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Nichols v. Progressive Northern Insurance Company, 2008 WI 20
Date: 3/25/08
Case No: 2006AP364
Issue: Social Host Liability
Holding: A claim for common-law negligence cannot be permitted against social hosts, who were aware of drinking on their property but did not supply the alcohol. To allow such a claim of negligence would be an inappropriate extension of common-law liability according to public policy considerations.
The Nichols were involved in a motor vehicle accident on the night of June 5, 2004. They were struck by Beth Carr, a high school student, who was intoxicated at the time of the accident. The Nichols alleged that Carr was allowed to illegally consume alcohol on property owned by the Niesens and that the consumption of alcohol by Carr was a substantial factor in causing the accident. The Nichols did not assert that the Niesens knew of the underage drinking but rather that the Niesens were negligent because they had a duty to supervise the high school students on their property. The complaint was initially dismissed for a failure to state a claim but the Court of Appeals found that the Nichols established all four elements of a common-law negligence claim.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court accepted, without deciding, that the Court of Appeals was correct in concluding the Nicholas satisfied all four elements of common-law negligence. However, the Supreme Court concluded that dismissal was proper based solely on public policy grounds.
The six public policy factors were articulated in Stephenson v. Universal Metrics, Inc., “a claim for common-law negligence is precluded if, (1) the injury is too remote from the negligence, (2) the injury is too wholly out of proportion to the tortfeasor’s culpability, (3) in retrospect it appears too highly extraordinary that the negligence should have brought abut the harm, (4) allowing recovery would place too unreasonable a burden upon the tortfeasor, (5) allowing recovery would be too likely to open the way to fraudulent claim, and (6) allowing recovery would have no sensible or just stopping point.” Stephenson v. Universal Metrics, Inc., 2002 WI 30, ¶43, 251 Wis. 2d 171,641 N.W.2d 158. The court concluded that the sixth factor is applicable in this case and precludes liability against the Niesens. Allowing a common-law negligence claim against Niesens as social hosts would be an improper expansion of liability, specifically against property owners.
Furthermore, the court states that the decision to expand common-law negligence to cover situations like this one would be a decision for the legislature not for courts. After assessing the public policy considerations the Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals decision.
State v. Hambly, 2008 WI 10
Date: 2/07/08
Case No: 2005AP3037
Issue: Admissible inculpatory statements
Holding: Inculpatory statements made by a suspect in custody, after Miranda rights are given, are admissible if the suspect initiates the communication with a law enforcement officer and voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waives his/her right to counsel.
Officers approached Hambly to speak with him about drug transactions. Hambly refused to talk with the officers and was then placed under arrest. He requested to speak with an attorney, but soon thereafter, Hambly initiated communication with the officers and signed a Miranda waiver form. An officer then proceeded to interview Hambly for approximately an hour and Hambly admitted that he sold cocaine on several occasions. The State charged Hambly with three counts of delivering cocaine. He moved to suppress the statements made to the officers. The circuit court denied this motion after a hearing. He was found guilty on one count. Hambly appealed his conviction, alleging the circuit court erred in denying his motion to suppress the statements made to the officer. The court of appeals affirmed the order denying the suppression and affirmed the conviction.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court concluded that Hambly’s statements are admissible. Hambly invoked his Fifth Amendment Miranda right while in custody, then initiated communication with a police officer in which he voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1986).
To show that a suspect waived his/her Miranda right to counsel after invoking it, the state must meet two criteria: (1) the suspect initiated further communication exchanges or conversations with police, and (2) the suspect waived the right to counsel voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. The court determined that the officer did not engage in express questioning after Hambly invoked his Fifth Amendment Miranda right to counsel. The officer’s words and conduct towards Hambly did not constitute interrogation and did not elicit an incriminating response from Hambly. The Wisconsin Supreme Court found that Hambly willingly initiated the communication with the officers, when he sought more information about why he was under arrest. Hambly voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his right to counsel in order to talk with the officers about the drug transactions. For a waiver to be voluntarily, it must be the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than by intimidation, coercion or deception. There is no evidence, which shows Hambly was intimidated or coerced. For a waiver to be knowing and intelligent, it must be made with full awareness of the nature of the rights abandoned. Hambly reviewed and signed the Miranda waiver form before speaking with the officers showing his willingness and desire for a discussion with the officers. The inculpatory statements made by Hambly are therefore admissible.
The court is divided on whether to adopt a temporal standard to determine whether a suspect in custody has effectively invoked his/her Miranda rights. Three justices adopted the standard that a suspect may effectively invoke the Fifth Amendment Miranda right to counsel when in custody even before interrogation is imminent. The other three justices conclude it is unnecessary to determine whether the appropriate temporal standard to adopt is “anytime in custody” or the “imminent or impending interrogation” standard.