Leocal v. Ashcroft (full text)
U.S. Supreme Court
Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (2004)
Date: 11/09/04
Case No: 03-583
Holding: DUI (driving under the influence of alcohol) offenses that do not contain a mens rea or only require a showing of negligence do not qualify as a “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. §16.
Summary:
Leocal is a Haitian citizen who is a permanent resident of the U.S. He was convicted of DUI and causing serious bodily injury. An immigration judge classified Leocal’s DUI conviction as a “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. §16 and ordered Leocal’s deportation under §237(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).
Applying 18 U.S.C. §16, the court to look to the nature of the offense rather than the facts of the defendant’s crime. The Florida DUI statute that Leocal violated did not contain a mens rea requirement. 18 U.S.C. §16(a) defines a “crime of violence” as involving the “use . . . of physical force against the person or property of another.” The court explained that “use” in this context requires active employment and suggests a higher degree of intent than negligent or merely accidental conduct. Leocal’s DUI conviction did not meet this threshold of intent and therefore did not qualify as a “crime of violence” under §16(a).
18 U.S.C. §16(b) refers to a felony that “involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property may be used in the course of committing the offense.” While the definition of §16(b) is broader than §16(a), the same analysis applies. Certain offenses carry a risk that the use of force against another might be required in committing the crime. The court provided burglary as an example of an offense involving a substantial risk that force will be used against a victim in completing the crime. Additionally, like §16(a), an offense under §16(b) requires a higher mens rea than merely accidental or negligent conduct involved in a DUI offense. Finally, when Congress defined “serious criminal offense” in §101(h) of the INA, it included DUI offenses causing injury separately from “crimes of violence” defined by §16. The court explained that interpreting §16 to include DUI offenses “would leave §101(h)(3) practically devoid of significance.”