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  Freiwald, }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 supra}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  note 3 (discussing current aggressive interpretations by law enforcement \softline
representatives). {\field{\*\fldinst ADVANCE \\d 6}{\fldrslt }}}}}
}{\plain \fs24 }{\plain \fs24 \par
}\pard \fs24\sl360\slmult1\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640 
{\plain \fs24 \par
}\ftnrstcont\pard \fs24\sl360\slmult1\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640 
{\plain \fs24 \tab As for the costs of organization, government representatives have aggressively \softline
lobbied for expansive government surveillance powers.  Executive branch authorities do \softline
not need the consensus of lower level members to represent their interests, so that \softline
reduces their organization costs.  Citizens have disparate interests and are more difficult \softline
to represent.  However, online privacy advocacy groups have grown in strength and \softline
efficacy over the last ten years.  The availability of inexpensive online publishing permits \softline
such groups as the Electronic Frontier Foundation, the Electronic Privacy Information \softline
Center, the Center for Democracy and Technology, and the ACLU to reach members \softline
cheaply.{}{\plain \fs24 \*\cs32\super 65{\footnote \fs20\pard \fs24\s31\sa120\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640 
{65}{}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \*\cs32\super\fs20 }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 See}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  www.eff.org; www.epic.org; www.cdt.org}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \*\cs36\fs20 ; }{\field{\*\fldinst   { HYPERLINK "http://www.aclu.org" }}{\fldrslt{{\sa120 \*\cs37\ul\cf3\fs20 www.aclu.org}}}}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \*\cs36\fs20 }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20 . The author serves on the board of the \softline
ACLU of Northern California.{\field{\*\fldinst ADVANCE \\d 6}{\fldrslt }}}}}
}{\plain \fs24 }{\plain \fs24   Representatives from such groups have testified in Congress to advocate \softline
limits on government surveillance capacities. \par
}{\plain \fs24 \par
}\ftnrstcont\pard \fs24\sl360\slmult1\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640 
{\plain \fs24 \tab Overall, we have seen much greater participation in Congress by law enforcement \softline
than by those advocating online privacy.  In the ECPA, the incomplete extension of rights \softline
and remedies to electronic communications reflected the desires of law enforcement and \softline
substantially limited online privacy.  The minimal protections of the pen register \softline
provisions reflect law enforcement{\u8217\'92}s priorities.{}{\plain \fs24 \*\cs32\super 66{\footnote \pard \fs24\s31\sa120\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640 
{66}{}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \*\cs32\super\fs20 }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 See}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  Michael S. Leib, }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 E-Mail and the Wiretap Laws: Why Congress Should Add Electronic \softline
Communication to Title III{\u8217\'92}s Statutory Exclusionary Rule and Expressly Reject a {\u8220\'93}Good Faith{\u8221\'94} Exception}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20 , \softline
34 }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \scaps\fs20 Harv. J. on Legis}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20 . 393, 409-11 (1997) (describing Justice Department opposition to the suppression \softline
remedy and congressional acquiescence due to the need for its support).{\field{\*\fldinst ADVANCE \\d 6}{\fldrslt }}}}}
}{\plain \fs24 \ftnrstcont\pard \fs24\sl360\slmult1\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640 
}{\plain \fs24   The privacy activists lobbied during \softline
consideration of the 1994 amendments, but the gains they achieved were not dramatic.{}{\plain \fs24 \*\cs32\super 67{\footnote \pard \fs24\s31\sa120\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640 
{67}{}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \*\cs32\super\fs20 }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 See}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 generally}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20 , Freiwald, }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 supra}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  note 17.{\field{\*\fldinst ADVANCE \\d 6}{\fldrslt }}}}}
}{\plain \fs24 \ftnrstcont\pard \fs24\sl360\slmult1\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640 
}{\plain \fs24   \softline
The Patriot Act amendments also reflected law enforcement{\u8217\'92}s interests and did little to 
improve privacy.  It is perhaps not surprising that some have proclaimed that Congress \softline
will not draft any law that law enforcement does not fully support.{}{\plain \fs24 \*\cs32\super 68{\footnote \pard \fs24\s31\sa120\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640 
{68}{}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \*\cs32\super\fs20 }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 See, e.g.,}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  Paul Ohm, }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 Symposium Piece}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20 , 72 }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \scaps\fs20 Geo. Wash. Law Rev. }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  (2004) (forthcoming). {\field{\*\fldinst ADVANCE \\d 6}{\fldrslt }}}}}
}{\plain \fs24 }{\plain \fs24    \par
}{\plain \fs24 \par
}{\plain \fs24 \tab History does not suggest that Congress has been well suited to achieve the social \softline
policy goal of protecting privacy from unnecessary monitoring.  For non-contents \softline
information in particular, Congress has seemed to abandon privacy in favor of giving law \softline
enforcement whatever tools it wants, necessary or not.  Congress seems burdened by the \softline
over-representation of law enforcement and the under-representation of privacy interests.  \par
}\pard \fs24\fi720\sl360\slmult1\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640 
{\plain \fs24 \par
}\ftnrstcont\pard \fs24\fi720\sl360\slmult1\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640 
{\plain \fs24 Several factors could improve the efficacy of participation in Congress, however.  \softline
First, if members of Congress and their constituents overcame their fears and approached \softline
online surveillance rationally, that would increase the negotiating leverage of online \softline
privacy activists.  Second, if executive branch officials continue to seem untrustworthy, \softline
as they have in connection with the run-up to the Iraq War, and overreaching, as the \softline
Supreme Court viewed them in the cases pertaining to enemy combatants and detainees,{}{\plain \fs24 \*\cs32\super 69{\footnote \pard \fs24\s31\sa120\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640 
{69}{}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \*\cs32\super\fs20 }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 See}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 72 U.S.L.W. 4607 (2004); Rasul v. Bush, 72 U.S.L.W. 4596 (2004).{\field{\*\fldinst ADVANCE \\d 6}{\fldrslt }}}}}
}{\plain \fs24 }{\plain \fs24  \softline
then their argument that we and our legislators should trust them should weaken.  \softline
Whether that would be enough to obtain the right balance in Congress and effectuate the \softline
social policy goal is another question.\par
}\pard \fs24\sl360\slmult1\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640 
{\plain \fs24 \par
}\pard \fs24\fi720\sl360\slmult1\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640 
{\plain \fs24 At this point in the analysis, our question remains: will Congress be better than \softline
the alternative, the courts, at achieving the social policy goal?  The relative nature of the \softline
inquiry permits us to sidestep the impossible task of specifying what {\u8220\'93}appropriate{\u8221\'94} \softline
representation is.  We do not have to identify the perfect participation balance, we must \softline
merely assess which institution provides less imbalance.  \par
}\pard \fs24\sl360\slmult1\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640 
{\plain \fs24 \par
}\pard \fs24\fi720\li720\sl360\slmult1\tx720\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640 
{\plain \fs24 3.  The Courts\par
}\pard \fs24\sl360\slmult1\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640 
{\plain \fs24 \par
}\ftnrstcont\pard \fs24\sl360\slmult1\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640 
{\plain \fs24 \tab As for the courts, judges should be less willing to indulge an irrational faith that \softline
surveillance protects us.  But several lower courts have accepted the executive branches{\u8217\'92} 
extravagant claims to unchecked power to prosecute the {\u8220\'93}War on Terror.{\u8221\'94}{}{\plain \fs24 \*\cs32\super 70{\footnote \pard \fs24\s31\sa120\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640 
{70}{}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \*\cs32\super\fs20 }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 See}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20 , }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 e.g., }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 430 (4}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \super\fs20 th}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  Cir. 2003) (denying relief to {\u8220\'93}enemy combatant{\u8221\'94}), \softline
}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 reversed}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 by}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  Hamdi v. Rumsfeld;  Al Odah v. United States, 321 F. 3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (affirming \softline
district court{\u8217\'92}s denial of  jurisdiction over Guantanamo detainees, who had to sue in Cuba, if at all), \softline
}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 reversed}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 by}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  Rasul v. Bush.   {\field{\*\fldinst ADVANCE \\d 6}{\fldrslt }}}}}
}{\plain \fs24 \ftnrstcont\pard \fs24\sl360\slmult1\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640 
}{\plain \fs24    The \softline
Supreme Court{\u8217\'92}s rejection of those claims could have gone much farther;{}{\plain \fs24 \*\cs32\super 71{\footnote \pard \fs24\s31\sa120\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640 
{71}{}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \*\cs32\super\fs20 }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  For example, the Court failed to rule on Padilla{\u8217\'92}s claims and left many questions unanswered about \softline
exactly what judicial procedures are required for enemy combatants and detainees and what rights they \softline
have.{\field{\*\fldinst ADVANCE \\d 6}{\fldrslt }}}}}
}{\plain \fs24 \ftnrstcont\pard \fs24\sl360\slmult1\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640 
}{\plain \fs24  the historical \softline
record reveals that fear can hold significant sway there.{}{\plain \fs24 \*\cs32\super 72{\footnote \pard \fs24\s31\sa120\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640 
{72}{}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \*\cs32\super\fs20 }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 See, e.g., }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).  Professor Komesar discusses the }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 Korematsu}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  \softline
case at some length. }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 See}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \scaps\fs20 Imperfect Alternatives}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20 , }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 supra}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  note 39, at 210-13, 248, 253, 254.{\field{\*\fldinst ADVANCE \\d 6}{\fldrslt }}}}}
}{\plain \fs24 }{\plain \fs24   In any case, let us consider \softline
how participation in the courts varies significantly from participation in Congress.\par
}{\plain \fs24 \par
}\ftnrstcont\pard \fs24\sl360\slmult1\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640 
{\plain \fs24 \tab While all potential victims of unlawful surveillance participate in Congress, only \softline
actual victims participate in litigation.{}{\plain \fs24 \*\cs32\super 73{\footnote \pard \fs24\s31\sa120\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640 
{73}{}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \*\cs32\super\fs20 }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  This is the shifted distribution that Professor Komesar observed.  }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 See}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 Id}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20 . at 134-38.  Actual victims may \softline
participate in Congress as a matter of principle rather than self-interest, since any law passed to protect \softline
privacy will likely give no remedy for their past victimization.{\field{\*\fldinst ADVANCE \\d 6}{\fldrslt }}}}}
}{\plain \fs24 \ftnrstcont\pard \fs24\sl360\slmult1\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640 
}{\plain \fs24  As discussed, the class of actual targets of \softline
surveillance who know they have been monitored is a small subset of those who have \softline
actually been monitored.  Not only do targets lack awareness of surveillance, but current \softline
law provides no remedies for unlawful interception of non-contents information online.{}{\plain \fs24 \*\cs32\super 74{\footnote \pard \fs24\s31\sa120\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640 
{74}{}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \*\cs32\super\fs20 }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 See}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 supra}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  note 20.{\field{\*\fldinst ADVANCE \\d 6}{\fldrslt }}}}}
}{\plain \fs24 }{\plain \fs24    \softline
\par
}{\plain \fs24 \par
}\ftnrstcont\pard \fs24\fi720\sl360\slmult1\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640 
{\plain \fs24 The only cases so far to consider privacy rights in online non-contents \softline
information have been those brought by Internet users seeking to exclude from their \softline
criminal trials the subscriber information obtained by the government.{}{\plain \fs24 \*\cs32\super 75{\footnote \pard \fs24\s31\sa120\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640 
{75}{}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \*\cs32\super\fs20 }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  In other words, the cases have arisen under the stored records provisions of the ECPA, 18 U.S.C. {\u167\'a7} 2701, \softline
{\u167\'a7} 2703 and the Constitution, rather than the pen register provisions.{\field{\*\fldinst ADVANCE \\d 6}{\fldrslt }}}}}
}{\plain \fs24 \ftnrstcont\pard \fs24\fi720\sl360\slmult1\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640 
}{\plain \fs24   While their \softline
stakes are high, such defendants have not been the best representatives of overall \softline
society{\u8217\'92}s privacy interest.  Most of them have been online child pornographers and \softline
sexual abusers, who are some of the most heinous criminals in society.{\*\bkmkstart _Ref77772143}{}{\plain \fs24 \*\cs32\super 76{\footnote \pard \fs24\s31\sa120\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640 
{76}{}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \*\cs32\super\fs20 }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 See}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20 , }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 e.g., }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20 United States v. Hambrick, 55 F. Supp. 2d 504, 508 (W.D. Va. 1999), }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 aff{\u8217\'92}d}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20 , 225 F.2d 656 (4}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \super\fs20 th}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  \softline
Cir. 2000), }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 cert}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20 . }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 den}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20 ., 531 U.S. 1039 (2001) (denying suppression of e-mail address, name, billing address, \softline
credit card number, and IP connection information despite invalid subpoena); United States v. Kennedy, 81 \softline
F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1110 (D. Kan. 2000) (denying suppression of subscriber information obtained by invalid \softline
court order); Guest v. Leis, 255 F.3d 325, 333, 335-36 (6th Cir. 2001) (denying suppression of passwords, \softline
names, addresses, and birthdates because they were provided to a third party in a case involving both 
obscenity and child pornography).   {\field{\*\fldinst ADVANCE \\d 6}{\fldrslt }}}}}
}{\plain \fs24 \ftnrstcont\pard \fs24\fi720\sl360\slmult1\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640 
{\*\bkmkend _Ref77772143}{\*\bkmkstart _Ref77772143}{\*\bkmkend _Ref77772143}}{\plain \fs24   Because 
incriminating evidence is such cases may be largely electronic, those defendants have \softline
had a lot to gain from the suppression of evidence.  Yet citizens and judges are likely to \softline
focus on the danger these defendants pose and lose sight of the more abstract question of \softline
how government investigators use their surveillance powers.   Similarly, law enforcement \softline
agents have a strong interest in bringing these defendants to justice, an interest that is \softline
widely shared.  Average citizens may see their interests as more aligned with the victims \softline
than with the defendants.  Overall, it should not be surprising that these defendants have \softline
lost their claims and, along with them, the opportunity to protect privacy.{}{\plain \fs24 \*\cs32\super 77{\footnote \pard \fs24\s31\sa120\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640 
{77}{}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \*\cs32\super\fs20 }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 See}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  cases }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 supra}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  note 76. {\field{\*\fldinst ADVANCE \\d 6}{\fldrslt }}}}}
}{\plain \fs24 }{\plain \fs24  \par
}\pard \fs24\sl360\slmult1\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640 
{\plain \fs24 \par
}\ftnrstcont\pard \fs24\sl360\slmult1\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640 
{\plain \fs24 \tab Courts have justified their repeated denial of constitutional claims in some online \softline
non-contents information by extending }{\plain \fs24 \i Smith}{\plain \fs24  beyond telephone numbers.  In fact, Justice \softline
Department officials have wrongly characterized }{\plain \fs24 \i Smith}{\plain \fs24  as having applied to }{\plain \fs24 \i all}{\plain \fs24  non-contents information.{}{\plain \fs24 \*\cs32\super 78{\footnote \pard \fs24\s31\sa120\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640 
{78}{}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \*\cs32\super\fs20 }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 See, e.g. Antiterrorism Hearings, supra }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20 note 32, at 7 ({\u8220\'93}Of course, the Supreme Court has long held that \softline
non-content information is not protected by the Fourth Amendment.{\u8221\'94})  (statement of Viet D. Dinh, \softline
Assistant Attorney General, Justice Department).{\field{\*\fldinst ADVANCE \\d 6}{\fldrslt }}}}}
}{\plain \fs24 \ftnrstcont\pard \fs24\sl360\slmult1\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640 
}{\plain \fs24   The contents/non-contents distinction serves law enforcement{\u8217\'92}s \softline
interest in constraining privacy rights, but it ignores history.  The Supreme Court in }{\plain \fs24 \i Katz}{\plain \fs24  \softline
and Congress in the Wiretap Act distinguished protected conversation contents not from \softline
unprotected non-contents but rather from tangible items.  At the time, questions lingered \softline
about whether intangible conversations were protected by the Fourth Amendment, \softline
because the literal language did not include them.{}{\plain \fs24 \*\cs32\super 79{\footnote \pard \fs24\s31\sa120\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640 
{79}{}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \*\cs32\super\fs20 }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20  See }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 364 (1967) (Black, J. dissenting) (arguing that intangibles were \softline
not protected).{\field{\*\fldinst ADVANCE \\d 6}{\fldrslt }}}}}
}{\plain \fs24 \ftnrstcont\pard \fs24\sl360\slmult1\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640 
}{\plain \fs24   When Congress passed the Wiretap \softline
Act, it included all information disclosed by wiretaps.{}{\plain \fs24 \*\cs32\super 80{\footnote \pard \fs24\s31\sa120\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640 
{80}{}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \*\cs32\super\fs20 }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 See}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  18 U.S.C. {\u167\'a7} 2510(8) (1968) (defining {\u8220\'93}contents{\u8221\'94} as {\u8220\'93}any information concerning the identities of the \softline
parties to such communication or the existence, substance, purport, or meaning of that communication{\u8221\'94}).  \softline
The definition of contents was designed to be comprehensive.  }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 See}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  S. Rep. No. 90-1097, at 105 (1968), \softline
}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 reprinted}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 in}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  U.S.C.C.A.N 2112, 2179 (defining {\u8220\'93}contents{\u8221\'94} to include {\u8220\'93}all aspects of the communication{\u8221\'94}).  {\field{\*\fldinst ADVANCE \\d 6}{\fldrslt }}}}}
}{\plain \fs24 \ftnrstcont\pard \fs24\sl360\slmult1\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640 
}{\plain \fs24   After }{\plain \fs24 \i Smith}{\plain \fs24 , the ECPA limited \softline
the definition of contents, but did not address information that was neither contents nor \softline
captured by pen registers.{}{\plain \fs24 \*\cs32\super 81{\footnote \pard \fs24\s31\sa120\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640 
{81}{}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \*\cs32\super\fs20 }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 See}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  18 U.S.C. {\u167\'a7} 2510(8) (1986) (redefining the {\u8220\'93}contents{\u8221\'94} of a communication to include {\u8220\'93}any \softline
information concerning the substance, purport or meaning of that communication{\u8221\'94}).  {\field{\*\fldinst ADVANCE \\d 6}{\fldrslt }}}}}
}{\plain \fs24 \ftnrstcont\pard \fs24\sl360\slmult1\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640 
}{\plain \fs24   Courts that have applied }{\plain \fs24 \i Smith}{\plain \fs24  have repeated the Supreme \softline
Court{\u8217\'92}s mistake in that case.  They have held Internet users to assume the risk of 
disclosure of non-contents information, rather than considering, at a normative level, the \softline
type of information, and the implications of withholding privacy protection from it.{}{\plain \fs24 \*\cs32\super 82{\footnote \pard \fs24\s31\sa120\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640 
{82}{}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \*\cs32\super\fs20 }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 See }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20 cases }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 supra}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  note 76.{\field{\*\fldinst ADVANCE \\d 6}{\fldrslt }}}}}
}{\plain \fs24 }{\plain \fs24   \par
}{\plain \fs24 \par
}\ftnrstcont\pard \fs24\sl360\slmult1\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640 
{\plain \fs24 \tab As it stands, most potential and actual victims of undue surveillance powers never \softline
make it into courts to plead their case.   In fact, those who do sue arguably inhibit courts \softline
from achieving the social policy goal.  While it is possible that courts could become more \softline
aware of the broader privacy implications of their decisions, little suggests such a trend.{}{\plain \fs24 \*\cs32\super 83{\footnote \pard \fs24\s31\sa120\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640 
{83}{}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \*\cs32\super\fs20 }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  For example, the 10}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \super\fs20 th}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  Circuit expressed genuine hostility to the notion of privacy in a recent case.  }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 See \softline
}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20 U.S. West Inc. v. FCC, 182 F.3d 1224, 1234-35 (10}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \super\fs20 th}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  Cir. 1999) (expressing doubt about the value of \softline
privacy and cataloguing the harms from keeping information private).  {\field{\*\fldinst ADVANCE \\d 6}{\fldrslt }}}}}
}{\plain \fs24 }{\plain \fs24   \softline
Under the current legal framework, Congress seems preferable to the courts as the \softline
institution to update the electronic surveillance laws.  Instead of hearing from dangerous \softline
child predators attempting to escape punishment, Congress can hear from impressive \softline
academics and impassioned activists.  Though participation in Congress is imperfect, it \softline
seems better than the alternative.\par
}{\plain \fs24 \par
}\ftnrstcont\pard \fs24\fi720\sl360\slmult1\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640 
{\plain \fs24 This result is remarkably contingent.  Small changes in the law could switch the \softline
institutional preference to courts.  For example, if the ECPA permitted generous statutory \softline
remedies for victims of unlawful surveillance, then ordinary citizens would be motivated \softline
to bring cases, perhaps with the help of activists.{}{\plain \fs24 \*\cs32\super 84{\footnote \pard \fs24\s31\sa120\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640 
{84}{}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \*\cs32\super\fs20 }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  Relatedly, Professor Orin Kerr has recommended a statutory exclusionary rule to flesh out the contours of \softline
the law  }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 See}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  Kerr, }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 supra}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  note 38. {\field{\*\fldinst ADVANCE \\d 6}{\fldrslt }}}}}
}{\plain \fs24 \ftnrstcont\pard \fs24\fi720\sl360\slmult1\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640 
}{\plain \fs24   Courts considering such cases would \softline
be better able to assimilate the complicated legal issues than members of Congress, who \softline
are susceptible to sound bites.{}{\plain \fs24 \*\cs32\super 85{\footnote \pard \fs24\s31\sa120\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640 
{85}{}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \*\cs32\super\fs20 }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  In discussions about a narrowly defeated recent bill to make minor changes to Patriot Act provisions to \softline
protect privacy, law enforcement advocates engaged in fear mongering.  }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 See }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20 Eric Lichtblau, }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 Effort to Curb \softline
Scope of Antiterrorism Law Falls Short}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20 , New York Times (July 9, 2004).  Those also tactics preceded \softline
passage of the Patriot Act.  }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 See}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 Justice: From the Ashes of 9/11}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20 : }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 Big Bad John}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20 , 35 }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \scaps\fs20 Nat{\u8217\'92}l L. J. }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20 4 (Jan. 25, \softline
2003) (reporting that Attorney General Ashcroft assured lawmakers that {\u8220\'93}blood would be on their hands{\u8221\'94} if \softline
another terrorist attack occurred before they passed the version of the Patriot Act he promoted).{\field{\*\fldinst ADVANCE \\d 6}{\fldrslt }}}}}
}{\plain \fs24 \ftnrstcont\pard \fs24\fi720\sl360\slmult1\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640 
}{\plain \fs24   Also, such plaintiffs as journalists or political activists \softline
who have been harassed by government surveillance would likely enlist the judge{\u8217\'92}s \softline
sympathy.   Moreover, if courts understood the need to respect privacy as a normative \softline
matter and rejected the assumption of risk, then they could establish a strong \softline
constitutional foundation that protected rich online data despite the lack of statutory 
protection.  Finally, another significant terrorist attack could well scare citizens into \softline
relinquishing yet more privacy rights to gain a sense of security.  In that case, law \softline
enforcement may overwhelm its opponents in Congress.{}{\plain \fs24 \*\cs32\super 86{\footnote \pard \fs24\s31\sa120\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640 
{86}{}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \*\cs32\super\fs20 }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  At the recent ACLU membership conference, several speakers warned that another terrorist attack could \softline
lead us into a police state. {\field{\*\fldinst ADVANCE \\d 6}{\fldrslt }}}}}
}{\plain \fs24 }{\plain \fs24     \par
}\pard \fs24\fi720\sl360\slmult1\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640 
{\plain \fs24 \par
}\pard \fs24\fi720\li720\sl360\slmult1\tx720\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640 
{\plain \fs24 4.  The Executive Branch\par
}\pard \fs24\sl360\slmult1\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640 
{\plain \fs24 \par
}\ftnrstcont\pard \fs24\sl360\slmult1\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640 
{\plain \fs24 \tab In the foregoing analysis, the executive branch did not come to mind as a possible \softline
institution to change the online surveillance rules, because law enforcement, which falls \softline
within the executive branch, is charged with enforcing those rules.  The rules themselves \softline
are designed to constrain law enforcement.  But arguably the current law, with \softline
insufficient proscriptions that are largely unenforceable, has devolved into a set of rules \softline
that law enforcement agents interpret themselves.  In fact, apologists for the current \softline
system argue that law enforcement{\u8217\'92}s self-restraint obviates the need for change.{}{\plain \fs24 \*\cs32\super 87{\footnote \pard \fs24\s31\sa120\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640 
{87}{}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \*\cs32\super\fs20 }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  For example, the Department of Justice has dismissed concerns about its new Patriot Act powers to \softline
acquire library records and the like by arguing that it does not use them. }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 Cf}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20 . }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 See}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  Steve Jackson Games, Inc. \softline
v. United States Secret Service, 36 F.3d 457 (3d. Cir. 457) (1994) (suggesting that possibility of key-word \softline
searching obviates the need to minimize acquisition of stored contents).{\field{\*\fldinst ADVANCE \\d 6}{\fldrslt }}}}}
}{\plain \fs24 }{\plain \fs24 \par
}{\plain \fs24 \par
}\ftnrstcont\pard \fs24\sl360\slmult1\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640 
{\plain \fs24 \tab From the perspective of the participation framework, law enforcement would not \softline
be the institution to effectuate the social policy goal of protecting privacy from \softline
unnecessary surveillance.  Law enforcement officers tend to approve of all surveillance \softline
powers and to exhibit insufficient concern for privacy.{}{\plain \fs24 \*\cs32\super 88{\footnote \pard \fs24\s31\sa120\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640 
{88}{}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \*\cs32\super\fs20 }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  For a fascinating history of law enforcement{\u8217\'92}s early abuse of surveillance, see }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \scaps\fs20 Dash}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20 , supra note 47.  An \softline
interesting exception to this general rule can be found in the Attorney General{\u8217\'92}s opposition to the Wiretap \softline
Act on the grounds that law enforcement did not need surveillance powers.  }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 See}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \scaps\fs20 Lapidus, }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 supra}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  note 51, at \softline
13, 40.{\field{\*\fldinst ADVANCE \\d 6}{\fldrslt }}}}}
}{\plain \fs24 }{\plain \fs24   Potential targets have a difficult \softline
time knowing what current practices are, and actual targets are unlikely to find out if they \softline
are victimized by unlawful practices without notice.  Whether potential or actual, targets \softline
of surveillance have no ability to affect law enforcement{\u8217\'92}s own choices about how to \softline
conduct surveillance, outside of Congress or the courts.  Since the party with the least \softline
interest in privacy has sole representation in the executive branch, the current system is \softline
untenable.\par
}\ftnrstcont\pard \fs24\fi720\sl360\slmult1\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640 
{\plain \fs24 Reformulating the social policy goal {\u8211\'96} to be giving law enforcement agents the \softline
maximum freedom to investigate within constitutional limits -- would significantly \softline
change the analysis.  First of all, if the courts are correct that there are }{\plain \fs24 \i no}{\plain \fs24  constitutional \softline
constraints on non-contents information, a position that I reject but the government \softline
supports, then the goal becomes maximizing law enforcement{\u8217\'92}s surveillance power.  \softline
Surely law enforcement knows best how to maximize its power; it does not need any \softline
representation from others to get the {\u8220\'93}balance{\u8221\'94} right.  Under this approach, permitting \softline
law enforcement to interpret the law themselves is exactly right.  Not surprisingly, law \softline
enforcement representatives have often formulated the social policy goal in exactly this \softline
way.{}{\plain \fs24 \*\cs32\super 89{\footnote \pard \fs24\s31\sa120\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640 
{89}{}{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \*\cs32\super\fs20 }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20  }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \i\fs20 See, e.g., Antiterrorism Hearings, supra }{\plain \fs20 \sa120 \fs20 note 32, at 8 ({\u8220\'93}I appreciate the opportunity to testify today about \softline
the Justice Department{\u8217\'92}s ongoing efforts to protect the lives of innocent Americans, and our commitment to \softline
doing so within the limits of the Fourth Amendment{\u8217\'92}s guarantee of individual privacy.{\u8221\'94}) (statement of Viet \softline
D. Dinh, Assistant Attorney General, Justice Department).{\field{\*\fldinst ADVANCE \\d 6}{\fldrslt }}}}}
}{\plain \fs24 }{\plain \fs24   \par
}\pard \fs24\sl360\slmult1\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8