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\par A Comparative Institutional Analysis of \'93}{\b\fs24\insrsid12779645 Regulation by }{\b\fs24\insrsid12779645 Litigation}{\b\fs24\insrsid12779645 \'94}{\b\fs24\insrsid12779645 
\par Preliminary Conference Draft \endash  July 15, 2004
\par }{\fs24\insrsid12779645 Wendy Wagner
\par 
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\widctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 {\fs24\insrsid12779645 
\par Asbestos, DES, the Dalkon Shield, and tobacco are classic cases of regulatory failure.  Manufacturers of these products purposefully resisted learning about the risks of their products and concealed whatever incriminating information was produced.  At t
he same time, the companies used their advantaged informational position to outsmart regulators and lobby congresspersons for legislation that would immunize or protect their interests.  While some of these manufacturers also attempted to capture regulato
r
y and congressional officials using their abundant resources, much of their exemptions from regulatory oversight can be attributed to their devious methods for controlling the information available to policymakers and the public at large regarding their p
roducts.}{\cs46\fs24\super\insrsid12779645 1{\footnote \pard\plain \s45\ql \li0\ri0\widctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 \fs20\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\fs24\insrsid12779645 1}{\fs22\insrsid12779645  See, e.g., }{\field{\*\fldinst {
\fs24\insrsid12779645    HYPERLINK "http://www.westlaw.com/Find/Default.wl?rs=dfa1.0&vr=2.0&DB=578&FindType=Y&ReferencePositionType=S&SerialNum=1982127256&Reference" }}{\fldrslt {\cs48\fs22\ul\cf2\insrsid12779645 
Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 436 N.E.2d 182, 185 (N.Y.}}}{\fs22\insrsid12779645  {\*\bkmkstart Document4zzSDUNumber162}{\*\bkmkend Document4zzSDUNumber162}}{\field{\*\fldinst {\fs24\insrsid12779645 
   HYPERLINK "http://www.westlaw.com/Find/Default.wl?rs=dfa1.0&vr=2.0&DB=578&FindType=Y&ReferencePositionType=S&SerialNum=1982127256&Reference" }}{\fldrslt {\cs48\fs22\ul\cf2\insrsid12779645 1982)}}}{\fs22\insrsid12779645 
 (describing conduct of manufacturers of DES); Paul Brodeur, Outrageous Misconduct: The Asbe
stos Industry on Trial 118-19 (1985); Philip J. Hilts, Smokescreen: The Truth Behind the Tobacco Industry Cover-Up 10-11, 20-22, 23-1, 129 (1996);  Morton Mintz, At Any Cost: Corporate Greed, Women, and The Dalkon Shield 123 (1985).}}}{
\fs24\insrsid12779645 
\par 
\par It was mass litigation against these manufacturers that finally brought an end to their long immunity from public oversight.  This litigation not only managed to dislodge incriminating, internally held information, but it succeeded in drawing policymakers
\rquote  and the public\rquote s att
ention to bad corporate behavior and large gaps in regulatory protections.  The result, in all cases, was not perfect safety or deterrence, but there was a great deal more accountability for these manufacturers as a result of the litigation than there was
 before.
\par 
\par Yet while this type of litigation \endash part of a larger set of mass litigation loosely known as \'93regulatory litigation\'94
 -- is hailed as a positive development by public health professionals because of its important contribution to public awareness of product risks,}{\cs46\fs24\super\insrsid12779645 2{\footnote \pard\plain \s45\ql \li0\ri0\widctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 
\fs20\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\fs24\insrsid12779645 2}{\fs22\insrsid12779645  See, e.g., Peter D. Jacobson & Soheil Soliman, Litigation as Public Health Policy: Theory or Reality?, 30 J. of Law, Medicine & Ethics 224 (2002).}}}{
\fs24\insrsid12779645  a number of prominent legal scholars condemn this form of litigation as an illegitimate end-run around the political process.}{\cs46\fs24\super\insrsid12779645 3{\footnote \pard\plain \ql \li0\ri0\widctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 
\fs20\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\fs24\insrsid12779645 3}{\fs22\insrsid12779645 
 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, "Implications for Legal Reform," in Regulation Through Litigation, ed. W. Kip Viscusi (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2002), 325; Peter H. Schuck, "The New Judicial Ideology 
of Tort Law," in New Directions in Liability Law, ed. Walter Olson (Montpelier, VT: Capital City Press, 1988), 4 \endash  17.  }}}{\fs24\insrsid12779645   Richard Epstein, Kip Viscusi, Peter Schuck,}{\cs46\fs24\super\insrsid12779645 4{\footnote 
\pard\plain \s45\ql \li0\ri0\widctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 \fs20\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\fs24\insrsid12779645 4}{\fs22\insrsid12779645  Prof. Schuck is more equivocal than some of the other critics and concedes some of the 
benefits of this litigation.  Nevertheless, he tends to understate the role of the litigation in lowering a variety of inflated information costs and the comparative deficiencies of the political process relative to the court in addressing these costs.}}}
{\fs24\insrsid12779645  an
d others use comparative institutional analysis in part to argue that this regulatory litigation, which attempts to regulate drugs, products, and hazardous activities through the court system, is misguided.  These critics argue that the courts lack the te
chnical competence and the tool kit of regulatory-like remedies to adequately address widespread threats to public health that are available to their counterparts in the political process.}{\cs46\fs24\super\insrsid12779645 5{\footnote \pard\plain 
\s45\ql \li0\ri0\widctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 \fs20\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\fs24\insrsid12779645 5}{\fs22\insrsid12779645  See, e.g., Peter H. Schuck, Benched: The pros and cons of having j
udges make the law, Washington Monthly, December 2000, at 35, 39.}}}{\fs24\insrsid12779645 
  Critics also argue that the courts lack the democratic legitimacy to resolve inherently political issues about the level and appropriateness of government intervention relating to product 
safety.  Finally, they question the motives of the attorneys themselves and their ability to fairly represent the large number of victims in class actions.  
\par 
\par In this essay, I argue that these criticisms miss the unique contribution of the courts, relative
 to other institutions, to lower a variety of information-related impediments that afflict participation in the political process.  In settings where large stakeholders are able to control the political process by their privately held information (an impo
rtant contributor to \'93minoritarian bias\'94
), an institution able to substantially reduce these information costs for the diffuse public accomplishes a great deal, regardless of its capacity to completely resolve the problem once the public becomes alerted to 
the new risks.  When criticisms of regulatory litigation are logged under the heading of comparative institutional analysis,}{\cs46\fs24\super\insrsid12779645 6{\footnote \pard\plain \s45\ql \li0\ri0\widctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 
\fs20\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\fs24\insrsid12779645 6}{\fs22\insrsid12779645  Some of the criticisms of regulatory litigation raise doctrinal concerns, such as arguments that individual lawsuits are legally 
frivolous or in violation of constitutional requirements. See, e.g., Margaret A. Little, A Most Dangerous Indiscretion: The Legal, Economic, and Political Legacy of the Governments\rquote 
 Tobacco Litigation, 33 Conn. L. Rev. 1143 (2001); Walter Olson, Big Guns, Reason, Oct. 1999, at 60. These very different doctrinal concerns are not taken up here.  }}}{\fs24\insrsid12779645 
 critics must account for the ability of courts to decrease information costs and overcome the participatory imbalances that hinder the political process when a small group of risk producers enjoy a monopoly of expertise and relevant information.   

\par 
\par Identifying the institution best able to overcome impediments to participation, by for example lowering information costs, is an important methodological consideration fo
r comparative institutional analysis.  Traditionally, comparative institutional analysis has focused on identifying an institution best able to compensate for underlying problems of minoritarian or majoritarian bias.  The form of comparative analysis adva
n
ced here looks instead at the features of participation itself, at least with respect to information costs, and asks whether there are institutions able to permanently correct (not simply compensate for) imbalances in the basic variables that determine pa
rticipation.  Finding an institution best able to correct a basic participatory deficiency may in fact be the first step in comparative institutional analysis and could limit the amount of unproductive cycling between institutions.}{
\cs46\fs24\super\insrsid12779645 7{\footnote \pard\plain \s45\ql \li0\ri0\widctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 \fs20\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\fs24\insrsid12779645 7}{\fs22\insrsid12779645  See, e.g., Neil K. Komesar, Law\rquote 
s Limits: The Rule of Law and the Supply and Demand of Rights 163 (2001) (discussing the cycling phenomenon); cf. Philip Bobbitt & Guido Calabresi, Tragic Choices.}}}{\fs24\insrsid12779645 
  Broad public dissemination of accessible information regarding the latent harms of a product, and the manufacturers\rquote 
 strategic effort to conceal this information, for example, can catalyze the dormant majority across all institutions with respect to the public\rquote s oversight of that product.  Rather than simply considering which instituti
on is best suited to oversee product safety when there is limited available information, the inquiry instead should be which institution is best able to dislodge or force the production of relevant information that can then catalyze and inform the public 
as it participates in the market, the legislature, and the courts.  
\par 
\par This argument that in the area of regulatory litigation, the courts can serve an indispensable role in lowering information costs that obstruct more balanced participation is advanced in 
three parts.  Part I identifies three types of information costs that often impede participation by the diffuse public and their representatives in health and environmental protection, while also highlighting the comparative attributes of the courts, rela
tive to the political process, to lower these costs.  Part II then reviews two of the most controversial mass lawsuits assailed by \'93litigation by regulation\'94
 critics and notices that even in these cases courts manage to lower inflated information costs in valuable ways.  Part III concludes by offering several, more general lessons for comparative institutional analysis.
\par 
\par }{\scaps\fs24\insrsid12779645 I.  Information Costs and Participation
\par }{\fs24\insrsid12779645 
\par Healthy institutional functioning is characterized by a participatory process that does not 
unfairly exclude or alienate attentive participants.  Whether a party will participate in any given issue is generally a function of the costs of information and the costs of organizing set against the benefits or stakes that party enjoys by participating
.}{\cs46\fs24\super\insrsid12779645 8{\footnote \pard\plain \s45\ql \li0\ri0\widctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 \fs20\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\fs24\insrsid12779645 8}{\fs22\insrsid12779645 
 Neil K. Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives: Choosing Institutions in Law 8 (1995).}}}{\fs24\insrsid12779645 
  If the benefits outweigh the costs of participating on a given issue, then a party will participate. Artificially inflated information costs, especially those that serve t
o disadvantage some groups over others, are a signal of potentially serious participatory and institutional problems. 
\par 
\par In public health and environmental protection, at least three different information-related barriers to participation arise with some regularity, referred to here as \'93information costs.\'94
  These costs needlessly raise the resources and energy needed from participants to access vital information relevant to participation.  Since participation is a function of the benefits of participating se
t against the costs, then only the most motivated participants will endeavor to access the relevant information.  Even more perversely, some of the inaccessible information can deprive participants\rquote 
 of knowledge of the benefits of participating, thus artif
icially lowering their stakes.  Each barrier to information is discussed in turn, and the comparative ability of the political versus the judicial institution to lower these information costs is considered.
\par  
\par }{\fs24\ul\insrsid12779645 A.\tab Asymmetrical Information
\par }{\strike\fs24\insrsid12779645 
\par }{\fs24\insrsid12779645 The first barrier 
to information arises when one or a group of participants have asymmetric access to important information relevant to a given issue, but they refuse to produce or share the information.  In health and safety regulation it is typically the party who is the
 target of added regulation or liability that enjoys these asymmetric advantages, since they have superior access to a large body of technical information about the nature of their activities and associated risks.}{\cs46\fs24\super\insrsid12779645 9
{\footnote \pard\plain \s45\ql \li0\ri0\widctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 \fs20\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\fs24\insrsid12779645 9}{\fs22\insrsid12779645  The pervasiveness of these information as
ymmetries in health and environmental regulation is discussed in Wendy Wagner, Commons Ignorance: How the Environmental Laws have Failed Us (forthcoming 2004).}}}{\fs24\insrsid12779645 
  At the same time, these parties face a number of reasons to keep the information secret.  Shar
ing or volunteering to produce information regarding risky activities, especially when the information might be incriminating, could lead to increased regulation, liability, or reputation damage.  Without strong \'93sticks\'94
 that force its production and disse
mination, this information can be suppressed.  Economic theory reinforces this simple intuition: Producing new information will be optimal only when its expected value is greater than the costs of producing the information.}{
\cs46\fs24\super\insrsid12779645 10{\footnote \pard\plain \s45\ql \li0\ri0\widctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 \fs20\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\fs24\insrsid12779645 10}{\fs22\insrsid12779645  Steven Shavell, 
Liability and the Incentive to Obtain Information About Risk, 21 J. Legal. Stud. 259, 263 (1992).}}}{\fs24\insrsid12779645 {\*\bkmkstart _Ref47883769}{\*\bkmkend _Ref47883769}
  For actors whose activities or products create externalities, conducting research on potential harms is not only costly,
 but it may yield bad news.  Facilities or others that have important asymmetric access to important information also enjoy a distinct advantage in policy-making discussions.  They can share information most favorable to their position, while concealing o
ther information or resisting the production of additional, relevant knowledge.  
\par 
\par To the extent that some participants do conceal or refuse to produce information vital to a health protection issue, the first step of comparative institutional analysis is t
o identify the institution best able to dislodge or force the production of the information.  Since markets lack tools for affirmatively forcing the disclosure of relevant information, the main contenders for overcoming this information cost are the court
s
 and the political process.  Both institutions rely on subpoena powers and court-backed authority to force the production and dissemination of information. The primary difference between these institutions is the motivation of the participants.  Attorneys
 
in civil litigation generally have stronger incentives and fewer constraints than their counterparts in the bureaucracy to dislodge incriminating information.  If the litigation is a good investment, a committed attorney who stands to claim a sizable mone
tary prize has high stakes in locating the suppressed, smoking-gun \'93needle\'94 in the haystack of file folders.  Indeed if the history of several major toxic tort cases are any guide, a litigant\rquote 
s case can rise or fall on discovering suppressed, incriminating information.}{\cs46\fs24\super\insrsid12779645 11{\footnote \pard\plain \s45\ql \li0\ri0\widctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 \fs20\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {
\fs24\insrsid12779645 11}{\fs22\insrsid12779645  Certainly this describes the tobacco, asbestos, lead, breast implant, and bendectin litigation.  See infra Part II and supra note 1.}}}{\fs24\insrsid12779645 
  By contrast, while agencies and Congress can subpoena broad categories of records and testimony, the \'93smoking gun\'94
 documents are often intentionally and sometimes illegally withheld from these broad information sweeps.  To extract this information can require a great deal of persistence and sanctions that may be lacking in political systems that remain sensi
tive to the demands of the highest stakeholders.}{\cs46\fs24\super\insrsid12779645 12{\footnote \pard\plain \s45\ql \li0\ri0\widctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 \fs20\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\fs24\insrsid12779645 12}{
\fs22\insrsid12779645  Cf. Agency Watch, EPA\rquote s Voluntary Data, Nat\rquote l L. J., Nov. 4, 1996, at A10 (reporting that only after the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) granted substantially reduced penalties for 
noncompliance with these reporting requirements under the Toxic Substances Control Act did companies volunteer 11,000 studies of their products -- four times the number of studies submitted in the prior 15 years since passage of the statute).}}}{
\fs24\insrsid12779645   As long as the information is not sealed in a settlement, the courts seem better equipped to overcome asymmetrical information problems relative to the political branch.}{\cs46\fs24\super\insrsid12779645 13{\footnote \pard\plain 
\s45\ql \li0\ri0\widctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 \fs20\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\fs24\insrsid12779645 13}{\fs22\insrsid12779645  Sealing the records is a serious problem and is especially attractive to defendants (with hig
h bonuses to plaintiffs in settlements) when the information is incriminating and closely held.  See generally Jack B. Weinstein & Catherine Wimberly, Secrecy in Law and Science, 23 Cardozo L. Rev. 1, 18-31 (2001).}}}{\fs24\insrsid12779645  
\par 
\par }{\fs24\ul\insrsid12779645 B.\tab Legal Complexity and Related Information Costs
\par }{\fs24\insrsid12779645 
\par The second type of information-related cost that can impede participation, especially for those with lower stakes, are the information and related costs associated with navigating the rules of the governing institution.}{\cs46\fs24\super\insrsid12779645 
14{\footnote \pard\plain \s45\ql \li0\ri0\widctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 \fs20\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\fs24\insrsid12779645 14}{\fs22\insrsid12779645  See Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives, supra at 8 (referring to the \'93
formal barriers to access associated with institutional rules and procedures\'94).}}}{\fs24\insrsid12779645   To be able to participate meaningfully in a process, one needs information not only on the basic features of the problem, but 
how other participants weigh in on those issues and the radius of their influence, the types of alternatives that are acceptable, the impediments to reform, and the points in time that participation can take place.  These costs, called \'93
legal complexity\'94 c
osts, vary according to the institutional setting and can be so high as to effectively preclude participation.  Would-be participants simply may not have the expertise or resources to master existing rules, power structures, legal constraints, and partici
patory procedures.
\par 
\par Although civil proceedings often entail high legal complexity costs (at the least, one must secure a capable lawyer), these costs may still be lower than the comparable costs arising in the political branches.  Understanding the applicab
le regulatory requirements and whether or how they can be changed requires considerably more participatory fuel than filing an affirmative claim on behalf of victims.  First, it requires a sophisticated understanding of existing rules and their limitation
s
 in order to isolate problems, as well as the legal aperture through which reforms can fit (formal legal costs).  If most of this information about deficiencies in existing regulatory approaches is mired in controverted and voluminous technical reports an
d
 agency preambles, and opportunities for participation are limited to short windows of time on narrow legal issues, then most attentive publics and interest group representatives may find themselves unable to participate due to the sheer costs of processi
ng the relevant information and identifying a useful entry point into the political process.}{\cs46\fs24\super\insrsid12779645 15{\footnote \pard\plain \s45\ql \li0\ri0\widctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 
\fs20\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\fs24\insrsid12779645 15}{\fs22\insrsid12779645  See, e.g., Wendy E. Wagner, Restoring Polluted Water with Public Values, W&M.}}}{\fs24\insrsid12779645 
  Second, legal complexity requires participants to understand the political lands
cape, including stakeholder responses to the problem and the history and fate of reform efforts in the policy-making process over time (informal legal costs).  Knowledge of the life cycle of a social problem, including the nature and types of support and 
o
pposition for change as the problem moves through the political process, is vital to anticipating constraints on reform options.  While attentive participants may locate an attorney or interest group well-versed in this information, locating these uniquel
y suited experts within the political process can involve high search and oversight costs.}{\cs46\fs24\super\insrsid12779645  }{\fs24\insrsid12779645   (These costs are discussed more fully below).  
\par 
\par Relative to the courts, the political branch may also be inherently more susceptible to needless legal complexity. 
 Sophisticated rent-seekers and even agency officials or Congress may find it beneficial to construct a regulatory program so complex that it defies understanding by attentive participants.  Complex programs alienate participants and increase agency or po
litical power.  A sizable body of public choice literature theorizes that political officials benefit by making regulatory systems complex in order to provide personalized benefits to their constituents.}{\cs46\fs24\super\insrsid12779645 16{\footnote 
\pard\plain \s45\ql \li0\ri0\widctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 \fs20\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\fs24\insrsid12779645 16}{\fs22\insrsid12779645  See, e.g., Morris Fiorina & Roger G. Noll, Voters
, Bureaucrats and Legislators: A Rational Choice Perspective on the Growth of Bureaucracy, 9 J. Pub. Econ. 239 (1978); Morris P. Fiorina & Roger G. Noll, Voters, Legislators and Bureaucracy: Institutional Design in the Public Sector, 68 Am. Econ. Ass
\rquote n Proc. 256 (1978).}}}{\fs24\insrsid12779645 
  By contrast, although there are some incentives for legal complexity in the courts, the counter-pressure for clear communication makes courts significantly less conducive to needlessly complex rules and processes.  Advocates generally bene
fit by simplifying their cases for juries and judges.}{\cs46\fs24\super\insrsid12779645 17{\footnote \pard\plain \s45\ql \li0\ri0\widctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 \fs20\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\fs24\insrsid12779645 17}{
\fs22\insrsid12779645  See, e.g., Roger Haydock and John Sonsteng, Advocacy \endash  Planning to Win: Effective Preparation 10-11 (1994) (advocating \'93understandable language\'94 and \'93simple explanations\'94 as winning strategies).}}}{
\fs24\insrsid12779645   The nature of the litigation process also forces a judge to render a decision that sets forth clear rules that guide future litigants.  
\par 
\par Legal complexity costs also impede the ability of more attentive participants to catalyze fellow sympathizers since catalyzing participants generally requires low cost, accessible messages.}{\cs46\fs24\super\insrsid12779645 18{\footnote \pard\plain 
\s45\ql \li0\ri0\widctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 \fs20\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\fs24\insrsid12779645 18}{\fs22\insrsid12779645  Cf. Sunstein Cascades.   }}}{\fs24\insrsid12779645 
  The higher the costs needed to understand the issues, especially with respect to the formal complexity costs, the larger the challenge to catalyze others to partake in the institutional process.}{\cs46\fs24\super\insrsid12779645 19{\footnote 
\pard\plain \s45\ql \li0\ri0\widctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 \fs20\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\fs24\insrsid12779645 19}{\fs22\insrsid12779645  Id.}}}{\fs24\insrsid12779645 
  Because regulatory processes involve maze-like rules with equivalent maze-like problems, communicating these problems and strategies may be difficult.  Without concrete harms, moreover, it is difficult to spark the diffuse public\rquote 
s interest.  Social scientists observe that interest groups need a \'93credible risk\'94 to generate public and congressional support for their causes.}{\cs46\fs24\super\insrsid12779645 20{\footnote \pard\plain 
\s45\ql \li0\ri0\widctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 \fs20\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\fs24\insrsid12779645 20}{\fs22\insrsid12779645  Const
ance A. Nathanson, Social Movements as Catalysts for Policy Change: The Case of Smoking and Guns, 24 J. Health Pol.\~ Pol\rquote y & Law 421, 422 (1999).\~}}}{\fs24\insrsid12779645   Without this \'93credible risk,\'94
 only the higher stakes participants can be recruited to join the campaign sin
ce others will not have the interest to invest the time to understand the issues.  Indeed, in the past when the dormant majority has been successfully catalyzed to demand reform of existing regulatory programs, catastrophes or near-catastrophes served as 
the focal point to generate interest.}{\cs46\fs24\super\insrsid12779645 21{\footnote \pard\plain \s45\ql \li0\ri0\widctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 \fs20\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\fs24\insrsid12779645 21}{\fs22\insrsid12779645 
  See, e.g., Sunstein, supra.}}}{\fs24\insrsid12779645   Short of an Exxon Valdez spill or a Love Canal, however, these adverse consequences seem most likely to present themselves in civil litigation.  
\par 
\par Civil litigation, with its discrete c
laims of concrete harms, helps to lower legal complexity costs that overwhelm the political branches by focusing participants on the underlying issues.  Civil litigation can also spotlight regulatory exceptions and gaps that permit, for example, harmful p
r
oducts to remain on the marketplace without adequate regulatory oversight despite laws that appear to govern these risks.  Civil litigation can even bypass enforcement slippage that undercuts regulatory programs due to limited government resources and com
plex and effectively unenforceable legal rules.}{\cs46\fs24\super\insrsid12779645 22{\footnote \pard\plain \ql \li0\ri0\widctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 \fs20\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\fs24\insrsid12779645 22}{
\fs22\insrsid12779645  Cf. Daniel A. Farber, Taking Slippage Seriously:  Noncompliance and Creative Compliance in Environmental Law, Harvard Environmental Law Review (1999). }}}{\fs24\insrsid12779645   Civil litigation thus can serve a vital catalytic r
ole in lowering the costs to onlookers-participants to understand the relevant information and evaluate their stakes in a way not possible in the political process.  Courts, in other words, have the capability of educating lower stakes participants about 
complex social issues when the political process has become inaccessible to them.}{\cs46\fs24\super\insrsid12779645 23{\footnote \pard\plain \s45\ql \li0\ri0\widctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 \fs20\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {
\fs24\insrsid12779645 23}{\fs22\insrsid12779645  See, e.g., Schuck, Benched, supra at 40 (conceding this attribute of some \'93impact\'94 litigation).}}}{\fs24\insrsid12779645 
\par 
\par }{\fs24\ul\insrsid12779645 C.\tab The Costs of Monitoring Agents
\par }{\fs24\insrsid12779645 
\par The third information cost is the cost
 of overseeing agents in a setting where facts are incomplete, technical, and asymmetric, and legal processes are nearly impenetrable.  Because of high information costs from asymmetric and complex information that impede participation, the diffuse public
 grows more dependant on interest groups to lead, educate, and lobby for public-serving ends.  But these same informational impediments make it difficult for the members to hold their agents accountable.}{\cs46\fs24\super\insrsid12779645 24{\footnote 
\pard\plain \ql \li0\ri0\widctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 \fs20\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\fs24\insrsid12779645 24}{\fs22\insrsid12779645  See, e.g., Enrico Colombatto & Jonathan Macey, 15
5 Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 617, 623 \endash  624 (1999) (arguing that \'93
information and transaction costs prevent the public from grasping the implications of most of the bargains reached among narrow interest groups and ruling political coalitions.\'94).}}}{\fs24\insrsid12779645 
\par 
\par In a comparative sense, courts again seem to excel at lowering the costs of overseeing agents relative to political processes.  Because of their commitment to adequate representation, the courts dedicate some effort to insisting on a nexus
 between attorney and client through a series of ethical and court-made rules.}{\cs46\fs24\super\insrsid12779645 25{\footnote \pard\plain \s45\ql \li0\ri0\widctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 \fs20\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {
\fs24\insrsid12779645 25}{\fs22\insrsid12779645  See, e.g., }{\cs48\b\fs22\insrsid12779645 Model Rules of Prof\rquote l Conduct, Rs. 1.4, 1.7, 3.2. }}}{\fs24\insrsid12779645 
  By ruling on the merits of arguments and insisting they be supported by some evidence, the courts also serve as gatekeepers on the quality of the positions taken by attorney-agents.}{\cs46\fs24\super\insrsid12779645 26{\footnote \pard\plain 
\s45\ql \li0\ri0\widctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 \fs20\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\fs24\insrsid12779645 26}{\fs22\insrsid12779645  See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, 12(b)(6); Model Rules of Prof\rquote l Conduct R. 3-1.}}}{
\fs24\insrsid12779645   Even the rules governing class actions regulate attorneys through a series of imperfect, but nevertheless relatively specific requirements.}{\cs46\fs24\super\insrsid12779645 27{\footnote \pard\plain 
\s45\ql \li0\ri0\widctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 \fs20\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\fs24\insrsid12779645 27}{\fs22\insrsid12779645  See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.}}}{\fs24\insrsid12779645 
  Finally, the public record of all filings provides ready information for clients and others interested in an attorney\rquote s arguments and positions.  
\par 
\par By contrast, the political pr
ocess makes no effort to lower the costs of monitoring interest groups that purport to speak for a broader constellation of members and passive participants.  There are no ethical or legal rules governing representation in the political process; instead i
nterest group representatives operate free of constraints, except for reputation-related considerations, in determining how to represent and educate members on relevant issues.  This lack of oversight is especially problematic because of interest groups
\rquote  need to generate support for their cause, which may cause them to overstate the adverse consequences and to formulate positions based at least as much on generating membership as serving the diffuse public.}{\cs46\fs24\super\insrsid12779645 28
{\footnote \pard\plain \ql \li0\ri0\widctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 \fs20\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\fs24\insrsid12779645 28}{\fs22\insrsid12779645  In fact, on more than one occasion, the informa
tion provided by an organization revealed a conflict of interest between their own mission (and effort to retain members) and their neutrality on the issue of concern.  See, e.g., David E. Seidemann, Insufficient Accountability: Case Study of the Recyclin
g Plan of a Public Interest Research Group, 3 Buff. Envtl. L.J. 221 (1995) (detailing inaccuracy of NYPIRG study on recycling as the answer to NYC\rquote s solid waste problem).  A similar allegation was made with respect to the NDRC\rquote 
s handling of the Alar controv
ersy. See, e.g., Leslie Roberts, Pesticides and Kids, 243 Science 1280, 1280-81 (1989) (discussing NRDC report); Joseph D. Rosen, Much Ado About Alar, Issues in Sci. & Tech., Fall 1990, at 85, 87-88 (1990) (identifying weaknesses in NRDC\rquote 
s risk assessment, which include using arguable math, arguable food consumption data, and arguable potency factor).}}}{\fs24\insrsid12779645   Also in contrast to the courts, there is no \'93neutral\'94
 arbiter in the political process to verify the strength of the evidence and legal arguments or to over
see the credibility of interest group positions.  The primary constraint on the plausibility of interest group claims is oversight by its members.  But the members of interest groups may be unaware of the positions their agent/interest groups are taking i
n the political process and often have no way, other than accompanying them to meetings, to learn about these positions.}{\cs46\fs24\super\insrsid12779645 29{\footnote \pard\plain \s45\ql \li0\ri0\widctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 
\fs20\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\fs24\insrsid12779645 29}{\fs22\insrsid12779645  See infra Part II.B.}}}{\fs24\insrsid12779645 
  At the same time, interest groups have potentially conflicting incentives to frame issues and educate members
 in ways that best suit their purposes, even though this education may be neither complete nor accurate.  In an area of high complexity, the courts might again provide more accountability checks on the advocates than their counterparts acting exclusively 
in the political process. 
\par 
\par }{\fs24\ul\insrsid12779645 D.\tab Sum
\par 
\par }{\fs24\insrsid12779645 Information costs can significantly impair the ability of the attentive public to participate meaningfully in an issue.  These information costs can exacerbate preexisting imbalances in the distribution of stakes for grou
ps of participants.  When the consequences of a policy decision will accrue only to unknown, future parties, as they often do in health and environmental protection, the diffuse public is already handicapped in the strength of its participation because of
 their low ex ante stakes.}{\cs46\fs24\super\insrsid12779645 30{\footnote \pard\plain \s45\ql \li0\ri0\widctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 \fs20\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\fs24\insrsid12779645 30}{\fs22\insrsid12779645 
 Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives, supra, at 171-77.}}}{\fs24\insrsid12779645   Affected industries, by contrast, have high ex ante stakes and often set significant resources aside for continuous participation in these issues.  These high stakes partici
pants put their adversaries at a significant disadvantage, especially if some of the asymmetries and legal complexity can be protected and perpetuated by higher stakeholders.  As a result, when there are institutional interventions that make progress in l
owering information costs for all participants, the resulting changes can lead to better functioning across all institutions.
\par 
\par }{\scaps\fs24\insrsid12779645  II.  \tab Regulatory Litigation and Dropping Information Costs
\par }{\fs24\insrsid12779645 
\par This section reviews some of the allegedly worst examples of regulatory litigation \endash  the litigation over breast implants and the municipal gun litigation \endash 
 and concludes that even this litigation succeeds in lowering one or more of the inflated information
 costs, often in permanent ways.  The resulting, more level participatory playing field then serves to jumpstart other institutional responses to ensuring the safety of these products.
\par 
\par }{\fs24\ul\insrsid12779645 A.\tab Breast implant litigation
\par }{\fs24\insrsid12779645 
\par The breast implant litigation is generally regarded as exemplifying all that is wrong with \'93regulation by litigation.\'94}{\cs46\fs24\super\insrsid12779645 31{\footnote \pard\plain \s45\ql \li0\ri0\widctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 
\fs20\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\fs24\insrsid12779645 31}{\fs22\insrsid12779645  See generally Marcia Angell, Science on Trial: The Clash of Medical Evidence and the Law in 
the Breast Implant Case (1996); David E. Bernstein, The Breast Implant Fiasco, 87 Cal. L. Rev. 457, (1999); Peter Schuck, in Litigation by Regulation.}}}{\fs24\insrsid12779645 
  Critics argue that the litigation was not only an end-run around existing regulatory processes, but tha
t it illustrates the hazards of empanelling juries to decide technical issues like causation.  Scientific research produced late in the course of the litigation revealed that the verdicts in favor of plaintiffs were likely in error with respect to causati
on since implants did not appear to cause a statistically significant increase in connective tissue and autoimmune diseases.}{\cs46\fs24\super\insrsid12779645 32{\footnote \pard\plain \s45\ql \li0\ri0\widctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 
\fs20\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\fs24\insrsid12779645 32}{\fs22\insrsid12779645  Angell, supra, at 101-08.  }}}{\fs24\insrsid12779645 
  This fact, critics claim, is striking evidence of a judicial branch that lacks the competence to decide highly technical issues that routinely arise in health and environmental litigation. 
\par 
\par These criticisms, however, miss the value of the litigation set amidst the larger landscape of institutional failure.  The litigation not only overcame information
 asymmetries that allowed manufacturers to conceal incriminating information regarding implant safety, but it provided the sanctions and public pressure to force manufacturers and public institutions to conduct research to determine whether implants were 
c
ausing serious harms.  In the wake of the early plaintiff verdicts, the manufacturers moved from vigorously resisting conducting research on the safety of implants and selectively concealing the research that was produced, to investing tens of millions of
 dollars into implant safety research.  As one scientist concludes with regard to the litigation and regulatory aftermath:
\par }\pard \ql \li720\ri720\widctlpar\tx720\tx7920\faauto\rin720\lin720\itap0 {\fs24\insrsid12779645 It is possible that the research being driven by this controversy will result in a greater understanding of the immunologic implicatio
ns of xenobiotics, of the importance of nonbiased observations, of the need for ready access to valid data sets, and of the opportunity for valid scientific information to guide legal decisions.}{\cs46\fs24\super\insrsid12779645 33{\footnote \pard\plain 
\s45\ql \li0\ri0\widctlpar\tx0\tx7200\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 \fs20\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\fs24\insrsid12779645 33}{\fs22\insrsid12779645  Ralph R. Cook et al., The Breast Implant Controversy, 37 
Arthritis & Rheumatism 153 (1994).}}}{\fs24\insrsid12779645   
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\widctlpar\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 {\fs24\insrsid12779645 
Rather than a sign of weakness, it is a testament to the success of the litigation that we now have a considerable body of scientific research against which to evaluate early jury verdicts.}{\cs46\fs24\super\insrsid12779645 34{\footnote \pard\plain 
\s45\ql \li0\ri0\widctlpar\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 \fs20\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\fs24\insrsid12779645 34}{\fs22\insrsid12779645 
 See, e.g., David A. Kessler, The Basis of the FDA\rquote s Decision on Breast Implants, 326 New Eng. J. Med. 1713, 1715 (1992) (observing the likelihood that \'93
[h]ad the FDA failed to intervene, the uncontrolled and widespread available of breast implants would probably have continued for another 30 years\emdash 
without producing any meaningful clinical data about their safety and effectiveness.  Such a situation is obviously unacceptable.\'94).  Even Angell, a critic of FDA and the litigation, concedes that these legal interventions led to much ne
eded scientific research on implants.  See, e.g., Marcia Angell, Shattuck Lecture\emdash Evaluating the Health Risks of Breast Implants: The Interplay of Medical Science, the Law, and Public Opinion, 334 New Eng. J. Med. 1513, 1515 (1996) (\'93
After the [FDA] ban, under Kessler\rquote s prodding, the breast-implant manufacturers began to do what they should have done years earlier: they began to fund serious studies of the safety of breast implants.\'94).  }}}{\fs24\insrsid12779645 
  Indeed, if the results of the later research had instead confirmed what appeared possible early in the litigation \endash  namely that implants did lead to a statistically significant increase in chronic harms \endash 
 then some of the critics would be forced, by the underlying logic of their criticisms, to concede that the litigation made a positive contribution to implant safety.}{\cs46\fs24\super\insrsid12779645 35{\footnote \pard\plain \s45\ql \li0\ri0\widctlpar
\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 \fs20\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\fs24\insrsid12779645 35}{\fs22\insrsid12779645  For example, Bernstein\rquote 
s critique of the litigation, supra, turns on the fact that the research ultimately exonerated implants.  Bernstein does not attempt to argue that this causal conclusion was preordai
ned or that the preliminary evidence of leaking implants should have been dismissed as a scientific matter.  Presumably, if the research instead had followed the path of the asbestos, DES, ultra-absorbent tampon and Dalkon Shield litigation, Bernstein wou
ld be forced to concede that the litigation served as a positive force in creating incentives for safe products.  }}}{\fs24\insrsid12779645   
\par 
\par Irrespective of the information-generating features of the litigation, critics also argue that the mistaken plaintiff verdicts early in the litigation spotlight the jurors\rquote 
 scientific and technical incompetence and suggest, in a comparative institutional sense, that courts are not up to the task of deciding technically complex cases.}{\cs46\fs24\super\insrsid12779645 36{\footnote \pard\plain \s45\ql \li0\ri0\widctlpar
\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 \fs20\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\fs24\insrsid12779645 36}{\fs22\insrsid12779645 
 Angell, Science on Trial, supra note, at 159, 176. }}}{\fs24\insrsid12779645   There can be no doubt that early jury verdicts were based more on outrage at the manufacturers\rquote 
 indifference to health risks than on definitive scientific evidence of causation.}{\cs46\fs24\super\insrsid12779645 37{\footnote \pard\plain \s45\ql \li0\ri0\widctlpar
\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 \fs20\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\fs24\insrsid12779645 37}{\fs22\insrsid12779645 
 See, e.g., Fredric L. Ellis & Ernest Hornsby, Dow Chemical Hid Truth on Breast Implants, N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1995, at A24 (letter from attorneys in one breast implant case citing jury\rquote s unanimous finding that \'93
Dow Chemical committed fraud and exhibited a conscious disregard for the health and safety of the women receiving silicone gel breast implants.\'94).}}}{\fs24\insrsid12779645 
  In the course of this early litigation, industry documents were discovered that revealed one of the implant manufacturers, Dow Corning, not only knew that implants were gradually leaking (in addition to their potential for rupt
ure) but it suppressed internal research on the few animal studies it had conducted on rats.}{\cs46\fs24\super\insrsid12779645 38{\footnote \pard\plain \s45\ql \li0\ri0\widctlpar
\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 \fs20\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\fs24\insrsid12779645 38}{\fs22\insrsid12779645 
 Angell, Science on Trial, supra, at 57-61; see also Human Resources and Intergovernmental Relations Subcomm., Comm. On Gov\rquote t Operations, 102d Cong., The FDA\rquote s 
Regulation of Silicone Breast Implants 29-31, 34-37 (Comm. Print 1993) (documenting how one implant manufacturer, Dow Corning, concealed the results of the few animals studies that had been done and also withheld information that revealed the implants wer
e leaking silicone).  }}}{\fs24\insrsid12779645   These documents, when paired with the defendant-Dow Corning\rquote 
s resistance to conduct follow-up testing, apparently outraged the jury sufficiently to cause them to not only award damages to the plaintiff, but also a sizable punitive damage award.}{\cs46\fs24\super\insrsid12779645 39{\footnote \pard\plain 
\s45\ql \li0\ri0\widctlpar\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 \fs20\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\fs24\insrsid12779645 39}{\fs22\insrsid12779645 
 See id. at 52. Although the incriminating documents were sealed in an eventual settlement of the litigation, they were used in subsequent litigation by the same attorney and eventually leaked to the media and the press. See Bernstein, supra, at 473-74.}}
}{\fs24\insrsid12779645   When more comprehensive research was ultimately available years after the litigation had begun, the research effectively exonerated the manufacturers as a significant cause of connective tissue and autoimmune diseases.  
Once this new research was introduced at trial, plaintiff verdicts dropped and defense verdicts rose. See Figure 1.}{\cs46\fs24\super\insrsid12779645 40{\footnote \pard\plain \s45\ql \li0\ri0\widctlpar
\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\tx7200\tx7920\tqr\tx8640\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 \fs20\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\fs24\insrsid12779645 40}{\fs22\insrsid12779645 
 Figure 1 is copied from Rebecca Dresser, et al., Breast Implants Revisited: Beyond Science on Trial, 1997 Wisc. L. Rev. 705, 744.}}}{\fs24\insrsid12779645   
\par 
\par 
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\widctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 {\fs24\lang1024\langfe1024\noproof\insrsid12779645 Figure 1: Timeline of Breast Implant Science, Litigation, and FDA Regulation
\par }{\fs24\insrsid12779645 
\par }}