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CASE NAME |
DATE | DOCKET NO. | ISSUE |
| State v.
Peters
244 Wis. 2d 470, 628 N.W.2d 797, 2001 WI 74 |
June 28, 2001 | 99-1940-CR | Collateral
Challenge of Prior Convictions; Assistance of Counsel:
This case concerns the extent to which a defendant may collaterally
attack a prior conviction in a subsequent criminal case where the
prior conviction is used to enhance the sentence for the subsequent
crime. Earlier this term, in State v. Hahn, 2000 WI 118,
238 Wis. 2d 889, 618 N.W.2d 528, the Wisconsin supreme court
followed Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485 (1994) and
held that a defendant generally may not collaterally attack a prior
conviction in a subsequent criminal case where the prior conviction
enhances the subsequent sentence. There is an exception, however,
for a collateral attack based upon an alleged violation of the
defendant's right to counsel. Hahn, 238 Wis. 2d at 903-04;
see also Custis, 511 U.S. at 495-96.
The Wisconsin supreme court views this case as falling within the right-to-counsel exception to the general rule against collateral attacks on prior convictions. It holds that D may, in the context of this prosecution for fifth offense OAR, collaterally challenge his second OAR conviction, because the no contest plea upon which it was based was entered without counsel. The court reverses and remands for consideration of whether D knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel before pleading no contest to second offense OAR. |
| State v.
Kelsey C.R.
243 Wis. 2d 422, 626 N.W.2d 777, 2001 WI 54 |
May 31, 2001 | 99-3095 | What Constitutes
a Seizure; Reasonable Suspicion; Terry Stop; Community Caretaker
Exception: This case arises out of a stop and pat-down
search of Petitioner. Two police officers came upon P sitting
alone after dark in a high-crime neighborhood. The officers were
concerned that she was a runaway so they began asking her
questions. After P had responded to a few questions, the police
told her to "stay put." P then fled from the police. The police
chased and eventually caught her. The officers detained P, and had
a pat-down search of her person for weapons conducted. The police
found a loaded handgun on P, and she was charged with possession of
a dangerous weapon. P moved the circuit court to suppress the
results of the pat-down--the handgun--as evidence. The circuit
court denied her motion and the court of appeals affirmed. We
granted
P's petition for review. The court addresses three distinct points in the encounter
between the police and P. First, did the police seize P, thereby
invoking her constitutional protection against unreasonable
seizures, when they told her to "stay put" but she ran away?
Second, was the detention of P after she fled and the police caught
her reasonable? Third, was the pat-down search of P reasonable?
|
| State v.
Piddington
241Wis. 2d 754, 623 N.W.2d 528, 2001 WI 24 Petition for Certiorari Filed:
|
March 22, 2001 | 99-1250-CR | Implied Consent;
Persons with Disabilities: D seeks review of a published
court of appeals decision that reversed a circuit court order which
had suppressed the test results of D's blood for alcohol. State
v. Piddington, 2000 WI App 44, 233 Wis. 2d 257, 607 N.W.2d
303. D was tested after he was arrested for operating a motor
vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant (OWI). The
circuit court had concluded that D, who has been profoundly deaf
since birth, needed an ASL interpreter to fully understand the
field sobriety tests and the information that he was to be given
pursuant to Wisconsin's implied consent law. The court of appeals
reversed, concluding that the law enforcement officer need only
"orally inform" D of the required information.
The supreme court disagrees with the court of appeals' approach regarding the implied consent warnings. The court holds that § 343.305(4) requires the arresting officer under the circumstances facing him or her at the time of the arrest, to utilize those methods which were reasonable, and would reasonably convey the implied consent warnings. In determining whether the arresting officer has used reasonable methods which would reasonably convey the necessary information in light of the pertinent circumstances, the focus rests upon the conduct of the officer. The supreme court thus agrees with that part of the circuit court's findings that "the attempts of law enforcement to communicate with the defendant were reasonable under all the circumstances, perhaps even exemplary . . . ." (R. at 28:1-2.) The law enforcement officers here used reasonable methods to convey the required implied consent warnings, and, accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals. The test results should not have been suppressed. |
| State v.
Rutzinski
241Wis. 2d 729, 623 N.W.2d 516, 2001 WI 22 |
Mar 20, 2001 | 98-3541-CR | Reasonable Suspicion; Anonymous Tip: This case requires us to decide under what circumstances a cell-phone call from an unidentified motorist provides sufficient justification for an investigative traffic stop. D moved to suppress evidence obtained during the traffic stop, arguing that information from an unidentified motorist's call was not sufficiently reliable to justify the stop and, therefore, the stop was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution. The Wisconsin supreme court holds that under the circumstances of this case, the information in the motorist's call provided sufficient justification for an investigative stop of D. |
| State v.
Williams
241 Wis. 2d 631, 623 N.W.2d 106, 2001 WI 21 Petition for Certiorari Filed:
|
Mar 13, 2001 |
96-1821-CR
|
Reasonable
Suspicion; Anonymous Tip; Protective Search: A review of
the court of appeals decision that reversed the conviction of the
defendant, State v. Williams, 214 Wis. 2d 412, 570 N.W.2d
892 (Ct. App. 1997). On April 27, 1999, the supreme court issued a
decision, State v. Williams, 225 Wis. 2d 159, 591 N.W.2d
823 (1999), that reversed the court of appeals decision. However,
on April 3, 2000, the United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari and vacated (without review) the decision, and remanded
the case for further consideration in light of Florida v.
J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 120 S. Ct. 1375 (2000). Williams v.
Wisconsin, 529 U.S. 1050, 120 S. Ct. 1552 (2000). Now having
the benefit of the U.S. Supreme Court's guidance in Florida v.
J.L., the Wisconsin Supreme Court concludes that, considering
the totality of the circumstances, including the indicia of
reliability surrounding the anonymous tip and the police officers'
additional observations, the officers reasonably suspected that
criminal activity was afoot.
The second issue before the court is whether there was reasonable suspicion for the police officers' subsequent search of the vehicle. The circuit court found that there was, and the court of appeals did not reach that question. The supreme court agrees with the circuit court that under the circumstances, the officers reasonably suspected that they were in physical danger, justifying the protective search. |
| State v.
Matejka
241 Wis. 2d 52, 621 N.W.2d 891, 2001 WI 5 Certiorari Denied:
|
Feb 6, 2001 | 99-0070-CR | Consent Search of Passenger Compartment Including Passenger's Possessions: The issue in this case is whether, under the consent exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement, a driver's consent to a police officer's search of a vehicle extends to a passenger's jacket left in the vehicle at the time of the search. Defendant was one of several passengers in a van that was stopped by a state trooper for a traffic violation. The trooper obtained the driver's consent to search the van and ordered everyone out while he conducted the search. D left her jacket behind, and the trooper eventually searched it, finding drug paraphernalia and marijuana. Additional drug paraphernalia, marijuana, and LSD were discovered during a custodial search of D and her belongings after her arrest. The circuit court suppressed the drug evidence, finding a Fourth Amendment violation because D had not personally consented to the search of her individual property within the van. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the driver's consent to the search of the van encompassed the jacket D had left in it. The Wisconsin supreme court agrees, and therefore affirm the decision of the court of appeals which reversed the circuit court's suppression of the drug evidence in this case. |
| State v.
Hahn
238 Wis.2d 889, 618 N.W.2d 528, 2000 WI 118 Reconsideration Denied:
Opinion Clarified on
|
November 1, 2000 | 99-0554-CR | Three Strikes
Law; Collateral Challenge of Prior Convictions: The
defendant appeals his sentence of life in prison without the
possibility of parole under Wisconsin's persistent repeater
statute, Wis. Stat. § 939.62(2m) (1997-98). The Wisconsin supreme
court concludes that an offender does not have a federal
constitutional right to use the enhanced sentence proceeding
predicated on a prior state conviction as the forum in which to
challenge the prior conviction, except when the offender alleges
that a violation of the constitutional right to a lawyer occurred
in the prior state conviction.
The court further concludes, as a matter of judicial administration, that an offender may not use the enhanced sentence proceeding predicated on a prior conviction as the forum in which to challenge the prior conviction, except when the offender alleges that a violation of the constitutional right to a lawyer occurred in the prior state conviction. Because the defendant in the present case does not allege that a violation of his constitutional right to a lawyer occurred in the prior conviction, he may not challenge his 1994 conviction during this 1997 persistent repeater proceeding. A second question of law presented is whether the persistent repeater penalty enhancer as applied to the defendant violates the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment. For the reasons set forth in the opinion, the court reject the defendant's Eighth Amendment challenge to Wisconsin's persistent repeater statute, Wis. Stat. § 939.62(2m). |
| State v.
Pallone
236 Wis. 2d 162, 613 N.W.2d 568, 2000 WI 77 Certiorari Denied:
|
June 30, 2000 | 98-0896-CR | Search Incident
to Arrest; Containers in Passenger Compartment: D seeks
review of a published decision of the court of appeals, State
v. Pallone, 228 Wis. 2d 272, 596 N.W.2d 882 (Ct. App. 1999).
The court of appeals affirmed the decision of the circuit court
denying D's motion to suppress evidence obtained when police
arrested the driver of the vehicle in which D was a passenger and searched a duffel bag belonging to D. The circuit court concluded that the search was proper because it was conducted incident to an arrest. The issue before the court is whether police may conduct a warrantless search of the belongings in a motor vehicle when the driver of this vehicle is under arrest but police do not have probable cause to arrest or detain the passenger. The Wisconsin supreme court holds that the search of D's duffel bag was constitutionally sound, on the facts presented, for two reasons. First, the search was valid under the "search incident to arrest" exception to the warrant requirements set forth in Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and art. I, § 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution. Second, the search was proper because police had probable cause to search the passenger compartment of the driver's truck and any containers capable of concealing the object of the search. The court therefore concludes the search of the duffel bag was valid, and the evidence obtained from the search was admissible at trial. Accordingly, it affirms the decision of the court of appeals. |
| State v.
Richter
235 Wis.2d 524, 612 N.W.2d 29, 2000 WI 58 |
June 20, 2000 | 98-1332-CR | Exigent Circumstances; Attenuation: This case involves a warrantless entry of a home, and the recurring question of whether the circumstances under which it took place were sufficiently exigent to justify it. D was charged with several marijuana possession offenses, and moved to suppress the physical evidence and his statements, alleging an illegal entry. The circuit court granted the motion, and the court of appeals affirmed, finding the circumstances insufficiently exigent and D's consent insufficiently attenuated to justify the search. State v. Richter, 224 Wis. 2d 814, 817, 592 N.W.2d 310 (Ct. App. 1999). Because the Wisconsin supreme court concludes the entry was justified by exigent circumstances-specifically, the deputy's "hot pursuit" of the burglary suspect and his need to protect the safety of those inside the trailer- the supreme court reverses. The supreme court also concludes that the court of appeals' application of the attenuation doctrine was based upon a misconstruction of several of the doctrine's elements. |
| State v.
Griffith
236 Wis. 2d 48, 613 N.W.2d 72, 2000 WI 72 |
June 28, 2000 | 98-0931-CR | Questioning of
Passengers; Assistance of Counsel; D petitions for review
of a decision of the court of appeals affirming his convictions for
obstructing an officer, possession of marijuana, and escape from
custody. On appeal, D argues that the police questioning that led
to the obstruction charge constituted an unreasonable search or
seizure. D contends that all of his convictions should therefore be
reversed. At his trial, D presented a defense of mistaken
identity, arguing that he was not the passenger who fled from
police. The jury found D guilty.
In a postconviction motion, D argued that he did not receive effective assistance of counsel because his trial attorney failed to raise a Fourth Amendment argument. D's claim is that under the Fourth Amendment and Wis. Const. art. 1, § 11, the officer lacked lawful authority to ask the passenger his name and date of birth. In sum, D contends that because the officer lacked lawful authority to ask his name and date of birth, all of his convictions must fail. The circuit court determined that D's Fourth Amendment argument was without merit and that failure to raise a meritless argument did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. The court of appeals affirmed, and D petitioned for review. The supreme court agrees with the circuit court and the court of appeals that D's Fourth Amendment argument fails on the merits. Asking the passenger his name and date of birth during a lawful traffic stop was not an unreasonable search or seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment. It therefore affirms. |
| State v.
McGill
234 Wis. 2d 560, 609 N.W.2d 795, 2000 WI 38 Certiorari Denied:
|
May 12, 2000 | 98-1409-CR | Terry Frisk; Probable Cause: This is a challenge to a protective frisk for weapons that produced not a weapon but cocaine. The defendant has two complaints. First, he says there was insufficient justification for the frisk because this was merely a routine traffic stop devoid of any circumstances suggesting that he was armed and presently dangerous. And, second, he says that even if the weapons frisk was justified, the officer exceeded its scope by seizing and opening the package of cocaine that he had in his pocket. The supreme court disagrees and hold that both the frisk and the subsequent seizure and inspection of the packaged drugs in D's pocket were constitutional. |
| State v.
Hughes
233 Wis. 2d 280, 607 N.W.2d 621, 2000 WI 24 Certiorari Denied: Hughes v. Wisconsin, 531 U.S. 856 |
Mar 17, 2000 |
97-1121-CR
|
Warrantless Search of a Home; Exigent Circumstances: This case involves a warrantless police entry into a home. The officers in question were at the threshold of the defendant's apartment about to investigate a complaint of trespassing when the door was unexpectedly opened, and they immediately detected a strong odor of marijuana coming from inside. The officers also deduced a distinct possibility that any evidence of the drug would be destroyed if they did not immediately enter, since the people in the apartment were now alerted to their presence. The question in the case is, under these circumstances, does the combination of the strong odor of marijuana coming from the apartment, and the knowledge on the part of the occupants that the police are standing outside, amount to exigent circumstances justifying the warrantless entry and subsequent search? The supreme court holds that it does, and therefore reverses the court of appeals decision that reversed the circuit court's order upholding this search. |
| State v.
Longcore
233 Wis. 2d 278, 607 N.W.2d 620, 2000 WI 23 Appeal After Remand:
|
March 10, 2000 | 98-2792-CR | Decision of the court of
appeals in State v. Longcore,
226 Wis.2d 1, 594 N.W.2d is affirmed by evenly divided court. |
| State v.
Ward
231 Wis. 2d 723, 604 N.W.2d 517, 2000 WI 3 |
Jan. 19, 2000 | 97-2008-CR | Probable Cause;
Good Faith Exception; No-Knock Warrant: The State of
Wisconsin seeks review of a court of appeals' decision that
reversed a judgment of the circuit court convicting the defendant
on his no-contest plea to two counts of possession of a controlled
substance with intent to deliver. The court of appeals held that
evidence seized during the search of D's home should have been
suppressed because the affidavit submitted to the warrant-issuing
judge in support of the search warrant failed to provide a
substantial basis for finding probable cause that evidence of
criminal activity was likely be found at that site. State v. Ward,
222 Wis. 2d 311, 333, 588 N.W.2d 645 (Ct. App. 1998).
Two issues are raised on review. The first issue is whether the warrant to search for drugs at Ward's home was supported by probable cause. The court concludes that the warrant-issuing magistrate had a substantial basis for finding probable cause to issue the warrant to search D's home, and accordingly it reverses on that issue. The second issue, not reached by the court of appeals, is whether the evidence should be suppressed because officers executed an unlawful no-knock entry into D's residence in violation of the rule of announcement. At the time of entry, the police action was in conformance with then-existing law, subsequently changed by the United States Supreme Court. The court concludes that the evidence should be admitted because the police officers acted in good faith reliance on law that was controlling at the time of the search. |
| State v.
Orta; State v. Ruiz
231 Wis. 2d 782, 604 N.W.2d 543, 2000 WI 4 |
Jan. 19, 2000 | 97-3105-CR & 97-3106-CR | No-Knock
Warrant; Good Faith Exception: The question presented in
these consolidated cases is whether evidence that is seized
pursuant to a rule expounded by this court must be suppressed when
that rule is subsequently determined by the United States
Supreme Court to be unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. We considered this identical issue in a separate case decided today, State v. Ward, 2000 WI 3, ____ Wis. 2d ____, ___ N.W.2d ___. For the reasons set forth in Ward, the Wisconsin supreme court concludes that the evidence seized at the home of Lisa Orta and Ricardo Ruiz is admissible evidence. Accordingly, the decision of the court of appeals is reversed. |
| State v.
Martwick
231 Wis.2d 801, 604 N.W.2d 552, 2000 WI 5 |
Jan. 19, 2000 | 98-0101-CR | Warrantless
Search; Curtilage: The state, as petitioner, seeks review
of an unpublished decision of the court of appeals, State v.
Martwick, No. 98-0101-CR, unpublished slip op. (Ct. App. July
21, 1998), which reversed a Price County Circuit Court judgment.
The circuit court convicted the respondent of manufacturing THC,
contrary to Wis. Stat. § 961.41(1)(h)1 (1995-96). The court of
appeals reversed, holding that the circuit court erroneously denied
a suppression motion concerning evidence of marijuana plants seized
by sheriff's deputies from the curtilage of D's home. Martwick,
Slip op. at 1-2. The supreme court reverses. The court holds that
a curtilage determination is a question of constitutional fact
subject to a two-step standard of review: a circuit court's
historical findings of fact are reviewed under a clearly erroneous
standard, while the ultimate question of constitutional fact is
reviewed de novo. It further holds that applying this two-step
process, the five marijuana plants the
deputies initially found were outside of the curtilage of Martwick's home. Accordingly, it reverses the court of appeals' decision, which overturned Martwick's conviction. |
| County
of Jefferson v. Renz
231 Wis. 2d 293, 603 N.W.2d 541 |
Dec. 22, 1999 | 97-3512 | Probable Cause; PBT: The petitioner, Jefferson County, seeks review of a published decision of the court of appeals, County of Jefferson v. Renz, 222 Wis. 2d 424, 588 N.W.2d 267 (Ct. App. 1998), which held that a law enforcement officer must have probable cause for an arrest before asking a driver suspected of driving while intoxicated to submit to a preliminary breath test (PBT) under Wis. Stat. § 343.303 (1993-94). The court of appeals reversed the judgment of conviction against the defendant for driving while intoxicated (OWI) and with a prohibited alcohol concentration (PAC), which was entered in the circuit court for Jefferson County. The sole issue on appeal is whether a law enforcement officer is required to have probable cause for arrest before asking a suspect to submit to a PBT. The court concludes that the legislature did not intend to require an officer to have probable cause to arrest before requesting a PBT. It therefore reverses the court of appeals and remands the cause to the circuit court for reinstatement of the judgment of conviction. |
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