University of Wisconsin Law School

RESOURCE CENTER REPORT

Number 97-1

August 1997

University of Wisconsin Law School

Resource Center on Impaired Driving

MANDATORY BLOOD TESTING IN MOTOR VEHICLE CRASHES

Nina J. Emerson, Director

The reason we are replacingResource Center Report, No.96-2 is because someone tookthe time to read it and bring toour attention someinconsistencies in the legalanalysis.⁽¹⁾ While we apologizefor any confusion this may havecaused, this is exactly what wewant our readers to do. Wewant to know how we're doingand how we can do a better job. In fact, the impetus for severalResource Center Reports wasprovided by those who use theResource Center.⁽²⁾ TheResource Center continues toinvite your comments, inquiries,and suggestions.

In this report, we have added afact scenario to the discussionof mandatory blood testing inmotor vehicle crashes involvingserious injury or death to (1)illustrate the different legalapplications; (2) discusspossible statutory solutions; and(3) consider practicalramifications and policyconcerns. Finally, the reportconcludes that whateverapproach is adopted, it shouldbe applied uniformly to insurethe injured impaired driver doesnot escape prosecution and theinjured unimpaired driver isexonerated from the suspicionthat alcohol or drugs wereinvolved.

Fact Scenario No. 1

A two-car crash occurred inwhich the driver of one car waskilled. The surviving driver,who apparently caused the crashafter falling asleep at the wheel,was questioned briefly by twoofficers. Neither officerdetected signs of intoxication,e.g., odor of intoxicants,slurred speech, or bloodshoteyes. The driver was taken tothe hospital for medicalattention where medicalpersonnel requested a bloodsample. The driver signed thehospital's consent form andsubmitted to a blood draw. Thedriver was not placed underarrest for operating whileintoxicated (OWI) and was notread the Informing the Accusedform. The blood test resultsindicated the driver had analcohol concentration wellabove the legal limit.⁽³⁾ Thedriver was then charged withoperating with a prohibitedalcohol concentration(OWI-PAC) in violation of Wis.Stat. § 346.63(1)(b).⁽⁴⁾

Discussion

In City of Muskego v. Godec,⁽⁵⁾the driver was involved in aserious one-car crash, requiringimmediate medical attention. The officers arrived on thescene in time to have Godectaken to the hospital by the"Flight for Life" helicopter. The officers did not request thatmedical personnel obtain abreath, blood, or urine test foralcohol concentration. However, after the officersinvestigated the crash, theyformed the basis for issuing anOWI citation. The officers alsolearned that the treatingphysician had ordered a bloodtest for diagnostic purposes, butGodec refused to release hismedical records.⁽⁶⁾

The Wisconsin Supreme Courtin Godec held that blood testresults taken for diagnosticpurposes could be used in asubsequent prosecution for anOWI offense. In reaching thisdecision, the court appliedsubsec. 905.04(4)(f) whichexempts chemical tests forintoxication from the physician-patient privilege.⁽⁷⁾ In Godec,the blood test was taken prior tohis arrest and was not takenpursuant to the direction of lawenforcement.

Therefore, fact scenario No. 1does not raise a search andseizure issue because bloodtests taken solely at thedirection of a doctor, in theabsence of any governmentalrequest, do not fall within theconfines of the fourthamendment.

Fact Scenario No. 2

A two-car crash occurred inwhich the driver of one car waskilled. The surviving driverhad apparently fallen asleep atthe wheel and caused the crashby crossing into the oncominglane of traffic. The officersresponding to the scene did notdetect an odor of intoxicants onthe driver's breath. Althoughthe driver was obviouslyshaken, upset, and unsteady, hedid not otherwise exhibitobvious signs of intoxication. The driver sustained moderateinjuries and was taken byambulance to the hospital formedical attention.

The officers investigating thecrash site found empty beercans suggesting one or bothdrivers had been drinking. When the officers went to thehospital, the paramedicsindicated that the driver's breathhad a slight odor of intoxicants. Although unable to request thatthe driver perform field sobrietytests, the officers placed thedriver under arrest for OWI andread the Informing the"Accused form." The driverrefused to comply with theofficers' request. The officersthen directed hospital personnelto take a blood sample. Thedriver complied and signed thehospital consent form.

Discussion

In State v. Bohling,⁽⁸⁾ a driverwas involved in a two-car crash. When an officer arrived at thescene, he noted that Bohlingsmelled of intoxicants, hadbloodshot eyes, and exhibitedpoor balance. The officerplaced Bohling under arrest forOWI and took him to the policestation where he refused to takethe intoxilyzer test. Subsequently, Bohling wastaken to the hospital for a bloodtest pursuant to policedepartment policy. Although herefused to sign the hospitalconsent form, he complied withthe blood test.⁽⁹⁾

In Bohling, the WisconsinSupreme Court held that bloodmay be taken as a searchincident to a lawful OWI arrest. The court concluded that bloodtest results taken without asearch warrant will beadmissible provided thefollowing requirements are met:

(1) The blood is taken from aperson legally arrested for adrunk driving offense to obtainevidence of intoxication. (2)There is a clear indication thatthe blood will produce evidenceof intoxication. (3) The methodused is performed in areasonable manner. (4) Thearrested person does not havean objection to the blood test.⁽¹⁰⁾ Finally, the court reasoned thatbecause alcohol quicklydissipates from a person'sbloodstream, there is sufficientexigent circumstances to justifytaking blood without awarrant.⁽¹¹⁾

Application

Although the blood test in factscenario No. 1 was not takenincident to a lawful arrest orpursuant to the implied consentlaw, it will likely be admissiblefor the following reasons: (1) Itwas taken for diagnosticpurposes at the direction of atreating physician. (2) The testresults are not confidentialunder the physician-patientprivilege. (3) The officers'investigation of the crash siteprovided a sufficient basis toissue a drunk driving citation.⁽¹²⁾

Additionally, the blood testresult will likely be admissiblein fact scenario No. 2 because: (1) It was taken pursuant to alawful arrest for drunk driving. (2) It was reasonable for theinvestigating officers to believethat, based on the totality of thecircumstances, the driver'sblood contained evidence of acrime which was rapidlydissipating. (3) The blood testwas performed by medicalpersonnel in a reasonablemanner.

In the alternative, a statutewould eliminate the aboveissues of admissibility byproviding mandatory chemicaltesting of all drivers who havebeen issued a citation for anonequipment violation andhave been involved in a motorvehicle crash resulting in deathor serious personal injury. Thepossible statutory solutions arediscussed below.

Universal Alcohol Testing

At one time, Wisconsin lawauthorized blood tests for"surviving drivers in accidentswhich result in death or 'greatbodily harm' to anyone." Further, the test results wereadmissible in court.⁽¹³⁾ Specifically, subsection343.305(2)(am) provided:

A law enforcementofficer shall request anyperson who was theoperator of a motorvehicle involved in anaccident resulting in greatbodily harm or death toany person to take a testas provided under par.(b) or (c) [breath, bloodor urine] for the purposespecified in sub.(1) [todetermine the presence orquantity of alcohol orcontrolled substances].⁽¹⁴⁾

This subsection becameeffective July 1, 1978, andgenerated some confusionconcerning the legislative intentbehind its application. Subsection (am) appeared to bean aberration from the impliedconsent law which required anofficer to have either probablecause to believe the driver wasoperating while under theinfluence of an intoxicant or thatthe driver was already placedunder arrest for OWI. On itsface, subsection (am) requiredneither probable cause nor anarrest. One possibleexplanation was that thelegislative intent construed thevery fact of an accidentresulting in great bodily harm ordeath as sufficient probablecause to justify taking achemical test. However, thiswas considered to be one areaof the new law that thelegislature needed to clarify.

The question of a lawenforcement officer's authorityunder subsection (am) wasposed to then-senior staffattorney for the legislativecouncil and then attorneygeneral which yieldeddivergently different responses. Senior Staff Attorney Jim Fullininterpreted the legislative intentof (am) to take away anofficer's discretion and mandatethat tests be requested in allserious accident situations.⁽¹⁵⁾ Attorney General BronsonLaFollette, on the other hand,stated unequivocally that a "lawenforcement officer could not,in the absence of a validlyissued citation, request that anoperator of a motor vehicleinvolved in a crash when thereis a fatality or a very seriousinjury submit to a test." In thealternative, the attorney generalapproved the followingprocedure for implementingsubsection 343.305(2)(am):

(1) If there is 'probablecause' to make an arrest,proceed with the arrestand implied consentprocedure.

(2) If there is no'probable cause' present,request the operator(s) tosubmit to the test. If theoperator(s) refuse,discontinue theprocedure.⁽¹⁶⁾

A subsequent Attorney GeneralOpinion reiterated thisprocedure in concluding that adriver could not be asked totake a test under subsection(2)(am) unless there was alawful arrest.⁽¹⁷⁾ Subsection(2)(am) was repealed in 1981.⁽¹⁸⁾

However, the dialogueconcerning universal bloodtesting did not end with therepeal of subsection (2)(am). Two faculty members of theUniversity of Wisconsin LawSchool suggested a differentapproach to the traditionalprobable cause rationale tojustify taking blood tests ofdrivers involved in vehiclecrashes. They reasoned that theunique circumstancessurrounding a crash resulting indeath or serious injury, whentaken together with the highcorrelation between trafficcrashes and alcohol, wereenough to satisfy the probablecause requirement, providedcertain "neutral and objective"criteria were met.⁽¹⁹⁾ It wasargued that the legislative intentof subsection 343.305(2)(am)clearly provided for bloodtesting of all drivers involved incrashes resulting in death orserious injury. Further, thestatute was considered to be inkeeping with the public'sinterest of responding to theproblem of the drinkingdriver.⁽²⁰⁾

Illinois recently passedlegislation that requires driversinvolved in crashes resulting inserious personal injury or deathand issued a citation for anonequipment offense toundergo chemical testing forimpairment by drugs oralcohol.⁽²¹⁾ The statute waschallenged as unconstitutionalunder the fourth amendment ofthe United States Constitution. However, the Illinois SupremeCourt concluded that becausethe chemical test imposes only aminor intrusion on a driver whoalready has a diminishedexpectation of privacy whileoperating a vehicle⁽²²⁾ that thestatute fit within the "specialneeds" exception to the fourthamendment.⁽²³⁾ The courtreasoned that any subsequentprosecution is merely incidentalto the primary purpose of thestatute which is to protect thepublic from the hazards causedby intoxicated drivers.⁽²⁴⁾ Illinoisis the second state to allowemergency room physicians tovolunteer chemical test resultsto the police without fear ofbeing sued by the injureddriver.⁽²⁵⁾

In response to concerns of theinjured impaired driver, theNational Committee on UniformTraffic Laws and Ordinancesdeveloped a model statute formandatory chemical testingwhich provides, in part:

. . . [W]hen the driver ofa vehicle is involved in acrash resulting in deathor serious personal injuryof another person, andthere is reason to believethat the driver is guilty of[driving under theinfluence of alcohol ordrugs], the driver may becompelled by a policeofficer to submit to a testor tests of the driver'sblood, breath orurine. . . .⁽²⁶⁾

A number of states haveestablished similar procedureswhich allow medical personnelto withdraw blood from a driverof a crash resulting in a fatalityor serious bodily injury. Thesetests may be taken without thedriver's consent, without alawful arrest, and may be usedas evidence of impairment tosubsequently prosecute thedriver. In cases where a driverhas been injured in a crash andrequires medical attention, thismay be the only way ofascertaining the driver's alcoholconcentration.

Practical Considerations

Without the statutory authorityto take blood tests of all driversinvolved in motor vehiclecrashes resulting in seriousbodily injury or fatality, whatare the practical logistics ofobtaining hospital blood testresults taken for diagnosticpurposes? Further, to whatextent will medical personnelvoluntarily release the blood testresults revealing a prohibitedalcohol concentration toprosecutors or law enforcementofficers? These are some of thepractical considerations thatmust be addressed whenconfronted with the factscenarios presented here.

Much of the cooperation on thepart of medical personnel andemergency medical technicians(EMTs) will depend on the kindof working relationship theyhave with law enforcementofficers. The primary concernsof an officer responding to aserious vehicle crash are: first,to promptly arrange for medicaltreatment of the injured; andsecond, to direct traffic awayfrom the scene to insure it doesnot cause a hazard. Underthese circumstances, an officermay not have an opportunity toadequately investigate thepossibility of a survivingdriver's impairment before heor she is taken to a hospital fortreatment. Therefore, it isimperative that law enforcementofficers and emergency roompersonnel have good workingrelationships prior to a crashthat requires blood testing. Most emergency medical staffand EMTs will cooperate withlaw enforcement officers,provided the officers'involvement is relativelyunobtrusive and their requestscan be accommodated bytreating medical personnel.⁽²⁷⁾

At least two jurisdictions inWisconsin; namely, Milwaukeeand Madison, have indicatedthat their police departmentshave not had any problemsobtaining blood test results aftera crash. If an officer contactsmedical personnel at thehospital following a crash andrequests the blood test results ofa suspect, they will usually befurnished. Most hospitals inMilwaukee and Madison willcooperate by providing bloodtest results when aninvestigation reveals that alcoholmay have been a contributingfactor in a crash.

If the incident goes to trial, thecity attorney or countyprosecutor may want to issue asubpoena to obtain hospitalblood test results.⁽²⁸⁾ However,some hospitals will release theresults without a subpoena. Inone case, it was the hospital thatcalled the police department toreport that a driver who soughtmedical attention after aone-vehicle crash had tested.39% alcohol concentration. Based on this information, thepolice were able to locate thedriver and place her underarrest for OWI.⁽²⁹⁾

Policy Concerns

If obtaining hospital blood testresults is not a problem from apractical standpoint, why wouldthere need to be a law requiringtesting in all crashes involvingserious bodily harm or fatality? A mandatory blood testingstatute would treat all driversinvolved in crashes the same,whether or not there is asuspicion of alcohol. Thisuniform treatment of drivers hasthree benefits: (1) It wouldquickly identify those caseswhere intoxication was not afactor in the crash; (2) it wouldquickly identify those caseswhere alcohol or drugs played arole in the crash; and (3) itwould provide medicalpersonnel the opportunity tointervene for the purpose ofmaking appropriate treatmentreferrals. These points arediscussed below.

First, a blood test can easilyidentify those cases wherealcohol was not a factor in thecrash. This information couldquickly exonerate thosesurviving drivers who otherwisemight be presumed to beintoxicated. For example, aman who caused a crash thatresulted in three fatalities wasoriginally jailed on three countsof homicide by intoxicated useof a motor vehicle. However, ablood test taken several hoursafter the crash revealed analcohol concentration of .02%,well below the legal limit. Subsequently, the districtattorney charged the man withthree counts of homicide bynegligent use of a motorvehicle.⁽³⁰⁾ Certainly a driverwho knows he or she was notdrinking prior to a crash wouldwant the opportunity to beexonerated from the suspicionthat intoxication played a role inthe crash.

Second, thousands of injuredimpaired drivers in need ofmedical attention are able toavoid prosecution for drunkdriving when treating physiciansdo not have the statutoryauthority to report chemical testresults. And yet emergencyroom personnel have known foryears that many people who aretreated for injuries from carcrashes are legally drunk.⁽³¹⁾ However, without a policy orstatute, emergency roompersonnel are faced with thedilemma of whether they shouldprovide blood test results onlywhen requested or if theyshould actively offer them evenwhen not questioned. In manystates, doctors are forced toremain silent because thephysician-patient privilege treatsblood test results asconfidential. Thus, a recentstudy found that 70% of injureddrivers hospitalized fortreatment who had an alcoholconcentration over .08% werenever prosecuted or convictedfor drunk driving.⁽³²⁾ From thestandpoint of the physicians andemergency room personnel whomust treat the injured impaireddriver, the message seems to bethat if you drink, drive, and getinjured, you probably won't getcaught. In fact, you're morethan likely to get away with it.⁽³³⁾

Third, medical personnel shoulddevelop a policy requiring themto make appropriate referralsfor alcohol rehabilitation. Thehigh incidence of alcohol abusein vehicle crashes requiringmedical attention will providean opportunity for medicalpersonnel to intervene for thepurpose of getting the patient toalcohol treatment.⁽³⁴⁾ Appropriate referrals andtreatment of those with alcohol-related problems can helpprevent a significant number oftraffic crashes.⁽³⁵⁾

Conclusion

There is a high correlationbetween the consumption ofalcohol and the incidence ofmotor vehicle crashes.⁽³⁶⁾ Officers who respond to thescene of a serious crash havemultiple responsibilities thatoften do not allow them to fullyinvestigate the possibility of asurviving driver's impairment. Obtaining blood test results ofthe injured impaired driver canbe handled in one of severalways; namely: (1) Blood maybe taken at the direction of atreating physician and madeavailable to investigatingofficers upon request. (2)Blood may be taken incident toa lawful arrest, without thedriver's consent, due to exigentcircumstances. (3) Amandatory blood testing statutecould test all surviving driversof vehicle crashes, whether ornot there is a suspicion ofimpairment. Whateverapproach is adopted, publicpolicy dictates that the injuredimpaired driver should not beable to escape prosecution andthe injured unimpaired drivershould be exonerated from anysuspicion of intoxication.

Endnotes

1. Letter from City of Appleton,Assistant City Attorney Scott E.Hansen to Nina J. Sines, Director,Resource Center on ImpairedDriving (Jan. 20, 1997).

2. For example, Judge JamesCarlson suggested the ResourceCenter look at the history of theminimum drinking age discussed in"The Minimum Drinking Age andAlcohol Policy: An HistoricalOverview and Response to theRenewed Debate in Wisconsin,"Resource Center Report, No. 96-1,April 1996. In addition, inquiriesfrom both the prosecutor and thedefense attorney in a drunk drivingcase provided the factual scenariodiscussed in "Informing theAccused Under the Implied ConsentLaw," Resource Center Report, No.95-2, October 1995.

3. Wis. Stat. § 340.01 (46m)defines "prohibited alcoholconcentration" as either 0.10percent and 0.10 grams or 0.08percent and 0.08 grams, dependingon whether the person has two ormore prior offenses. See also WisJI-Criminal 1186, Comment (1993).

4. Unless otherwise indicated, allreferences in this report to theWisconsin statutes are to the1995-96 statutes.

5. 167 Wis.2d 536 (1992).

6. Id., at 540-41.

7. Subsec. 905.04(4)(f) provides:

There is no privilegeconcerning the results ofor circumstancessurrounding any chemicaltests for intoxication orblood alcoholconcentration.

8. 173 Wis.2d 529 (1993).

9. See Id. at 534-35.

10. See Id. at 534.

11. See Id. at 539, citingSchmerber v. California, 384 U.S.757, 770-71 (1966).

12. See State v. Smith, 929 P.2d1191 (Wash. App. Div. 1 1997). The court relied on State v. Zielke,137 Wis.2d 39 (1987), to concludethat blood taken for medicalpurposes was admissible given thelegislative intent of the impliedconsent law. "Physician-PatientPrivilege Did Not Apply to BloodSample or to any Reports ofSample's Alcohol Content; Public'sInterest in Revelation of FactsSurrounding Alleged Drunk DrivingOutweighed Benefits of Privilege,"Drinking/Driving Law Letter, Vol.16, No. 15, 272-74 (July 18, 1997).

13. Office of the Governor,Highway Safety Coordinator, Stateof Wisconsin, Wisconsin ArrestsDrunk Drivers (leaflet) 1978.

14. Subsection 343.305,Wisconsin's Statutes on Operating aMotor Vehicle While Under TheInfluence, Legal Systems, Inc.,1978.

15. Wisconsin Legislative CouncilStaff Memorandum from SeniorStaff Attorney Jim Fullin to SpeakerEd Jackamonis (Dec. 8, 1978.)

16. Governor's Office of HighwaySafety, State of Wisconsin,Informational Bulletin #70, Jan. 15,1979.

17. 68 Op. Att'y Gen. 314 (1978).

18. See Chapter 20, Laws of 1981,sec. 1568e. (codified as amended atWis. Stat. § 343.305(2) (1981-82)).

19. The criteria would be based onthe circumstances of the crash andknowledge about the correlationbetween vehicle crashes and alcoholuse. See memorandum fromHerman Goldstein and ChuckSusmilch to Dave Schultz,(July 21, 1981) (on file withauthor).

20. See Id.

21. The Illinois Vehicle Codeprovides, in part:

Any person who drives. . . and has beeninvolved in a personalinjury or fatal motorvehicle accident, shall bedeemed to have givenconsent to a breath test orto a chemical test or testsof blood, breath, or urinefor the purpose ofdetermining the alcohol orother drug content of suchperson's blood if arrestedas evidenced by theissuance of a UniformTraffic Ticket for anyviolation of the IllinoisVehicle Code or similarprovision of a localordinance. . . .

625 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/11-501.6(a) (West 1997).

22. One has a lesser expectation ofprivacy in a motor vehicle, in partbecause its function is transportationand it seldom serves as one'sresidence. Because of this, and thefact that vehicular travel is, ofnecessity, highly regulated,individuals traveling in vehiclesmust expect that the state, inenforcing its regulations, willintrude to some extent on theirprivacy. "Search and Seizure," 65

LW 2653, 4/15/97, citing UnitedStates v. Stanfield; 109 F.3d 976,982 (4th Cir. 1997).

23. Fink v. Ryan, 673 N.E.2d 281,286-287 (Ill. 1996).

24. Id. at 285.

25. Oregon is the other state. Cindy Schreuder, "Law eased ondrunken-driving tests," ChicagoTribune, Jan. 27, 1997. Oregon'simplied consent law provides, inpart:

Any person who operatesa motor vehicle uponpremises open to thepublic or the highways ofthis state shall be deemedto have given consent . . .to a chemical test of theperson's breath, or of theperson's blood if theperson is receivingmedical care in a healthcare facility immediatelyafter a motor vehicleaccident, for the purposeof determining thealcoholic content of theperson's blood if theperson is arrested fordriving a motor vehiclewhile under the influenceof intoxicants . . .(emphasis provided). OR. Rev. Stat. Ann.§ 813.10(1) (Supp. 1996).

26. Uniform Vehicle Code andModel Traffic Ordinance, Sec.6-210.

27. Dan Mayer, "EmergencyRoom Medical Personnel andImpaired Drivers: Working withLaw Enforcement to Help StopRepeat Offenders," ImpairedDriving Update, Vol. 1, No. 2,21-21, January/February 1997.

28. Telephone interview withLieutenant John Michalak,Milwaukee Police Department(Jan. 31, 1997).

29. Telephone interview withLieutenant Pat Malloy, MadisonPolice Department (Jan. 30, 1997).

30. See "Driver in fatal crashjailed," Wis. St. J., Feb. 8, 1993;Cary Segall, "Intoxication doubtedin fatal crash," Wis. St. J., Feb. 9,1993; and Joe Beck, "DA to chargedriver in deaths of three," Wis. St.J., Feb. 10, 1993.

31. See Cindy Schreuder, supranote 25.

32. Rob Lillis, "Injured DrunkDrivers: Closing Gaps in LawEnforcement," Impaired DrivingUpdate, Vol. 1, No. 5, July/August, 1997. See also, M. Colquitt,P. Fielding, P. & J. Cronan,"Drunk Driving and Medical andSocial Injury," 317 New Eng. J.Med., 1262 (1987).

33. Due to the high rate of alcoholabuse in vehicular trauma, hospitaladmission may provide anopportunity to intervene in thetreatment of alcohol-relatedproblems. Appropriate treatmentcould prevent a significant numberof traffic injuries and death. M. Mancino, M. Cunningham,P. Davidson, and R. Rulton,"Identification of the Motor VehicleAccident Victim Who AbusesAlcohol: An Opportunity to ReduceTrauma," Journal Stud. Alcohol,57: 652-58 (1996).

34. Dan Mayer, supra note 27at 22. See also, Kevin V. Johnson,"A medical loophole for drunkendrivers," USA Today, April 1,1997.

35. See M. Mancino, M.Cunningham, P. Davidson, and R.Rulton, supra note 33.

36. In Wisconsin in 1995, overone-third of driver fatalities and asubstantial number of passengersand pedestrians killed in vehiclecrashes tested with alcoholconcentrations above .10%. Wisconsin Dep't of Transp.,Wisconsin Alcohol Traffic FactsBook, 1996 ed.

The Resource Center invites yourcomments, inquiries, andsuggestions. Call toll free1 (800) 862-1048 or in Madison265-3411.

The Resource Center on ImpairedDriving

The Resource Center on ImpairedDriving represents the combinedefforts of the Department ofTransportation and the University ofWisconsin Law School. TheResource Center is designed toprovide a wide range of alcoholrelated data and legal information onimpaired driving issues to judges,prosecutors, defense attorneys, lawenforcement agencies, educators, andcitizens. In addition, the ResourceCenter plays an integral role ineducation and training programs ondevelopments in the drunk drivingfield.

The Department of Transportation(DOT) initially proposed the conceptof a clearinghouse for information onoperating while intoxicated and relatedissues in developing its AlcoholTraffic Safety Plan. The plan, fundedthrough federal highway safety grantmonies and implemented by the DOT,identified public information andeducation as importantcountermeasures to the problem ofimpaired driving. A similar idea wasalso proposed in the DOT Task ForceReport on Repeat Offenders (1991).

The Resource Center on ImpairedDriving is located in the law schoolOffice of Continuing Legal Educationand Outreach. The law schoolprovides a natural setting because ofsubstantial work done in the past onissues related to impaired driving. The Office of Continuing LegalEducation and Outreach has hadextensive experience in working withother state agencies, trial judges, andlawyers. The combined expertise,experience, and objectivity willenhance the Resource Center's abilityto develop effective responses to theproblem of the impaired driver.

From the point of view of the lawschool and the university, theResource Center on Impaired Drivingprovides an opportunity to be ofservice to the state in the tradition of"The Wisconsin Idea." Specifically,the Resource Center creates apartnership between state governmentand the university in addressing anissue of statewide importance. TheResource Center's initial service-oriented activities will provide aresearch base that will be instrumentalin the development of new policyinitiatives on impaired driving issues.

The Resource Center invites yourcomments, inquiries, and suggestions. Call toll free 1 (800) 862-1048 or inMadison 265-3411. The ResourceCenter's new address is:

UW Law School Resource Center onImpaired Driving

975 Bascom Mall, Room 2348

Madison, WI 53706-1399